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INTRODUCTION
Recent, conflicting interpretations ot Whitehead's
metaphysics point to a serious problem in his philosophy.
problem is that of the
head 'a metaphysics.

pla~e

The

of religious experience in White-

On the one hand, there is the Christian-

Lowe-Leclero interpretation, according to which knowledge ot God
for Whitehead is primarily by way of inference from the knowledge

ot this world. 1

On the other hand, there is the Tillich-Harts•

horne interpretation, according to which knowledge of God 1s primarily by way of religious intuition and secondarily by way ot
inference.

2

These oontlioting interpretations need to be des-

cribed t'urther in order to isolate the problem ot this study.

1 William A. Christian, An Interpretation ot W~iye
head 1 s Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale-University Press;-19 9
p. 386; Viator Lowe, "The Approach to Metaphysics," !h! Relevance
ot Whitehead, ed. Leclerc (New York: Macmillan Co., 1961}
PP• 193-216; Ivor Leclerc, Whitehead's Metaphysics (New York:
Macmillan Co., 19$8) pp.

2 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1951) pp. 9, 43; Charles Hartshorne,
"Wh1 tehead' s Idea of God," The Philoaophx of Alfred North ~iye•
head, ed. P.A. Sch1lpp (NewYork: Tudor PUbliahing
I '19 1

ao.

1

2

Christian recognises 1n

11

the last Part ot Process and

Reality, in the final chapters ot Adventures S/l, Ideas, and elsewhere that he ,L\ilhitehea.9] speaks ot a 'Harmony ot Harmonies'
which is both the basis or morality and the objeot or religious
experience."3

Just as this religious experience is relevant to

man's seeking or the practical good in morality and religion, so
also it is relevant to man's seeking or the speculative good in
metaphysioa.

Christian suggests that Whitehead's speculative

philosophy is not pure speculative
from a speculative interest.

philoaop~y

proceeding only

A religious interest has a basic

influence on Whitehead's attempt to do speculative philosophy.4
This interest presupposes the existence ot the proper object ot
man's worship.

For the religious interest leads to asking the

basic religious question in a form such as this:

"What ia it

that rightly claims worship? ,.5
Although the religious experience presupposes the existence or the proper objeot of man's worship, Christian argues that

538; Hartshorne,

11

Ideal K.."lowledge Defines Reality: What Was
True 'Idealism'"• Journal ot Philosophy XLIII, no. 21 (Oot. 10,
p.

1946) p.

4.

~

.3 William A. Christian, "some Uses of Reason, 11 The
Relevance ~ Whitehead, ed. Leclerc, p. 85; Whitehead, Adventures
S!l, Ideas (New York: Macmillan Oo., 1961) p. 367. (Hereafter referred to as!,!.)

4 Obristian, loo. cit.

5

Christian, ..!Qig., p. 86.

.3
knowledge of God's existence 1s a oonolusion of Whitehead's meta•
physics and not a fundamental point of departure.

Christian in-

terprets Whitehead's statement that God is the ultimate irration•
ality in Soienoe and .!Ul!. Modern World to mean that "we have no
pure and self-evident principles trom which the existence of
God • • • could be deduced.

Our belief in the existence of God

is irrational only in the weak sense that it is logically based
on the reality of the given temporal world, accepted as a fact.6
Even though Christian holds that the categories of explanation,
suoh as the ontological principle are logically ineffective without Whitehead's notion of God, Christian argues that the concept

ot God is a derivative notion in Whitehead's metaphysios.7

Con-

sequently, it is Christian's view that religious experience is
not relevant to the truth of Whitehead's categories of explanation such as the ontological pr1no1ple.
Whitehead's ontological principle is his version of the
principle of suff1o1ent reason.

Lowe's interpretation of this

principle agrees with Christian•s interpretation:

6 William A. Christian, AB InterRret!tion ,2!: Whitehead 'a Metaphxaica, p. 386; ot. Whitehead, Solenoe and tge Modern
World (New York: Macmillan Co., 1926) p. 2~7. (Hereafter
referred to as~.)

7 Christian, "Some Uses of Reason," .2.R• cit., p. 85;
ct. Ohristian, "The Concept of God as a Derivative NOtion,"
Process and Divinity, eds. Reese and Freeman (Lasalle: Open
Court, i9'b'Q:) pp. 181-203.

4
"'l'bat the universe, or being, is intelligible, is often said
to be an indispensable and undeniable premise ot metaphysics.
But Whitehead has shown how the matter can and should be
conceived:
·
'That we fail to find in experience any elements
intrinsically incapable of exhibition as examples ot
general theory, is the hope of rationalism. This hope
is not a metaphysical premise. It is the faith which
forms the m.otive for the pursuit of all soienoes alike,
including metaphysioa.
In so tar as metaphysics enables us to apprehen9
the rationality of things, the ola.im is justified.'"
Leclerc's comment en this text is similar to Lowe's.
fhe belief and hope that the world is intelligible is not a meta-

physical premise which discloses anything about the metaphysical
truths of the universe.

Rather this hope is an ideal which is

seeking satiafaction, since it is intrinsically inherent 1n rationalism as suoh.

This ideal is inherent in any attempt to find

rational explanation.

Consequently, a rational attempt to deny

this ideal of seeking rational explanation is selt-contradiotory.9
On the one hand, then, the Ohristian-Lowe-Leclerc 1n-

terpreta t1on is that Whitehead establiahes his point of departure
in metaph7sios, his idaal that the world is intelligible and his
oategorie9 of explanation such as the ontologioal principle,

without any appeal to religious experience.

But on the other hand,

8 Viotor Lowe, "The Approaoh to Metaphysics," !h! Relevance g! Whitehead, ed. Leclerc, P• 210; ct. Whitehead, Prooeaa
~ Reality (New York: Macmillan Oo., 1930) p. 67.
(Hereafter
referred to as PR.)

-

9 Ivor Leclerc, Whitehead's Metaphysics, p. 37.

the Tillich-Hartshorne interpretation is that Whitehead's tundamental point or departure in metaphysics is his appeal to reli•
gious experience.
Tillich holds that the fundamental commitment which
directs Whitehead's philosophical approach is a type of mystical

or

or religious experience, namely, the awareness
processes.

value-producing

This perception and conception of reality is based on

an iminediate experience

or

something ultimate in value and being

ot which man can become aware intuitively.

16

Although Tillich

does not specify the texts ot Whitehead in which this intuitive
awareness 11 described, he is probably referring to the Modes g.£
Thought description ot the sense of Deity.

For Shahan interprets

this book as having "numerous references • • • to an ultimate
unity in the universe which can be experienced objectively and
which is the tinal basis ot 'importance• and •aigniticance.• • • •
The totality is desoribed as objectively experienced in a direct
fashion. nll
Hartshorne 1 s interpretation agrees with Tillioh's interpretation.

Hartshorne argues that the sense

or

Deity is related

to the very possibility ot man's knowledge ot objeotive truth,

10 Paul Tillich, Systematic !heology, Vol. I (Ohioago:
University of Chicago Preas, 19Sl) pp. 9, 43.
(New York:

11 Ewing P. Shahan, Whitehead's Theor~ of Experience
Columbia University, l9SO) pp. 127-l

a:-

6

including metaphysical truth. 12

In Whitehead's type ot metaphys-

ics, trillich points out, "God !!. .lh!. Ereaupposition .2! the question or

~.

or as Augustine argues more apeo1f1cally, Ver1taa ia

presupposed in every philosophical argument; and veritas is
God.nl3

The Tillich-Hartshorne interpretation, then, is that man

implicitly knows that God is, or in other words, man is immediately aware ot God as Truth Itself, in any attempt ot speculative
reason to state an objectively true statement.

This implicit

awarenesssot God becomes explloit in religious experience.

Conse-

quently, Whitehead's point or departure in metaphysiaa cannot be
described accurately without taking aooount of his description ot
religious experience and its relevance to the presuppositions ot
metaphysics.
The oont'licting interpretations of Tillich-Hartshorne
and Ohriatian-Lowe-Leclero on the fundamental presuppositions

ot

Whitehead's metaphysics and the relevance or religious experience
to them raise a serious problem in the understanding ot Whitehead's metaphysics.

This study proposes to examine the serious

problem ot the relevance ot Whitehead's description ot religious
experience as the sense ot Deity to the fundamental presupposi-

12 Charles Hartshorne, "Whitehead •a Idea ot God," .2.E.•
cit., P• 538; Hartshorne, "Ideal Knowledge Defines Reality: What
Was True in 1 Idealism, 1 " .22• ~., pp. 573·582.

13 Paul Tillich, "The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion," Union Seminary Quarterlz Review, I, no. 4 (May, 1946) p. 4.

7
tions of his metaphysics.

Lowe and Leclerc have indicated that

the ontologioal principle and the idE'lal or rationalism, namely,
that the world is intelligible, are closely oonneoted fundamental
presuppositions of Whitehead's metaphysios.

Assuming what chap-

ter four will show, namely, that the ontological principle is
only a restatement of the ideal of rationalism, this study will
ex.amine the relevance of the sense of Deity to the ideal of rationalism, that is, to the function of speculative reason.

For

the function of speculative reason is to attain the ideal ot
rationalism, a complete meta.physics, a complete understanding of
the general, rational principles which all particular facts exemplify.14

The purpose of chapter one is to discuss Whitehead'•
definition of' apeoulative philosophy and its method as the definition of the function of speculative reason.

Chapter two shows

that the function of speculative reason is defended by rational
religion and the religious intuition as the sense of' Deity.

Chap-

ter three shows that the sense of' Deity and other defenses of the
function of' speculative reason mutually supplement eaoh other.
It will be pointed out that thE>se various defenses need to be fulfilled by the best defense possible, namely, by the suooesst'ul
working out of a speculative understanding of reality,

Press,

14

Whitehead, The Flmotion of Reason (Boston:
(Hereafter referred to as,!!!!.)

1958) p. 65.

For

Beacon

8
Whitehead's method of the working hypothesis demands that the
function of speculative reason needs to be aohieved 1i11th some
suooess: otherwise it would be a worthless ideal for man's civilized life.

However due to the imperfections of metaphysical

systems, it is possible for man to lose hope in this ideal.
Whit~head's

sequently,

Con-

appeal to the sense of Deity is important

for man to continue to have faith in the ideal of speculative
reason.

Chapt~r

four sums up these conclusions ot the previous

chapters and considers two new problems related to thia study.
In th1.s study ot the relevance of the a.esthet1o-rel1g1ous sense
i~portant

or

Deity to the function of speculative reason, it is

to point out that although Whitehead began his academic

career as a teacher

or

philosophy at age 63, he was always in-

terested in the relevance of aesthetic and religious considera-

tions to man's life.

-

The reader of chapter five of _.....__......,_
Science and

!,h! Modern World, "The Romantic Reaction, n recognizes the significant influence which the Romantic poets had upon Whitehead's metaphysioa.15

Whitehead's interest in Wordsworth and Shelley was
acquired in preparatory schoo1. 16 He himself points out, "My

15

~- pp. 109-138.

Autobiographical Notes,'' .Ih! Phllosoph:r
Alfred North Whitehead, ed. P.A. Sch11pp, p. 6. This article
gives a brief autobiography of Whitehead.

9.!

16

'Whitehe,1d,

0

9
writings on philosophy were all after I oame to this country
[United StateiJ; but the ideas had been germinating in me for the
better part of a life time.

Some of them I had had when I was at
school before ever I went up to the university." 17
Whitehead's marriage to Evelyn Willoughby Wade empha·

sized what he had learned from the nature-poetry of the romantic
revival.

"Her vivid life has taught me that beauty, moral and

aesthetic, is the aim of existence; and that kindness, and love,
and artistic aat1sfe.ct1on are among its modes of attainment. 1118
Whitehead accepted the Romantic poets' "protest against the ex1
clusion of value from the essence of matter of taot." ' Chapter

two will especially examine how the sense ot Deity establishes
for Whitetead that vslue is of the eseenoe of matter of fact.

In

do!r..g that, the sense of Deity helps to establish the fundamental
presc.pposit1on of Whitehead's metaphysios, the function ot specu-

la.tive reason.

(Boston:

17 Lucien Price, Dialogues of Alfred North Wh1. tehead
Little, Brown, and Oo., 1954-Y-PP• 326-327.
18

Whitehead, "Autobiographical Notes," .2.E• ..9.!!·• p. 8.

19

~, p.

138.

OHAP.rER I

SPEOULATIVE. PHILOSOPHY AS TEE FUNCTION OP SPEOULATIVE REASON
The purpose of this chapter is to idtntify and define
speculative ph1loaoph7 as the function of speculative reason.

The

exposition begins with a discussion of evolution and the functions
of both speculative and practical reason.

Thia consideration of

evolution and reason offers a preliminary identification of the
function of apeoulative reason.

Then the chapter examines some

ot the history of speculative reason in order to give an exact
definition of speculative philosophy and its method.

Speculative

philosophy is the discipline in which Whitehead attempts to fulfill the function ot speculative reason.
Before the exposition ot Whitehead's concept of the
function of speculative reason, the difficulty should be raised
of his presupposing his speculative understanding of evolution in
order to explain the function of speculative reason.

The diffi-

culty is whether or not Whitehead begs the question sinoe reason
will be that wh1oh discovers this view ot evolution.

Whitehead

answers this difficulty by arguing that there is no way to begin
in philosophy other than "to starat somewhere for purposes ot d1s-

l0

ll

courS«h

But the philoaophp,_., aa he argues t'J:lom hia pHmi.e••t has

already marked down every word and phrase in them a.a topics tor

one wa:s of avoiding th• d1tfioult7 of begging
the question in underatanUng the function ot apeculat1ve reason

.ruture enqui17.n1

is to make a •tart somewheH, not forgetting that

t;h.e

starting

point needs to be ra....xam.tned. Another aspect of Whitehead••

avoiding this d1ttioul.t7 ia that he will appeal to tlaahea ot in•
sight• to the intuitioa and. underatand.ing ot aelt•eTid.-e.2
mrhe atteapt of

U'Q'

phtloaophio discourse should M to pi-oduo•

aelt•ev14onee."3 The philosopher mat begin aomewheM but mu.at
not a.aaume that where he begins :La a .tinalit7 neveit to be qUe••
tioned.

Wh1 tehead. as.sens thia point beoauae ot an insight into

the nature ot human

lanauas••

the inaight that

man•s experi$lld

ot language is not a perteot lmowledge but bu tr1at'lJ' obaolll'-1ti••
connected with it.4 In t171ng to understand. the tu.notion of
speculative reaaon Whitehead will appeal to tlaahea ot insight in
order to avoid an7 begging ot the question.

ao.,

1

Whi tehead.1 Mod.ea _2'

19)8) P• 23.
2

i:R.. P• 6.

3 5- P• 67.

4 !l.t

P• 23.$.

D\O!Elt

(lfev~lU

Haold.llD

12

A.

:iieeping in mind. that a stating point neede to be

H•

examined, Whitehead. otter>s "a prelWn&J.7 definition ot the tu.no•
ti.on ot Reason, a de.tinition to be illuatr>ated, distorted., and
enlai-ged• • • •

!b!, :tunctiga ot Reuon ia

.!St.

;eror.iot~ .~

a.rt ot

lite."$ Ile explains thia definition b7 a diacuaaion ot the evolutionist doctrine ot tl'M survival of the .f'itteat.

Theite are two

limitations ot the doctrine ot the aUl"W'ival of the titteat.

The

first ia that although the doctrine ma.y explain wl'J1' differing

speoiea a.rise, it doea not

apl)6U

able to explain the origin ot

living matter.

For living matter> 1a compapativel7 deficient in

survit"d value.

Inorganlt things pera1et to?! S"•t lengthe ot

ti.me whereu orgnnio things hal"dl.7 pe:.-sist at all.

A rook

~

vivea for eight huntb-e4 million yeaa whereas the limit tor a
tree is about a thouaan4 Y'G&re, tor a man a.bout a hundred yeua,
tor

a dog about twelve 7eara, to'I!' an inaect about one yea.
1'he p:ttoblem tor the

theo~

ot evolution ia to explain

how complex organism with such detioient survival power ever

evolve4.

The

doctrine

or

the survival of the t'i·ctest would ex•

plain veey well WJ' l'Ooka have survived but not wh7 orgeaic thi
have arisen trom inorganic matter.6 The second limitation is tha

4•
PP• 4•S.

$ PR, P•

6

13
this doctrine cannot explain why the trend of evolution hae been
upwards.

The upward trend is not explained by any doctrine of

adaptation to the environment or ot the survival ot the fittest.
The taot is not simply that living things have adapted to their e
environments but just as

muo~

that living things have adapted

their environments to themselves.

The more complex forms ot lite

are actively modifying their environment, and it is very signitioant that man actively attacks his environment.7
Whitehead 1a neady to develop his preliminary definition

ot the function ot reason:
I now state the thesis that the explanation of th1a
active attack on the environment is a three-told urge:
(1) to live, (11) to live well, (111) to live better. In
tact the art of lite is first to be alive, seoondlz to be
alive in a satiatactor7 way, and thirdlx to acquire an in•
crease in satisfaction. It is at this point ot our argument that we recur to the function of Reason, namely the
promotion of the art ot life. The primary function ot
Reason is the direction of the attack on the environment.a

Hia thesis ot a three-told urge in life is an understanding which requires that reason be "a factor in experience
which directs and orit1c1ses the urge towards the attainment of an
end realized in imagination but not in tact."9

Whitehead is as-

serting that final causality is a partial explanation of lite.

7 .l!l,

pp.

a

p.

!ft,

7-8.

a.

9 .!!!· p. 8.

14
Final causality, the grasping of a potential end as the formal
cause of a living thing, requires that the living thing have a
mental, non-physical factor which grasps the unaotualized, the
non-physical.

Reason or the mental factor of a living thing is

the source of a three-fold urge involved in the art of life:
urge to live, to live well, and to live better.

the

The art of life

requires a three-told urge rather than simply the urge to live,
since otherwise the facts of emergent evolution would be unintelligible.

The upward trend of emergent evolution requires more

than just the urge to live and more than just the urge to live
well, in order to continue evolutionary development.

This three-

fold urge of the art of life does not involve three different
types of causality but rather ls only one type, final causality.
The final causality involved in the three-fold urge is the grasping of novel potential ends.
Man's reason has developed out of this three-fold urge
as life in its mental and physical aspects has become more complex.

The fundamental base of the activity of reason is purposive

seeking of novel potential ends.

Whitehead points out that the

appetitlon of novel ends is anarchic in seeking to live well by
perfecting the living thing and in seeking to live in a better
way by changing the established order in an upward trend.

The

multiple species and mutations that have been lost in the struggle
for existence in evolution bear witness to the anarchic novelties

15
introduced by the mental factor in living things.

The novel ends

cannot be completely anarchic since sheer anarchy means oomplete
nothingness.

For the appet1t1on of sheer anarchy by the mental

faotor in a living thing would mean the mental appetition of such
impossibilities as a square-cirole.10

Man's reason is the de-

veloped mental factor which seeks to live, to live well, and to
live better.

Man's reason seeks to live well by fulfilling in an

orderly and satisfactory way the novelties projected by mentality.

Man's reason seeks to live better by evaluating and ordering

the projected novelties.

In man's reason mentality has become

self-regulative.

By evaluating the purposes of mentality, reason
introcuces a higher appetition into man's life. 11 Whitehead in-

siats upon final causality as a fundamental aspect of reason:

Provided that we e.dmit the category of final causation,
we can consistently define the primary function of Reason.
This function is to constitute, emphasize, and criticize
the final causes and strength of aims directed towards them,
• • • Apart from this primary function the very exist•
ence of Reason is purposeless and its origination is inexplicable. In the course of evolution why should the trend
have arrived at mankind, if his activities of Reason remain
without influence on his bodily aotlons. It is well to be
quite clear on the p91nt that Rea.son is inexplicable 1.f purpose be 1neffeotive.i2
This theory defines the primary function of reason as

10

E,!,

11

!,!, p. 34..

12

-FR,

i:p.

33-34.

pp. 26-Zf'.

16
practical:

(1) to constitute final causes, ths.t is, to live; (ii)

to emphasize final causes, that is, to l!ve well; and (111) to
criticize final causes, that is, to live

b~tter.

The function ot

practical reason is to achieve a pu.rpose exterior to the satistao•
tion of reason itself.

In order to achieve this

reason

p~rpose,

elaborates a methodology, a way of doing something.

When the

purnose is aoh1!"'vt::•d, praetieal reason is fulfilled and satia.fied.13
~he

operation of practical reason may be compared to

and understood as an aspect of the evolutionary process.

The

discovery of a methodology tr.at solves a problem for man is quite
similar to the discovery of a way to live for a species.

'!'he use

of this methodology solves the problem for man just as the use ot
a way to live solves s difficulty in the environment for a

speoies.

The successful use of the methodology or way to live

continues until fatigue or a new problem arises.

At this point

man or some species may refuse to overcome the fatigue or new
problem and simply keep to the old way or doing things.

But man

or some

speci~s

may attempt to overcome the fatigue or problem b7

sP-~king

from the background of experience a novel potential form,

a new methodology or way of living.

If the new methodology is

successful, the problem is overcome for man or some species; and

13

f!!,

p. 3'1 ~
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the upward trend of evolution continues.

It the new method is un·

successful, the problem is not solved; and a raoe of men or some
species may die out.

The discovery of a methodology by practical

reason is in its essence the discovery of a way to live

the
mental factor of a reality selecting a novel potential goai. 14
~y

Although the primary function of Reason is practical,
namely, to constitute, emphasize, and criticize final

oa~ses

and

the strength of aims towards them, reason also has a speculative

function.

In its apeculative f'unotion, reason is not subordinate(

to any purpose

othe~

than its own purpose of understanding every-

thing in terms of principles intelligible to itself.

3paoulative

reason ia the result of a diaintereated curiosity in the intell1gibili ty of the world, the result of an
world is intelligible.

ultima~e

.faith that the

Reason fulfills its speculative function

and gains its sole satisfaction when it understands all partioular facts in te.rn1s or general principles of reason. 1 5
Whitehead suggests that this interest in the relation
partioular faots to general principles is an aspect

or

the charac-

ter of the modern mind as it has been influenced by science and
Christianity.

In previous epochs, geniuses such a9 Aristotle,

Archimedes, and Roger 3aoon must have had this belief that every

14 !fi,

pp. 18-19.,

15 ,E!!, p. 37'!"38.

or
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particular tact oan be conceived as an exemplification ot general
pr1no1plea.

In previous epochs there have always been practical

men interested in particular tacts and men ot philosophic temper
interested in general principles, but the uniting of these two
interests has only been sporadic.

Today, however, it is a common

belief of the modern mind that the two intereata muat be united.16
This belief is due to the great auocess ot science.
Whitehead tinda two sources tor the great success ot
science in modern Europe since the time ot Galileo.

The f1rat

source is the riae ot Naturalism in the Renaissance in which
there ia an interest in natural occurrences and objects for their
own sakes.

Whitehead also points out the importance of the tech-

nology of the Benedictine monasteries in agriculture; thia technology kept the medieval mind in contact with particular tact.17

IWhitehead remarks that the emphaa1a on natural things in the
Renaissance was due to an aesthetic interest.

"The whole atmos-

phere of every art exhibited a direct joy in the apprehension of

the things which 11• around ua.nl8

The second source tor the

•ucceaa of aoienoe comes trom Christian faith in God aa influenced
~y

Greek philosoph7 in the Medieval Scholaat1c1am.

3-4, 1.

16

~.

pp.

17

.fil1M,

pp. 22-23.

18 ..1.t:nf,

p.- 23.

The medieval

19
insistence on the rationality of God whose providence governed
every particular faot helped to impress on the modern mind an
instinctive belief in an intelligible order in nature.

The

Asiatic conception of God where God is either too arbitrary or
too impersonal has not created such an instinctive belief • 1 9
Whitehead points out the importance of the instinctive
quality of the belief in an order of nature.

So long as men's

activities in speculative thought are controlled by this settled
instinct, it does not matter what men may say in words.

Words of

disbelief in the order of nature may ultimately destroy man's
belief in the function of speculative reason.

But until this

destruction has occurred, words do not oount.

These considera-

tions are important with respect to the history of scientific
thought.

For since the time of Hume, the fashionable soientifio

philosophy has been to deny the rationality of so1enoe.

Hume's

denial of any possible knowledge of a necessary oonneotion between a oauae and its effect should give the result that soienoe
oan only establish arbitrary connections between causes and effects.

But implicitly scientists have ignored Humeta explicit

rejection ot the cause-effect oonnection and have followed Hume's
instinctive belief that cause and etteot are necessarily conneo-

19

~.

pp. 18'-19.

20

ted, that there is an order of nature. 20

The understanding

or

al

the particular facts of nature in terms of general principles wil
disclose the order of nature and thereby fulfill the function of
speculative reason.

B.

----

The Relevanoe of Speculative Reason's History for ,!!! Exact
~efinit!on of Its Function and Method
............-..;;;;.-......;;;..;;;.......

- -

-

The preliminary identification of speculative reason's
function given in the discussion of evolution and reason needs to

be clarified.

An examination of the history of speculative reaso

will be offered in order to give an exact definition of the disci
pline, speculative philosophy, and its method for fulfilling the
function of speculative reason.
When speculative reason first emerged as a distinguishable force in the life of man, it came in the form of sporadic
inspirations.

Prophets and seers spoke their inspirations ot

moral insight and religious salvation.

These speculative insights

were relevant to the traditional ways and yet novel, transcending
the old ways.

However, the difficulty was and has always been

that the world's experience of professed seers has been mostly
untortunate.

Among those claiming to be prophets, there are the

insincere, the presumptuous, the ignorant, the incompetent, and

20 ~, ~ •. 5. . 6; or. David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, sections v and vr. ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902) pp. 40-59.
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the unbalanced.

Speculative reason needed some method ot testing

its sporadic inspirationa.21
Then the Greeks "discovered the almost incredible secret
that the speculative Reason was itself subject to orderly method.
They robbed it of its anarchio character without destroying its
function ot reaching beyond set bounds."22

It 1a the function ot

speculative reason to understand all methods aa coordinated in a
nature of things only to be grasped by transcending all method,
that is, by piercing into the ultimate reasons beyond limited
reasons.

But in transcending all the auccess.f'ul methodologies ot

practical reason and the mathematical and scient1t1o methods ot
speculative reason, metaphysical speculative reason must be bound
by some orderly method; otherwise its results will be untruatwor•
thy.

The Greeks replaced inspirations ot reason with speculative

reason.

They discovered how speculative reason is to be bounded

by method even while it tranaoenda the limitation of any of its

own methods and methodologies.23
Whitehead explains the Greek discovery that speculative <·
reason is itself subject to orderly method:

21

!'!!,, pp. 66-67.

!fi,
23 !!!.

22

pp. 66-67.
pp. 65-67, 82.

22

The Greeks invented logic in the broadest sense or that
term-•the logic of discovery. The Greek logic as finally
perfected by the experience or centuries provides n set of
criteria to whioh the content of a belief should be subjected. These are:
(1) Conformity to intuitive experience:
(11) Clarity or propositional content:
(111) Internal Logical consistency:
(iv) External Logical oonsistenoy:
(v) Status of a Logical scheme with,
(a) widespread conformity to experience,
(b) no diaoordanoe with experience,
(o) coherence among its oategoreal notions,
(d) methodological oonsequences.24
As perfected by the experience of centuries of mathema tios, science, and philosophy, the Greek logic of discovery
provides a set of oriteria by which any speculative understanding
of reality should be tested, whether the understanding be metaphysical or non-metaphysical.

It is a miaoonoept1on to hold that

the criteria are easy to use.

The Greeks and the medievals

thought that clear and distinot premises which conformed to ex•
per1enoe were very easily known.

Accordingly, they were careless

in their evaluation of premises and devoted to the elaboration of
deductive systems.

The philosophers of Modern Europe trom 1600

to 1900 have also assumed that olear and distinct premises which
conform to experience are easily known.

In wbitehead•s view, the

first two criteria, (1) conformity to intuitive experience and
(11) clarity of propositional content, are extremely difficult to

24 !!!!, pp. 67 -68.

23
In fact there are difficulties with the fulfilment ot

fulfill.

all five criteria.25

-The FirstTheCriterion
first criterion 1e that a belief should have oonformity to intuitive experience.
the first criterion is
m~nts

in experience.

t~at

One difficulty with fulfilling

there are always interpretative ele-

The Conceptual Order of experience, me.n's

general way of conceiving the universe, controls to a great extent
the interpretation of the Observational Order of experience, his
direct, immediate discriminations of particular observations.
Some theory ot reality, often unexpressed, is present in the observation ot reality, dictating what method is to be used 1n looking for evidence and how it is to be interpreted.
novel observations are rare ooourrenoes.

Unantio~pated,

Beoauae.. such

obser~4:iO';;

tions are unexpeoted, their sign1fioanoe may be lost if there is
no soheme

or

ideas to interpret t~em.26

A seoond difficulty with fulfilling the first criterion
is the obscurity and variety of experience.

The conventional

view of experience is tbat conscious experience is a clear-out
knowledge ot clear-cut items with clear-cut oonneotions with eaoh
other.

However, the evidence is against suoh an eq11ating of ex-

25 A!, pp. 198, 283-284; !!1 p. 68.
26

_m,

p. 12.

perience with clarity of knowledge.

The olarity cannot be sepa-

rated from the vagueness of experience.

There is a focus of

attention bringing to clear light a few items, having vague interoonnectiona with dimly apprehended items.

Besides this ambiguous

character or an immediate moment or experience, the moments differ
among themselvea in their meaning and importance tor a man.

He

can be alert, drowsy, excited, contemplative: man•s variety of
phases ia 1nfinite.Z7
A third difficulty with fulfilling the first or1ter1on
is the f1n1tenesa of human intuition.

Oonaciousnesa is able to

know the world only through a selective emphasis from the totality

ot experience.28 Any intuition is an abstraction, a selection,
which haa assumed 1ta clarity and self-evidence by neglecting
other faoeta of experience.

These other facets of experience may

have important modifications upon the self-evidence or the original 1ntu1t1on.29

Since man's finite understanding is unable to

grasp the totality of finite perapeotives in the universe by one
aet ot understanding, no intuition of experience claiming to be
self-evident is irreformably true.30

Z7 ,!!, pp. 78-79.
28 !fi, p. 22.
29 .!!'ll pp.
30

~. p.

143-144.
58.

Intuition of self-evidence on an abstract level such
ma.thematics is absolutely true.

a1

But once that level is deserted,

fundamental transformations ot meaning can ooour in the relating
to the rest of exper1enoe.31

There is a sense of completion in

an act of intuition, but the completion is not final.

For the

material understood presupposes an undefined environment which
is in process of change.
static state of mind but

Hence understanding is never a finished,
alway~

bears the character ot a process

of penetrating, incomplete and partia1.32

There are two modes of understanding a reality in pro-

cess:

!!!!

internal understanding and externa.l understangins.

Inter-

underatand1BS conceives the reality as the unified outcome

1ts composite factors.

or

The knowledge of the raotors in their in-

ter-relationship makes evident why the thins is what it is,.a unified outoome.

An1 reality so understood is to be viewed aa an

outcome in the strict sense of being a product or the interweaving

ot ita composite taotora.33

There is no such thing tor Whitehead

as the internal understanding or an abstract, unchanging tautology.
Tautology as a prevalent modern doctrine holds that •two-t1mesthree' is the same thing as 'six' and that, consequently, no

31 !!111 p. 78.
32 MT, p. 60.
33

~. p.

63.

new truth is arrived at in relating the two phrases in an identity.

Whitehead contends that suoh a sentenoe considers a prooeaa

and its resulting outcome.

The phrase 'two-times-three• indicate

a torm of fluent process, and

of its resulting outcome.

1 s1x 1

indicates a obaraoterization

Since there is no such entity as a

mere static number, that is to say, since there are only numbers
playing their parts in various processes in reality, it is not
true that the process of fusing two groups of three necessarily
issues in a group of six.

It 1a not true that the process ot

fusing two groups of three drops of water necessarily issues in
one group of six drops of water; one drop could be the result or
more than six could be the result.

Internal

unde~standJgg

does

oocur but does not result in mere tautologies.34
Internal understandi!!g leads into external understanding.

This second mode of understanding "is to treat the thing as

a unity, whether or not it be capable of analysis, and to obtain
evidence as to its capacity for affecting the environment.•35
Since the unified outoome of the interweaving of a group ot facts
can itself become a factor in the realities which it oan causally
affect, internal understanding does not suffice for a csomplete
understanding of the reality in question.

34 ,m:,
35 !2!,

pp/.124-125, 127-128.
p. 63.

When this reality as a
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unified outcome or faotors beoomes itself a factor in another
reality, another act of internal understanding is needed in order
to grasp how the first reality becomes a factor in the unified
outoome of the seaond reality.

Aooordingly, internal and external

understanding presuppose each other.

The former mode conceives

the thing as an outcome of its causal, composite factors, and the
second mode oonoe1ves the thing as becoming a causal factor in
the composition ot other realities.36
These reflections on 1nte:rnal and external understanding suggest another difficulty oonoerning the fulfilment of the
first criterion that a belier should have conformity to intuitive
experience.

Since nothing is finally understood until its refer-

ence to process have been made evident, the truths that apply to
an individual reality in process must apply to it as an individual
in process, or else the truths are without meaning.

The problem

is how truth ean be general, applying to all ind1•1duala in
process, and at the same time unique, applying to

.aob

individual

in process as that individual ia.

Whitehead's answer to this

difficulty ia the use or analogy.

Por example, it ms.y be possible

to compare two ultimate units of reality in the following way:
unity 'A' is different from unity 'B' ainoe the one is not the
other; yet the unities are similar since both are the unified

B6 J!l, p. 63.
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outcomes of their composite factors.

In seeking the general

rational prinoiples that all ultimate real1t1cn exemplify, the
procedure of rationalism is the discussion of analogy, the discovery of identities (similarities) amid diversity.
that the ultimate realities such as 'A' and

1

Por to state

B' are unities is to

state a general principle applying to all ultimRte realities and
at the same time to state a truth applying analogously to each

different ultimate reality.

~he

limitation ot rationalism is

that the diversity of things makes it difficult to discover identities amid diversity 1n intuitive experience.37

The Second Criterion
The second criterion by which a belief should be tested
!s the clarity of its propositional content.

It ia Whitehead's

view that this criterion is an ideal which man never fulfills
completely.

In the first plaoe, language never fully expresses

intuition; man's understanding of experience needs more than the
ordinary usages of words.3

8 In this sense, philosophy and poetry

are similar, explains Whitehead:

11

•••

philosophy is mystical.

For mysticism is direct insight into depths as yet unspoken.
the purpose of philosophy is to rationalize mysticism:

37

.!:!£.,

pP. 133-134.

38

_,
Mr

p. 68; PR, op. 17-20.

not by

But
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explaining it away, but by the introduction of novel verbal oharaoter1zat1ons, rationally coordinated."39

Because language never

fully expresses intuition, the P'allacy of the Perfect Dictionary
roust be avoided.

This is the belief "that n'Ankind baa conscious ..

ly entertained all the tundaroental ideas which are applicable to
its exper1enoe.

Further it is held that human language, in single

words or in phrases, explicitly expresses these ideaa."4o
accord with these refleotions, Whitehead maintains that the

In
ex~~

preasion of an intuition in a proposition does not yield perfect
clarity.
Another difficulty with the fulfilment of the criterion
of clarity of propositional content is that "apart from a com-

plete metaphysical understanding of the universe, it is very ditfioult to understand any proposition olearly and distinctly, so
tar as concerns the analysis of 'its oomponent elementa."41
a

proposition

ha.a

Since

meaning about a reality interconnected with the

universe, the proposition cannot be perfectly clear and distinct
unless this background is completely understood in its important
elements, that ia, in its metaphysical ele.ments.42

'39

MT, P• 23S.

}+O'

.!:«, P• 235 •

41 ..m

p. 68 •

42 -PR,

pp. 16-17.

Human language
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obscures the conneot1ona of things since "single words, each with
its diotionary meaning, and single sentences, each bounded by full
stops, suggest the possibility of complete abstraction from any
env1ronment.tt43
However, suoh a suggestion is erroneous.

Any reality

in the universe essentially presupposes in its reality oonnectiona

with the other realities in the universe.

Internal undet§tandil}Ft

should be used to conceptualize how the universe's realitiee are
faotors in the unified outcome of a given :reality, and external
understanding should be used to conceptualize how this given reality can causally affect the universe.

Sinoe any proposition

about a reality presupposes perfeot internal and external understanding, the proposition is never

p~rfeetly

understood.

For

perfect internal and external understanding are ideals that man's
finite intelligence can only strive to attain.44

__

-The Third and Fourth Criteria
............................
......,._._..

The third and fourth criteria tor testing the content ot
a belief are internal logiosl oonsistenoy and external logioal
consiateno7.

The dittioulty with fult1111ng these criteria fol-

lows from the reflections about the ambiguity

43

11!',, P• 90.

44

Hr, pp. 12-13, 90-91.

or

the propositional
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content.

If the analysis of a proposition always leaves some am-

bigU1ty of meaning in rete:renoe to the rest of the universe, it
is always possible that the propos1 ticn 1s el ther not self-consis-

tent or not externally consistent with other propositions already
accepted as true.45
If the first two or1 ter1a, con.f :.:-rmi ty to 1ntu1 ti ve ex-

perience and clarity of propositional content, ·were capable of
easy deternination, the remaining criteria would not be needed.

Also if the first four criteria aould be definitely f llfilled,
1

then the fifth criterion would not be needed.

Accordingly, the

fifth ori terion is needed to make up for the difficulties,dn ful-

filling the first four oriteria.46

!h.!. Fifth Criterion
The fifth criterion is a belief should fit into the
status of a logical scheme with (a) widespread oonforrnity to experience, (b) no discordance with experience, (c) coherence among
its categoreal notions, and (d) methodological oonaequencea.

This

or1ter1on helpa to remedy the diffioult1e.a involved in fulfilling
the first four criteria.
A scheme

4S ll!1
46

or

ideas stated in propositions which are 'log-

P• 69.

lj!, p. 69.
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1oal' helps the fulfilment of the third and fourth criteria of internal and external logical consistency.

For by a 'logical

scheme' of ideas, Whitehead means that the propositions are logically consistent, that is, that they lack contradiction internally
and externally, that the general ideas are defined in technical
terms, and that the scheme ot propositions is in aooord with the
principles or logical 1nferenoe.47
A logical scheme ot ideas with 'coherence among its
oategoreal notions' also helpa to fulfill the third and fourth
criteria.

"'Ooherenoe,' as here employed, means that the funda-

mental ideas, in terms of which the scheme is developed, presuppos4
eaoh other so that in isolation they are meaningless."48

The

essential interconnectedness or realities in prooess in the

uni~

verse requires that the fundamental notions about these interconnected realities be themselves interconnected,

No idea about the

essential interdonnectedness ot realities in process oan apply to
the world if it is isolated from other ideaa.49

Such isolation

is incoherence, the arbitrary disconnection of first prinoiples.50
No rational defense can be given for incoherence.

47 _E!!, p. 5.
48 !!!, p. 5.
49 Leclerc, Whitehead's Meta2hiaios,
50 J!, p. 9.

p.

For a rational

37.

explanation cannot make coherent or connected that which is supposedly absolutely inooherent, absolutely disconnected, absolutely
isolated.

Incoherence is a form of 1rrat1onal1sm; consequently,

Whitehead's rationalism rejects incoherence in his attempt to discover the general rational (coherently connected) principles that
all particular actualities exemplify.

The acceptance of the func-

tion ot speculative reason is simultaneously the aooeptanoe ot
herence, the rejeotion of incoherence.

co-

Therefore, the construc-

tion of a logical scheme of ideas with •coherence among its categoreal notions' should help to fulfill the third and fourth .2.£1·
teria of internal and external logical consistency.

The 'coher-

ence• of oategoreal notions requires internal and external logical
consistency.

For what is undefined or unexplained in one idea ot

an actual entity receives explanation from the other ideas which

are of equal generality with the first idea, that is, from the
other ideas which also apply to the aotual entity. 51

Metaphysioal

51 l11,, P• 1: "There a.re no definitions of such ffeetaphys1oa!7 notions. They are incapable of analysia 1n terms of tac
tors more far-reaching than themselves. f!.,ocordingl3] each must
be displayed as necessary to the various meanings of groups of notions, of equal depth with itself." Of. ,!!, p • .304: 11 Thus to
arrive at the philosophical generalization which is the notion of
a final aotuality conceived in the guise of a generalization or an
act of experience, an apparent redundancy of terms is required.
The words correct each other. We require •together•, 'creativity', •concresoenoe', •prehension•, 'feeling', •subjective form:•,
'data•, 'actuality•, 1 becoming 1 , •process'."

propositions will have internal and external logical consistency
since •coherence' requires that the scheme of oategoreal notions
exhibit their interconnections very clearly.
'l'he 'logical scheme of coherent categoreal notions'
helps to fulfill the second criterion of clarity of propositional

content since the scheme provides the background within which any
proposition should have meaning.52 Finally, the verification of
this scheme by 'widespread conformity to experience• and
cordance with experience• helps to fulfill the
conformity to intuitive experience.

or

firs~

1 no

dis-

oriterion of

For the d1reot verification

some ideas in the categoreal scheme is the indirect verifioa-

tion of the other ideas coherent with the verified ideas.53 Whitehead emphasizes that the veritioation ot the scheme must be in
those factors in experience whioh are 'stable.•

This means that

the 1ntu1t1on giving verification should not be confined to a tew
special people or a few special occasions.
~y

The first discernment

be due to an exceptional man in an exceptional moment, but

later discernments should be available to other people at other
niomenta.54
In seeking verification in the •stable' faotors of human

52 !!!. p. 10.
53 !!!, p. 69.
54 !f!, pp. 77-78.

experience, speculative philosophy should especially attend to
the evidence d1solosed in the welter ot established institutions
aonstitut1ng the structures of human society throughout the ages.
What those institutions presuppose and express represents impor•
tant, enduring facts of experience.

It is a commonplace that men

disagree about practically everything, but the basis of every discord is some common experience, discordantly interpreted.

One

example is that the disoordanoe over moral codes gives witness to
the faot of moral experience.

Another example is that although

menereate different institutions for different purposes, the very
faot of institutions to effect purposes gives w1tnasa to the unquestioned belier that foresight and purpose oan shape the atta1n-

m~nt of ends.55
The verification of the scheme of oategoreal notions in
the institutions of

show! how the soheme of ideas has 'methodologioal oonsequenoes.•56 Thia is the best verifioation possible
m~n

in that the scheme of

o~tegoreal

notions "issues in the establish-

ment of a praotioal teohn1que for well-attested ends, and that the
speculative system maintains itself as the elucidation of that
techn1que.n57

The scheme of oategoreal notions thereby gains the

55 J!!!,

pp. 85-86.

56 ![!,
51 !'!!,

p.

43.

pp. 80-81; in aocord with this text, Whitehead
says that "metaphysics is nothing but the desoript1on of the gen-
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character of generating ideas coherent with itself and
ing continuous verifioetion.5 8

or

receiv-

This interplay of thought and

practice, the progress from thought to practice and the regress
from practice to thought. is the supreme authority.

This inter-

play of thought and practice is the test to which speculative
..... Q

reason must submit its intuitions and generalizations.~'

Another required ver1fioat1on of the scheme of oategoreal notions is that speculative philosophy should make the various soienoes and their interrelations intelligible.
comments, Whitehead's

speoula~ive

As Ohristian

philosophy is meant to be both

relevant to and consistent with well-founded ao1ent1fio theories.
If the oategoreal scheme is incapable of interpreting a well•
fou...~ded

scientific theory, then the scheme is in that respect in•

adequate and not veritied.60

Leclerc explains how Whitehead con-

nects speculative pbilosophy (metaphysics) with the various
sciences throLtgh the discipline entitled cosmology..

Cosmology tt1a

the effort to frame a scheme of the general character ot the

present stage of the universe, 0 whereas metaphysics is the effort

eralities which apply to all the details of praotioe."

58 E!!.
59 !fi,

pp. 69-70.
pp.

80-81.

60 !,B, p. 76.

]!, p. 19.
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to .frame of the general character of all possible stages of the
universe. 6 1 Metaphysics as such ia not directly relevant to the
sciences; what the soienoes require for a philosophical interpretation is an application of the categoreal notions, an 1nterpreta•
tion of the universe as it is at present in terms of a metaphysical scheme of ideas.

This interpretation is cosmology.

5inoe

philosophy of science is not possible without metaphysics as the
basis from which science is interpreted, philosophy of science
should be recognized as cosmology, not as a d.1so1pl1ne that can be
done without metaphysical presuppositions.

Consequently, cosmolo-

gy takes the place of the philosophy of science in Wl:.1tehead 1 a
publications of his second per1oe. 62
In Whitehead's view, metaphysics, cosmology, the schemes
of the sciences

bot~

natural nnd social, the sociological struc-

ture of technical methods ane of institutions, and the whole of
man•s experience, including its aesthetic. moral, and religious
aspects, are all

mut~ally

critics of each other.

Reason inter•

venes in the capacity of arbiter by a further exercise of speculation, and all the elements of man•s lite, including the sohemea of
the so1enaes, cosmology, and metaphysics, are mutually modified.
The joint discipline of this mutual modification

61

Leclerc, .2.R• ~., p. 225.

62 _!lli.

~lim1nates

errors

3~

from the speculations of reason. 6 3

"The purposes of mankind re-

ceive the consequential modification, and the shock is transmitted
through the whole sociological structure of technical methods and
of inst1tut1ons." 64 This interpla1 of thought and practice is
the supreme authority, the test b7 which the errors of speculative
reason are eliminated.
However, this supreme authority tails to be final for
two reasons.

First, the evidence always remains confused, ambigu-

ous, and even contradictory •. Secondly, if speculative reason had
ever accepted any speculations as finally and absolutely verified
in this supreme authority of the interplay of thought and practice, all progress in history would have been stopped. 65 "The
horrid practices of the past, brutish and nasty, would have been
fastened upon us for all ages." 66

Man should not accept that the

praotioes of the present age are the final standard for all times.
Whitehead insists on the necessity ot speculation even though it

63 ,!!!!, pp. 76-77, 86-87; J!, p. vi; of.£!, pp. 82-85,
where Whitehead points out that the Greeks (Plato and Aristotle)
made speculation effective by (l) being unboundedly curious, (2)
striving for coherent systems, (3) having interest in every field
worthy of human endeavor, (4) seeking truths of the highest generality, and ($) having practical interests.

64 J!!!,

p.

65 !!!,

p. 81.

87.

66 !!!,, p. 81.
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does not yield praotioal benefits nor have immediate verification
in facts and practice.

Abstract speoulation gave European science

its foundation long before the sciences oame into being.

Conse-

quently, Whitehead argues, to set limits to speculation is treason
to the future.67

In fulfilling the art of life, it is true that

man lives and lives well, but he still feels the urge to live
better. 68
Consequently, no matter how well confirmed the eategoreal scheme may become, it must alwa7s remain a working h7pothesis.
Speculative philosoph7 must embod7 the method

or

the working hy-

pothesis, since its first principles are reformable.

Its first

principles are the very points which speculative reason is trying
to know.

69 Speculative reason must avoid the dogmatic fallacy,

the belief that the principles ot its working hypothesis ere clear
obvious, and irreformable.70

It philosophy be based upon olear

and distinot ideas, then the disoord of philosophers, competent
and sincere men, implies that the function
is a "will-o'-the wisp.

or

speculative reason

But as soon as the true function of

rationalism is understood, that it is a gradual approach to ideas

67 ,!!!!, pp. 71-76.

••

68
p. 81.
69 !!. P• 286; Leclerc, .2.2• cit., p.
70 ~I,. p. 287.
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of clarity and generality, the discord is what may be expected."71
In accord with the reflections on these five criteria of
the Greek logic of discovery, as perfeoted by the experience of
centuries of speculation, Whitehead defines speculative philosophy and describes its method.
O.

Speculative Philosophy !.! the Function £!.. Speculative Reason
The discipline in which speculative reason attempts to

fulfill its function la speculative philosophy:
Speculative Philosophy is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms
of which every element of our experience oan be interpreted. • • •
Thus the philosophical scheme should be coherent, logioal, and in respect to its interpretation, applicable and adequate. Here 'applicable' means that some items
ot experience are thus interpretable, and 'adequate• meall§
that there are no items incapable of suoh interpretat1on.l2

In this definition, the various refleations of Whitehead
on the five criteria of the Greek logic of discovery can be discerned.
deavour

First, in saying that speculative philosophy is the ,!l!-

12

frame • • • , he is pointing out that the activity of

seeking first principles, the general ideas, is reason in its basio form.

In its basic form, reason is not deductive reason but

speculative reason which uses the method of the working hypothe-

71 !!!, pp. 87-88.
12 !!!,, p.

4; or. Al·

p. 285.
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s1s.73

Speculative philosophy is n~ver a finished fact but some-

thing whioh man will always endeavour to do in attempting to fulfill the function of speculative reason.
Secondly, in saying that the philosophical scheme should
be

coherent~

terion.

logical, Whitehead is referring to the fifth cri-

'l'his criterion requires tba t speculative reason should

construct a logical scheme with coherence among its oategoreal
notions.

lhe scheme of general ideas is logical in so far as its

propositions are internally and externally consistent, in so far
as 1 ts general ideas are de tined in tecr...nical (ca tegoree:l} notions, and in so far as the scheme of propositions is in accord
with the principles of logical inference.

The scheme of general

ideas is coherent in so far ms the ideas of an actual entity connected with the universe of actual entities are not arbitrarily
disconnected but rather presuppose each other so that in isolation
they are meaningless.

What one idea of an actual entity presup-

poses and leaves unexpressed will be expressed in the other ideas
which also apply to it.
'l'hirdly, in saying that the philosophical scheme should
be apElioable

!!12

.!.£!9uate in its interpretation of every element

of experience, Whitehead is again referring to the fifth criteri-

on.

This criterion requires that the scheme of ideas have both

73

Leolero, -22• cit., pp.

41-42.

widespread conformity to experience and no discordance with experience.

Applicabilitz means widespread conformity to, and

adfquaoy means no discordance with, experience.
The definition of speculative philosophy has both a
rational side, expressed by the terms coherent and logical, and
an empirical side, expressed by the terms applicable and adeguate.

Whitehead explains how these two sides are bound together by showing how an adequate soheme must be a neeessarz one:

The adeguacz

of the scheme for the interpretation of experienoe does not mean
only adeguao1 for such experience as happen to have been consi<W:•
ered.,;

It means that all human experience is suoh that the items

diaoloaed 1n this awareness muat be interpretable by the scheme.
Consequently. the soheme is necessary in the sense that all experience as such ia interpretable hy the scheme.

Provided that

man limits his speculative understanding to that which cornmunioates with immediate matter of fact disolosed in his experience,
the aoheme will necessarily be applicable for the interpretation

ot any matter of fact.

For what does not communicate with immedi-

ate matter of fact diaolosed in awareness and experience is unknowable. and the unknowable 1s simply unknown.74

The scheme ot

philosophic ideas is neeesaarilz true in that it is adequate for
the interpretation of all matters of fact disclosed in experience.

74 11!1

pp.

5-6.
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"This doctrine of necessity in universality means that there is an
essence to the universe which forbids relationships beyond itself,
as a violation of its rationality.

Speculative philosophy seeks

that essenae.n75
The key terms in Whitehead's definition of speculative
philosophy have been considered; his definition may be restated
as the function of speculative reason:

Speculative reason's .func-

tion is to seek to frame a coherent, logical, neoessari system of
general ideas which makes intelligible every element of experience by being applicable to 1t and adequate for the interpretation
of any experience.
namely

These characteristics of metaphysical ideas,

that they are completely universal or neoessacr, forming

a system which is coherent, logical, applicable, and adequate,

constitute the requirements whioh a metaphysical system has to
fulf111.7 6 It is in terms of these requirements, as summarized in
the fifth criterion of the Greek logic of discovery, that Whitehead proposes the method of the working hypothesis for speculative
philosophy.

D.

!h!. Method £!. S2eculative PhilosophJ
Relying on his knowledge of the history of speculative

75

.ffi,

76

Leclerc, .2.1?• ..£!l., p. 39.

p. 6.
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reason, Whitehead adopts the method of the working hypothesis tor
speculative philosophy by asserting that progress in speculative
understanding has been achieved "by the complex process of generalizing from particular topics, ot imaginatively sohemat1z1ng the
generalization, and finally by renewed comparison of the imagined
scheme with the di?"ect experience to which it should apply."77
Whitehead is relying on hia exposition of the fifth criterion ot
the Greek logic of discovery:

any belief should fit into a logi-

cal scheme with (a) widespread conformity

uo

experience, (b) no

discordance with experience, (c) coherence among its oategoreal
notions, and (d) methodological consequences.
plies all that was stated in the above text.

This criterion imIt implies that a

logical scheme of ideas has been constructed by generalizing from
particular topics and imaginatively schematizing the generalizations into coherence.

The fifth criterion also requires verifi-

cation of the scheme through widespread <X>nformity to experience,
no discordance with experience, and methodological consequences
such as making intelligible the theories and discoveries of the
sciences.
Accordingly, Whitehead proposes that speculative reason
use the following three step method whioh he compares to the
flight of an airplane.

77 ]!!!, p. 24.

(l) Reason starts from the ground of par-

(2) Reason makes a flight in the thin air

tioular observation.

of imaginative generalization and sohematization
ization with other generalizations.

or

this general-

(3) Reason lands fbr renewed

observation rendered aoute by rational interpretation.7 8

Thia

method does not seem complex, but its actual use is very complex
because the three steps must be repeated over and over in the
attempt to discover
make intelligible

.!!!

the metaphysical first principles which

.!!!. particular tacts.

A further difficulty in

the use of the method is that imaginative generalization of the
correct metaphysical first principles must require a genius
the rank

or

Plato. Aristotle, Newton, and Einstein.

or

Once such

a genius has shown the way, it is possible for other men to grasp
their insights and follow their reasonings.

An explanation of

the three step method needs to be given.
First Stage g£, ,1h! Method
Reason starts from the ground ot particular observation.
Whitehead explains that the only point of departure available tor
speculative thought is immediate experience which discloses to
man the actual world. including man himself.
thought whioh is not for the sake
useless and unjustified thought.7 9

78 J!, p. 7.
79 !!!,

p.

6.

or

He also insists that

elucidation of experience is
In appealing to experience for

the discovery of the necessary features of reality, Whitehead ia
consistent with his ontological principle.

According to this

principle, the ultimate reasons (the metaphysical first principles or necessary features of reality) are only to be discovered
in the composite nature of definite actual entities.

Since the

actual entities themselves must embody those necessary features,
man must seek those features in his ecperience of those aotualities. 80
In seeking these necessary features in experience, man
oan only appeal to direct insight--to what Descartes termed
speotio. 81

.!B-

Leclerc points out that this direct insight is not

some separate and superior form of knowledge since it "is but a
phase in one whole constituting the method of the working hypothesis, the method by which, in the final analysis, all conceptual

knowledge is atta1ned.n82

These direct insights are formulable

into what Christian calls pre-systematic statements, "statements
of facts Whitehead means to take aGoount of and do justice to in
his speculative construotion. 1183 Examples of such statements

are:

"All things flow • • • • There are many things.

80 Leclerc, .2.2•
81

.HI,

~., pp.

43.

p. 103.

82 Leclerc, ..22• o1t., p.
83

27-28,

Things are

46.

Christian, "Some Uses of Reason," Relevance .2! White·

11!.!S, ed. Leclerc, p. 74.
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1nteroonneoted.

Aims are ef.feotive • • • • The primitive experi-

ence is emotional feeling, felt in relevance to a world beyond."84
These statements may be oharacter1ted as having their terms taken
from ordinary usage, soienoe, religion, or traditional philosophy.
Neither the logioal subjects nor the predicates of these statements are expressed by terms taken from Whitehead's oategoreal
scheme. The terms of these statements are non-systematio. 85
Seoond Stage of lh!, Method
The second step of the method is that reason imaginatively generalizes frOtl'l the particular observation and sohemat1zes
this generalization with other generalizations.

This generaliza-

tion and sohematization creates Whitehead's oategoreal scheme, a
logioal scheme or coherent ideas formulated in technical or systema tio terms and statements.86

Systematic statements are state-

ments of relationships within the scheme in wh1oh all the terms of
the statements, both logical subjects and prediaates, are derived
from the oategoreal scheme, suoh as the statement, for example,
"Every actual entity is present in every other actual ent1ty.n 87
Imaginative generalization from particular observation

84 ~85 Ibid.

-

86 Cf. 1!1 PP• 27.45, where Whitehead gives a concise
statement ot his categoreal scheme.
87

--

Christian, loo. cit.
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is termed "1magina ti ve rationalization, ii

11

tion," and u'ph1losoph1c generalization;

111

imag1nat1ve construcWhitehead explains this

last term as "'the utilization of speoific notions, applying to a
restricted group of tacts, for the divination of the generic notions which apply to all facts.• " 88 Christian ·~...mments that this
imaginative construction may be viewed as creating systematic
statements as analytic statements.

The truth of any particular

systematic statement does not strictly depend on or follow from
the truth of any pre-systematic statements. 39

Since there oan be

no indubitable immediate assurance of the correctness of direct
insight and its imaginative generalization, the imaginative generalization must be ta.ken es an hypothesis and subjected to a careful and elaborate procedure of ver1f1oat1on.90

Sinoe the imaginative generaliz1t1on does not striotly
follow from any pre-systematic statement, the problem arises how

direct insights are to be generalized.

In one sense, it is im-

possible to point out the positive connection

betwe~n

the insight

and its generalization without examining eaoh case, since the
generalization is unique each time it is done by the philosopher.
But in another sense, the general character of the positive con-

88 .!!!, PP• 7-8.

76.

89

Christian, "Some Uses of Reason," .2.R•

90

Leolero, Whitehead's Metaphfsics, p.

.2.!!•• pp. 75-

48.
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nection between a.direct insight and its generR11zat1on is analogy.

or

The procedure

or

Whitehead's rationalism is the discussion

analogy, the discovery ot identities amid diversity.

lustration

or

An il-

Whitehead's method is his generalization trom the

direct insight into human rreedom to the notion ot creativity
(novelty), a notion that might be applicable to the novelty ot
man's action and of any actuality in an analogous way.9 1
Christian's emphasis upciin imaginative genel'alization aa
construction tends to give the impression that Whitehead's categoreal scheme is simply a construction without any basis in exp©rience.

This would be, however, a mistaken impression.

The

categoreal notions and statements are generalized by analogy rrom
particular insights into experience.

Still, Christian's main

point, that syste:matio statements are not directly about the
world .. but rather e.nalyt1osl statements about I'elationships within
the oategoreal scht=1me, is ..,,,rrect. 92 Because systematic notions

91 Dewey, "Whitehead's Philosophy, .. Philosophical Review, XLVI, no. 2 (Jan., 1937) pp. 171-172, and l1artshorne, -~tehead, the Anglo-American Philosopher-Scientist," Prooeedinfa
or American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1961, pp. i63-f7 ,
b'Otfi point oU-C speair:tc examoles
fiow Wfiltehead could have 1mag1nat1ve1y generalized by analogy some direct insights from man's
experience of himself into metaphysical categories.

or

92 01"..ristian, loc. cit., 11 The entities listed in his
categories of existence are not intuited•-though they may well

have been suggested by elements in experience--or deduced; they
are constructed."
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are constructed, it follows that categories are what Whitehead
dafinea them to be.
Two kinds of problems might be raised a.bout the cate ....
goreal soheme, the problem of its own logical consistency and coherence and the problem of its applicability to and adequacy for
the interpretation of reality.

In orde1• to prevent such problems

from arising, two conditions should be followed for the success o
the im&ginative construction.

FiPst, the construction should bav

its origin in a generalization of a particular factor discerned
a direct

1~~1ght

from such experiences as physical science, phys1

ology, psychology, aesthetics, ethics, languages, or sociology.93
Such generalizations can only be made at an advanced stage of
thought upon the basis of antecedent analysis involved in more
special fields of knowledge.94 The fulfilment of this first condition ensures that the generalization will have an application to
experience, at least to

t~~t

aspeot of experienoe from which the

generalization was derived.
The second condition for the success of imaginative construction is that the two rationalistic ideals of coherence and
logical perfection should be pursued.

The requirement

or

eoher-

enoe is more important than the requirement of logical consisten-

93

!!!,

94

Leclerc, 21?•

P• 7 •

911.,

P•
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oy, sinoe the history ot philosophy shows that systems of philosophy are not refuted but rather abandoned.

The reason tor this is

that logical contradictions are usually only temporary slips of

the mind.

After a first orit1o1am, a system's logical inconsis•

tenoies may be able to be oorreoted.

However, a system's inco-

herences may be discoverable only through a very thorough second
criticism.

For example, Descartes' philosophy was not refuted be-

cause of its logical 1noonsistenc1es but rather abandoned because

ot its

~obereaoe,

ples.

His two kinds ot substance, corporeal and mental, illus-

trate incoherence.95

its arbitrary disconnection or first princiPor according to Descartes, a substantial

individual •requires nothing but itself in order to exist,• his
two kinds

or

substance are arbitrarily disconnected, neither one

requiring the other tor its being.

The attraction of Spinoza's

philosophy is that it modifies Descartes• position into greater

95 !!, pp. 8-9; Leclerc, .22• .2!!•• P• 48, points out
that Whitehead holds that Descartes• insight into the oogito and
point of departure from the subject's o..m •xperience are correct
but that Descartes• generalizations ~om these insights were not
suooesstul. Descartes committed the fallacy or misplaced concreteness in holding extension as such to be a metaphysical character of actual entities. Although he achieved the useful con•
cept of extension as such, his mistake was to neglect the degree
ot abstraction involved when considering how this notion applied
to actual entities. Accordingly, Whitehead proposes that the
success or speculative reason is to be measured by its concreteness. ~' pp. 84-85; !!!• p. 11.
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coherence, offering a one-substance world with different attributes and modes.96 In so offering only a one-substance world,
Spinoza is using Occam's razor, namely, that entities are not to

be multiplied beyond necessity.

Now the way in which the explan-

atory notions are not multiplied beyond necessity is to give each
metaphysical notion the widest extension of which it seems capable.

It is only in this way that the correct adjustment and co-

herence or ideas can be explored.

Accordingly, the rationalistic

ideal,coherenoe, suggests Whitehead, is another way

or

stating

Occam's doctrine ot parsimony, namely, that the scope ot a metaphysical principle should not be limited otherwise than by the
necessity of its own meaning.97

It a metaphysical notion does

not have the widest possible extension consistent with its comprehension, there will be incoherences in the metaphysical scheme.
For the notion 1n question should apply according to its meaning
but the scheme does not make it do so.
When the oategoreal scheme has been oonstruoted and
stated with the utmost precision and definiteness, the philosophe
should then argue trom it boldly and with the constructive power
of deductive logic.

The propositions derived from the oategoreal

scheme should then be confronted with the c1rou.mstanoes of ex-

96

PR,
.....

p.

97

!!·

pp. 304-305.
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perienoe to which they should apply.98
Third Stage

££. !h!,

Method

In this step of the method, the primary advantage

gained by observing in terms
soheme is

tha~

not.

the imaginatively constructed

experience is not interrogated with the benumbing

repression of common sense.
of difference:

or

Comroon sense observes by the method

sometimes men see an elephant and other times

The result is that an elephant is noticed when it is pres•

ent because or the difference it makes.

But the metaphysical

first principles are always exemplified, whatever the experience
may be.

Aooordingly, it is a mistake to expeot simple accumula-

tions and systematizations of experience in terms of itself to
reveal the metaphysical taotors. 99

This was the mistake 1n "the

Baoonian method of induction, a method which, it consistently pur

sued, would have left science where it found 1t.

What Bacon omit-

ted was the play of a free imagination, controlled by the requirements of coherence and logic. itlOO
When observation by the method ot difference fails to
reveal factors which are always present in experience, these may
yet be observable under the influence of an imaginatively oon-

98 _!!., p. 13;

!!!1

p. 71.

99 1!!1 pp. 6-7, 13.
100

!ft,

p. 1.
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structed scheme.

Scientific and philosophic generalities are not

discoverable by simple accumulation and systematization ot observations, but only by observation directed by theory. 1 01 Without
some theory presupposed as a working hypothesis, uit is impossible to know what to look for, and how to connect the sporadic
observations ... 102 The explicit statement ot the categoreal sohe
as a working hypothesis intelligently directs observation and

decides upon the mutual relevance

or

various types

or

evidence so

that the working hypothesis is capable ot meaningful veritioation.10.3
A

proposition or oonolusion derived trom the oategoreal

scheme has three possibilities in confronting experience:

"(1)

the conclusion may agree with the observed facts; (ii) the conclusion m11y exhibit general agreement, with disagreement in detail; (111) the conclusion may be in complete disagreement with
In the first case, the ca.tegoreal scheme is shown

the facts.ttl04

to make taots

or

experience intelligible.

In the second oase,

evaluation both ot the observation of faots and
scheme is required.

or

the categoreal

Thia history of thought shows that false in-

terpretations can be read into the observation of facts.

101

Leolero, .2.'2•

102

-

103
104

AI, p. 284.

-AI,
PR,

p. 286.
p. 13.

ill·'

p.
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third oase, either the categoreal soheme must be limited to a
speoial field and not be applied t.o all fields of experience, or
the main cAtegories must be abendoned.105

The successful philo•

soph1o generalization is confirmed in every field ot human experienoe and especially in religion, science, both natural and soci-

ological, and the wide self-evidence of o1v111zation.l06

In

seeking such confirmation of its working hypothesis, speculative
reason performs the useful function
systematization

or

or

promoting the most general

civilized thought. 107

Speculative reason

thereby JBa.intaina an active novelty of fundamental ideas illumi·
nating the actions of man in oivilization. 108
Christian warns that the verification of the antegoreal
scheme is not the simple matter of finding perceptually isole.ble
components in experience which illuatrnte Whitehaad•s categories
of existence suoh as actual entities and nexus.
ble, man is not seeing actual entities.

In seeing a ta•

Whitehead can say that 1

seeing a table a man is looking at a nexus of actual entities.
But such a statement is a post-systematic interpretation of experienoe.

Man does not experience the 'fact• that the table is a

lOS, _m, p. 13.
106 .f!, p. 23; lf!, p. 145; !,!, pp. 307 ... 381 •
107

..ffi.,

-

pp. 25-26 •

108 MT, p. 237.
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nexus of aotual entities; rather he interprets the table as a
nexus of actual entities.

Post-systematic statements are not

straight-forward desoriptions of what is experieno@d.109

Rsther,

post-systematic statements are "statements in which facts and
principles of various sorts are interpreted in terms of the cate•
goreal scheme, for example:

The finite things that endure through

time e.re not actual entities but nerlis of actua.l ent1 ties. nllO
Whitehead uses systematic terms to interpret non-systematic terms:
"perception facts, so1ent1!'1o tacts, moral !'sots, and others are
framed in terms of the oategoreal sohem.e.nlll
In summary, Leclerc and Obristian have correctly emphasized the inductive aspect of Whitehe~d's methoe.

Pre-eyetematic

statements of self-evidences are made in the first step ot the
method.

However, 9'Uoh direct insights are self-evident only from

the perspective reason takes, that is, only becPuse reason ignores
other aspects of experience.

Consequently, direct insight is not

a superior form of knowledge but one aspect in the whole constituting the method of the working hypothesis.

In the second step ot

the method, generalizations and systematizations are made from the
direct insights by analogy.

11.

A CRtegoreal scheme ot systematic

109 Christian, nsome Uses ot Reason," 2.2· Jtl!., pp. 76110

!21£.,

pp.

75-76.

11112!9.., p. 76.
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terms and definitions is constructed to fulfill the requirements
of logical consistency and coherence.

These systematic statements

are oonstruoted as analytically true in terms of the relationships

ot the oategoreal scheme itself.

The truth of any particular sys-

tematic statement does not strictly depend on or follow from the
truth of any pre-systematic statements.

S1noe there oan be no in-

dubitable immediate assurance of the oorreotness of direct insight
and its imaginative generalization, the oPtegoreal scheme must be

taken as an hypothesis and subjected to verification tests.

In

the third step of the method, the oategoreal scheme is tested as
to its applicability to and adequacy for the understanding of all
aspects of man's experience.

Systematic terms and statements are

used to make intelligible, post-systematic statements about, for
example, aoientitio faots, moral faota, perception facts, aesthetic experiences, and religious experience.
In this chapter, the function of speculative reason has

been identified in a discussion of reason and evolution.

Since

Whitehead admits the category of final aausality, as explanatory
of emergent evolution, he defines the primary function ot reason
to be:

(1) to constitute final causes, that is, to live; (11) to

emphasize final causes, that is, to live well; and (111} to criticize final causes, that is, to live better.

The function of prao-

t1oal reason is to achieve a purpose exterior to the satisfaction

ot reason itself, whereas the function of speculative reason is to
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satisfy its own purpose of understanding everything in tex-ms ot
principles intelligible to itself.

The Greek logio of discovery

provides a set of five criteria by which any speoulative under-

standing of reality should be tested.

It was in terms of these

criteria that Whitehead defined speculative philosophy and its
method for the fulfilment of the funotion of speculative reason.
Speculative philosophy seeks to frame a coherent,

~os1oal,

neoea-

sary system of genera.l ideas whioh makes intelligible every ele•
ment of experience.

Speculative philosophy uses the method of the

working hypothesis 1n order to fulfill the five criteria of the
Greek logic of discovery.

Although direct insight is the point of

departure for reason's speculations, it is not a superior torm of
knowledge but one aspect in the whole constituting the method of
the working hypothesis.

The direct insight must be capable of

being stated in systematic terms in order that it will tit in with
and be verified by all of man's experience and knowledge.
In light of the exact definition ot speculative philosophy and its method, the next chapter will consider what evidence
rational religion and the religious intuition as the sense of
Deity can ofter for Whitehead's asswnption of the function ot
speculative reason.

CHAPrER II

THE FUNCTION OF SPECULATIVE REASON CONSIDERED IN LIGHT
OF RATIONAL RELIGION AND fHE; RELIGIOUS INTUI~ION
AS THE SENSE OF DEITY
The purpose of this chapter is to consider how the tune•
tion of speculative reason is defended by rational religion and
the religious intuition as the sense of Deity.

The first section

indicates that Whitehead pointed to a significant relationship

between religion and the function of speculative reason.

The

second section desoribes Whitehead's view of rational religion,
the religious intuition, and its interpretation in his metaphysics

This seoond section serves as the context for the third section
where the Modes .Q£ Thought sense of Deity is described as an evi•
dence independent of his systematization of it.

Next the fourth

section considers how rational religion and the sense or Deity can
serve as defenses

or

the function of speculative reason.

Finally,

the fifth section oc:mpares this chapter with other investigations
of Whitehead, especially Till1ch 1 s and Hartshorne•s.

A. Speculative Reason .!BS Religion
In Modes .2f Thoqght, in the lectures describing the

$9
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sense of Deity, Whitehead also views his philosophy as a pragmatism.

"Pragmatism is simply an appeal to that self-evidence which

sustains itself in o1vil1zed experience.

Thus pragmatism ulti-

mately appeals to the wide self-evidence of civilization, and to
the self-evidence of what we mean by •civilization•." 1 Whitehead
will exclude by dogmatic denial no solt-ev1denoe in his pragmatism.

Despite the selective limitations

or

human consciousness,

there is no rP-ason, apart .from dogmatic assumption, why human
aonsoiousnesR could not have an intuition into some metaphysical
.factor of the universe. 2 Such an intuition would be an awareness
of a

sel.f-~videnoe

ot civilization.

The evidence could not be de•

nied without a denial of that aspect of civilization which is a
necessary part of civilized experience.

Consequently, such an

ev1denae could not be denied without self-contradiction.
Whitehead indicates that there is a self•evidenoe of
civilization which may serve as a basis for assuming the function
of speculative reason.

There is a strong moral

int~!tion

that one

of the ultimate elements in the good life of aiv111zat1on is speculative understanding for its own sake.

'l'his intuition is not a.a

w14espread as other moral feelings are, but in the history

1

,m.

pp.

or

o1v-

144·14.$.

2 Whitehead, "Remarks," The Philosophical Review, XLVI,
no. 2 (Jan., 1937) p. 181.
---
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ilization it has been transmitted by outstanding 1nd1v1duals.3
Such geniuses as Plato, Aristotle, Archimedes, and Roger Bacon
have lived their lives ot reflection according to the function of
speculative reason that all things are conceivable as exemplifications of general principlea.4

For both primitive man and the

primitive aide of civilized man, "the universe is not so much unfathomable as untathomed--by this I mean undiscriminated, unanalyzed. • • •
are absent.

The very presuppositions or a coherent rationalism
Such a rationalism presupposes a complex of definite
~

tacts whose interconnections are sought."-'

For primitive man and

the primitive side or civilized man, the universe is not such a
complex of interconnected facts that stimulates man to analyze and
discriminate the connections.

Rather, the universe is an obscure

background shot across by isolated, vivid effects charged with
emotional exoitementa.6

Consequently, what 1s necessary for the

moral intuition of the function of speculative reason is an insight into the presuppositions of a coherent rntionalism.

What ia

needed is an awareness of the evidence ot the universe as a complex of interconnected facts that stimulates man to analyze and

3 ]!!, pp. 38-39.

4 .m,
5 !!:J,
6 y,

-

p. 37; SMW, p.

p.

24.

p.

24.

1.
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identify the oonneotions.
Whitehead indicates that this self-evident intuition ot
the universe wh1oh is the presupposition of his ooherent rationalism is to be found in religious intuition:
That we tail to tind in experience any elements intrinsically 1noapable of exhibition as examples of general theory, is the hope of rat1onaliam. Thia hope is not a metaphysical premis~. It is the faith which forms the motive for
the pursuit of all sciences alike, including metaphysics.
In so far as metaphysics enables us to apprehend the
rationality of things, the claim is justified. It 1s always
open to us, having regard to the 1mperfeot1ons ot all metaphysical ~ystema, to lose hope at the exact point where we
find ourselves. The preservation of such faith must depend
on an ultimate moral intuition into the nature of intellectual action--that it should embody the adventure of hope.
Such an intuition marks the point where metaphysios·-and indeed every so1enoe--ga1ns assurance from religion and passes
over into religion.7

Whitehead has stated the function of speculative reason,
the hope, faith, and ideal of rationalism.

The function of spec•

ulative reaamn "is to pierce into the general reasons beyond limited reasons." 8 This ideal forms the motive for the pursuit of all
the sciences, especially metaphysics.

!n .!.2

~

!:!. metaphysics

19!!,. rationalitz of things, 1h!, ideal .!!.

enables !!!!!!l

~apprehend

Justified.

Although man falls short of the perfect metaphysics,

he should not give up the ideal.
tellectual action, in faot,

7 !!!. p. 67.

a £!!,

P·

65.

or

It is part of the nature of in-

all civilized action, that it
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should embody the adventure ot hope; tor o1v111zat1on is in deoa7
when its action is without adventure, without the striving for the
unattainable ideal.9

The ideal of intelleotual speculation is an

11

infinite ideal • • • never to be attained by the trounded intelligence of mankind. 1110 Yet this ideal essentially belongs to man.
Man as man, as civilized man, oa.nnot but have a tendency to fulfill thia ideal of speculative reason, to know the ultimate reasons of all tacts, their origin and their end.11

The self-evi-

dence supporting this ideal ia to be f;.O\lnd in "the deep oonnect1on

ot the speculative Reason w1 th rel 1g1 ous intuitions. nl2
B.

Rational Religion

~

,!h! Religious Intuition

Since Whitehead has indicated that the self-evidence for
the function of speculative reason is to be found in religion, it

1s necessary to describe his notion of rational religion and the
religious intuition prior to the examination of their releve.noe to
the function of speculative reason.
In order to

ex~lain

the nature of religious truth,

Whitehead distinguishes between religious truth and mathematical
truth.

One

~

9

.!\!,

arithmetic, but he

p. 360 •

10

!!!·

p.

65.

11

FR,
-J!!l,

p.

65.

12

p. 66.

!!

religious.

What one be-
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lieves as mathematical truth has no intluenoe upon his moral character, but what one believes as religious truth should have an intluenoe upon his moral character.

t:I..

A religious truth should Justi-

a person by cleansing his eharaoter of faults and by developing

his character towards the religious ideal of perfection.

Conse-

quently, a religion may be defined as a system of general truths
which trnnsform oharaoter when these truths are sincerely held
and vividly apprehended.13

This notion of religion emphasizes "the awful ultimate
fnot, which is the human being, oonsoiously alone with itself, tor
its own aake." 1 4 Consequently this notion of religion directly

contradicts '1 the theory that religion is pr1:mar117 a social
fact." 15

Social facts are important to religion since there is no

absolute abstraction

or

an individual from his environment.

How•

ever, society cannot be absolutely abstraoted from the individual
men who compose society.

Rel 1g1on is primarily what the individu-

al toes with his solitariness.

What should develop from religion

l) RM, p. lS: nYou use arithmetic, but you are religious • • • • NO one is invariably 'Justified' by his tA."Ith in the
mult1pl1oat1on table. But in some sense or other, justification
ts the basis of all religion. Your character is developed aooo,rd1ng to your faith. This is the primary religious truth from which
no one oan escape."

14 !,H,

p. 16.

15 .!!!,

p. 16.
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is individual worth of oharaoter.16

factors:

The emergence of religion in human history shows four
1
ritual, emotion, belief, and retionalization. 7 Ritual

and emotion predominate in primitive religion which is primarily
social in that the individual cannot give up the cult

or

the tribe

without giving up his identity as a meaber of the tribe.18

The

last two factors, belief and especially rationalization, predominate in civilized religion and emphasize solitariness as constituting the heart of religious importance.
conceptions which haunt the imaginations
scenes of solitariness:

"The great religious

or

civilized mankind are

Prometheus chained to his rock, • • • the

meditations of the 3uddha, the solitary Man on the Oross.nl9
The purpose of ritual and emotion is explained in a
myth.

If the myth is about a person, real or imaginary, the rit-

ual is the primitive worship of the hero-person.

The myth then

serves as a religious belief, and the belief encourages speculation about 1tselt.

Just as ritual encourages emotion for its own

sake beyond the mere response to practical necessities, so also
religious belief encourages thought for its own sake, since the

16

J!H,

pp. 16-17.

17 .fil:I, p. 18.
18 .!!!, pp. 19, 28.
19

.!!!1,

pp. 19-20.
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belief releases thought for a while trom its immediate environment
of sensation and perception.

The first stage of belief is marked

by uncoordinated beliefs; and this is the stage at which the mass-

es of sem1-o1v111zed humanity have halted, the stage of. satisfactory ritual and of satisfied belief without impulse towards higher
things. 20
The second stage of belief oocurs when the fourth factor, rfltional!zat!on, beoomes a part of religion.
attempts to introduce into

religi~ua

Rationaliza.tioI

beliefs a rational general!·

ty; myths, when retained, are reorganized with the intention of
making myth an aoeount of true historical oiroumstanoes which exemplify the general ideas with adequate perfection.

The life of

Christ oould be used to exemplify the general idea of love of God
and neighbor.

The Hebrew religion in the last thousand years be-

fore the Cbr18t1an era went through this stage ot rationalization
of belief.

Whitehead explains how rational criticism is admitted

1n principle as part of religion when custom no longer suffices to
direct man's religious and moral life.
der the eveluation of individuals

Religious beliefs coroe un-

~hen

(ethical, metaphysical, or logical).

they use direct intuition

Religion now emphasizes the

individual in his solitariness and his rational criticism of beliefs.

Religion has become rational religion, a religion with a

20

1Y1·

pp. 23-28 •.
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system of general truths which provide a coherent ordering both

of man's specul&tive life and of his

praotic~l

life.

Historical

examples of rational religion inolude Buddhism, Mahometanisro,
Jude.isr,i, and Ohr1stis.n1ty.21

The search tor a system ot general truths as a coherent

ordering of man's 11.f'e is exemplified by the book of Job in dealing with the problem or evil.

Joo 1s a good man who is suffering

tremendous evils to himself and his family.

seem to belie the general doctrine that

.~uffering

stanoee of hiR

The concrete circum-

the justice of God is beautifully evident in everything that hap•
pens.

How can Job be a good man, and God let all these evils

happen to h111t?

'l'hese evils do happen to him.

Job is a good man.

'l'herefore, the HE>brews a.rs wrong to believe that God will permit

evils to happen only to evil men.
a rational or1 tioislil of
to evil men. 2 2

tb~

1'hus the book of Job contains

.Hebraic

belie.1~

that evils happen only

However this rational eriticism does not solve the proble~

of evil.

The two great rational religions, Christianity and

Buddhism, have attempted to deal with this problem.

21

!!!11
fil1,

pp. 31,

31nee Bud-

35-36.

22
pp. 48-49: "The1"e is also throughout the book
the 'lndereurrent of fear lest an old-fashioned tribal god might
take offense at this rational critioism.n Job is tearing to
pieces the sophism that ell 1s for the best in the best of possible worlds, and that the juat1ce or God is clearly evident in
everything that happens.
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dhiam finds evil essential to the very nature ot individual experience, its doctrine solves the problem ot evil by preaching a
moral doctrine that releases one from his individual personality 1
the source ot evil.

Since Christianity holds that evil derives

trom the contingency in the world, not trom the very tact ot indi•
vidual personality1 its moral doctrine is to overcome evil with
good. 23 The solutions of Ohristian1ty and Buddhism to ~he problem

ot evil are solutions to be lived, just as religious truth in
general is a truth that is to be lived, not used as a mathematical
truth is used.

In being lived, their solutions to the problem of

evil are then to be understood.
Relt,gion•s confrontation with the problem of evil provides an understanding ot another aspect or religion as the tonging tor Justitiaation.

Whitehead explains "that religion is the

longing of the ,n:>irit that the tacts ot existence should tind juatit1oat1on 1n the nature of existenoe.
God,

1

'My soul th1rsteth tor

writes the Psalm1at."24 The religious need tor Just1t1oa-

t1on includes not only the need for moral purification and moral
development but also the need to understand man•a predicament in
~he

problem of evil.

The need for Justification must be fulfilled

morally and ttPeoulatively by answering why evils happen to man,

23 .!!!.

pp.

24 !H,

p.

48-49.
85.
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especially to the good man.

In the doctrines

or

a

r~tional

re-

ligion, the raot of the existence of evil should find justification in the nature or existence.

A rational religion should have

a system of general truths which provide a coherent ordering both
of man's praotical life and of his speoulat!ve lite.
Whitehead explains that the doctrines of rational religion are the outcome of a universal religious consciousness.
Religious consciousness is universal in two ways.

First, it is

universal as opposed to tribal; that is, all the great rational
religions have fundamentally the same conseiousness.

Secondly,

religious consciousness is universal in that it is a disconnection from immediate surroundings, that is, in that it is a oonsoiouaness of something Pf!rmanent !.!l£ intelligible.

The individu-

al in his solitariness onn get away trom the contusion of 1rmned1ate experience and everyday lite and try to find something perma~

_!ru! intelligible that gives meaning and Justification to all

the world and ms.n's life.25
The religious intuition is a oonsoiousness

.2£

something

oermanent and intelligible in so tar as it is a consciousness of

-

- - _'_______

the ultimate character of value in the universe:

~

This point of the origin of rational religion in solitar·
iness 1~ tund~mental. Religion is founded on the concurrence
of three allied concepts in one moment ot self-consciousness,
concepts whose separate relationships to faot and whose mu•

25 !!:!,

pp.

47, 58-6).
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tual relations to each other are only to be settled jointly

by some direct intuition into the ultimate oharaoter of the

universe.
These concepts arei
l. That of the value of an individual for itself.
2. That of the value of the diverse individuals of
the world for each other.
3. That of the value of the objective world which
is a community derivative from the inter•rela•
tiona or its component individuals, and also
necessary to~ the existence of each of these
1nd1viduals.26
The religious intuition occurs most easily in the indi-

vidual who sincerely seeks the meaningfulness of moral value:

"In

its solitariness, the spirit asks, What, in the way of value, is
the attainment or life?

And it can find no such value ;till it has

merged its individual claim for value with that of the objective
universe.

Religion is world-loyalty. 11 27

The religious intuition

is a revelation of the ultimate aharaoter of universe as value,
"apprehended as we apprehend the oharaoters of our friends • • • •
It is an apprehension of character permanently inherent in the
nature of things. •t28

The rieligious intuition is "a direct intui-

tion ot a righteousness in the nature of things, .funoti.oning as a
condition, a oritio, and an ideal. n29
is a direot intuition of tta character

26

!!!f,

PP•

58-59.

27 1!!1 p. 60.
28 !!1 PP• 60-61.

29 ,!!H, p. 63.

l'he religious experienoe

or

permanent rightness,
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whose 1nherence in the n1lture of things modifies both efficient
and final cause, so that the one oonforms to harmonious cond1·
tiona, and the other contrasts itself with an harmonious ideal."30
The religious experience is "the intuition of immediate occasions
as failing or succeeding in reference to the ideal relevant to
them.

There is a rightness attained or missed, with more or less

completeness of attainment or ornission."31
Whitehead clarifies the religious intuition in two ways.
First, he argues that this direct apprAhenmion of a permanent
rightness ''doea not inolude any direct 1ntu1 tlon of a definite
person or individual."3 2 Many rational religions agree that there
is no direct vision of God as this specific person or as that spe-

cific person.

Con.f'uo1an, Buddhist, and Hindu philosophy agree in

this, and so also do most Christian theologians and Greek thinkers.33

Aooording to Whitehead, there is no direct vision of a
For 1r the religious intuition is such a direct

personal God.

vision; then the various descriptions of religious experience by
~itferent

faiths would simply contradict each other with all their

30

!!11

P·

sa.

-

.31 RM. pp. 60-61 •

32 g, p. 61.
33 .fil!, pp. 62-64. Whitehead's interpretation of these
f'ive trends of thought could be investigated at some length.
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dif i~erent personal gods. 3li

Secondly, althouch there is no direct vision of a personal God, Whitehead holds tb8.t the religious 1ntu1 tion is the
experienae of God as a charRcter of permanent rightness immanent
in the nature of things.

Whitehead explains:

(1) that Christ

represents rationalism derived from direct intuition; (2) that
Christ assooiated God with the lm.111B.nence of the Kingdom of Heaven;

(3) that the kingdom of heaven 1a God's pr1mord1alt consequent,
and superjeot natures; and (4) that the religious intuition is the
experience of the kingdom of heaven.
(l) Christ represents for Whitehead rationalism derived
from direct intuition:

forraularized thought.

"The reported sayings of Christ are not
They are descriptions of

d1~ect

1ns1ght.

The ideas are in his mind as immediate p1otures, and not as analyzed in terms of ebstraot conoepts.•35

For example, Christ sees

intuitively the relations between 3ood men and bad men; he does
not talk of goodness and badness.
nor does he re-ason about facts.

He does not analyze concepts,
Rather, he uses the lowest ab-

stractions that language is capable of, if it is to be language
and rational understanding at all and not the fact itselr.36

34 .!!!'!1 pp. 62-64, 66.

35

~. pp.

36

!ll!,

p.

56-57.
57.
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(2) Consequently, when Christ associates

11 God

with the

Kingdom ot Heaven, coupled with the explanation that 'The Kingdom
of Heaven is within you,, .. Whitehead understands Obrist to be
describing an intuitive experience.37

Obrist is expressing a de-

oigive emphasis of the immanence or God in the world which was
absent in the original Semitic doctrine ot God.38

(3) The kingdom of heaven ia God's primordial, consequent, and superjeot natures.

In Whitehead's metaphyaios, there

are tour creative phases in the universe.

(1) There is God's pri-

mordial nature, the principle determining the grading ot values

prior to the passage of actual things.39

This aspect of God is

"the complete oonoeptual realization of the realm of ideal forms.
The kingdQm of heaven is God. 4.0
tual origination of the universe.

This is the phase of the o·o~.ep_~~ .

(11) There is the phase of the

physical origination ot many differing actualities 1n the universe
In this phase, realities have both mental and physical aspects,

but there is a deficienoy in the solidarity ot the individuals
with eaoh other.

The potential values or ideal forms ot th1a

phase are derived from the immanence in the world of the first

37 g, p. 72.
38 !!!f, pp. 72-74..
39 !!!, p. 532. Gt. Leclerc, Whitehead's Metaphysics,
pp. 109-202, for a brief treatment of God's primordial nature.

40

,g,

p. 1$4.
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phase, God's primordial na1rure.

(111) There is God's consequent

nature, the phase ot the universe in which the many actualities
from the second phase are unified.

This third phase ot the uni-

verse derives from the tirst two phases:

trom the first, in that

God's primordial valuing ot potential torms includes the appetite
for actualizing the potential value of God's own consequent na•
ture; and from the second, in th.at God must unify and preserve
the universe as it is given to him with all its suffering and imperfections.

In thia third phase, God is appropriately termed

the kingdom of heaven since he uniDiea and preserves the values ot
the universe with the actuality ot his own value.

(iv) Lastly,

there is the phase of God's superjeot nature in which God passes
over into the universe, affecting the many new actualities with
his consequent nature.

The perfected actuality of the previous

world as it has been preserved and valued by God•s consequent nature passes over into the temporal world along w:i th the aim of
God'• primordial nature toward the value of the future universe.4l

(4)

The religious intuition is the experience of the

kingdom of heaven, the experience of God in his primordial, consequent, and superject natures.

The religious intuition is the

direct apprehension of the primordial nature of God, "the prina1-

.m,

41
p. 532. or. Leclerc, ~· cit, pp. 203-208 tor
brief treatment of God a.a primordial and consequent; ct. also. 1! 1
pp. 134•135 on the primordial, consequent, and auperject natures
of God.

7S
ple determining the grading of values,"

as

immanent in the indi-

vidual providing him with his appropriate ideal of value for himto the value of others and the value .......
of -----the world
-self in relation
.............
2
...........

!:.!! ..! whole.4

_.....

The religious intuition is also the awarteness of

the superjeot nature of God, i.e., the 1mm.a.nenoe or the consequent

nature of God in the world, his preserving unir1oat1on and valua•
tion of the past world.

The love 1n the world passes into the

love 1n heaven, the consequent nature

or

God, and floods back a-

gain into the world as the auperjeot nature of

God.43

The super-

jeot nature, 1.e., the ilrmanenoe of the consequent nature, of God
is that factor in religious experience whioh enables the individual to conceptualize clearly the third element revealed in religious experience.

For it is the immanence

nature that makes the individuals

or

or

God•a consequent

the universe into a valuable

communitr, a solidarity, both.!! derived from God's presArving
un1.t'1cat1on and valuation of past actualities

!!'!£ .!.! necessax:r for

the existence of each present actuality as a potentially valued
member of the kingdom of heaven.44
This brief ocmparis:on of the religious intuition with
Whitehead 1 s concept of the primordial, consequent, and superject

42 !!,M,
43 !!!1.
44 fill,

p. 60.
p. 532.
P·

S9.
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tures of God has helped to clarity what the religious intuition
1soloses.

The religious intuition is a direct experience of a

oharaoter of permanent rightness, the kingdom of heaven, whose
immanence in things modifies both efficient and final cause.

Eff1

lent causation in the world is modified by the efficient causation of this character of permanent rightness.

Efficient causa-

tion in the present actualities is influenced by God's superjedt
overflow of God's consequent nature into things.

It

is God's consequent nature which helps to make the world unified
nd harmonious.

Final causation in things is initially derived

n each new thing from the final oBusation of God's primordial
as immanent in things.

God's superjeot nature, by its aim

the value of the future universe, also affeots the final aims
Both God's primordial finality and superjeot finality
elp to unify the final causality of the many actualities in the
In summary, the direct apprehension of God's primordial
onsequent, and superjeot natures as immanent in the individual as
character of permanent rightness enables him to know his

.Q!fi!

alue, the value .Q! 1nd1 viduala !2!! .!.!,gh other, and the value !1$_
world .!! .! oomm.unitx.
The immanence of the kingdom of heaven is Whitehead's
bristian solution of the problem of evil.
ries to overcome evil with good.

The kingdom of heaven

Evil is the brute motive force

r .fragmentary purpose, disregarding the eternal, harmonious ti-
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nality of the kingdom of heaven.45

When God 1 s oonsequent nature

is affected by something evil, i.e., by the result of fragmentary
purpose, the harmonious finality of his primordial and superjeot
natures presents new final causes to actualities.

If the actuali-

ties achieve these final causes, harmonious purpose will overoome
fragmentary purpose.

Good will overcome evil by the power of

God's persuasive ideals.
Even more than providing for the solution of particular
evils, the immanence of the kingdom of heaven makes eaoh present
actuality a potentially valuable member of the

kin~dom

of heaven.

The ultimate evil of the temporal world is that its actualities
are temporal••that they cease to be.

Past temporal aetualities

have affected present actualities causally, but present actualities do not preserve the full immediaoy ot the past.46

Whitehead

explains how the kingdom ot heaven solves this ultimate evil.
God•a aim in his primordial nature includes the appetite tor his
consequent nature.

God's consequent nature is causally affected

by temporal actualities, but God unifies and preserves their val-

ues achieved and their immediacy in himselr.47

Since the kingdom

ot heaven solves the ultimate evil in the world, it follows that

4S !!!!!, p. 276.
46 .f!, p. 517.
47 !!!, P• 524.

78
it is religious experience that discloses the ultimate good, the
kingdom ot heaven.

The kingdom ot heaven is the ultimate good,

both as immanently providing the potential value for each actuality and as immanently preserving the value ot each actuality in
its immediacy.

The kingdom ot heaven discloses in the religious

intuition that the temporal individual

!! valuable in an everlast-

ing way, that the individuals .!!! their mutual temporal relationships .!.£!. valuable in an everlasting way.48
This study agrees with Thompson'• study ot Whitehead's
philosophy ot religion in that the religious intuition tor White•
head is an "intuition disclosing a real order or permanence in the
ultimate nature of things which is both productive and protective
of value. n49 Thia study also agrees with 'l'hompaon that the permanent rightness, immanent in the nature of things and modifying
both efficient and final causality, is to be correlated with White
head's metaphysical description of God's primordial, consequent,
and superject natures.SO

or

In evaluating Whitehead's description

the religious intuition as the foundation

or

rational religion,

Thompson holds that Whitehead is content merely to formulate his

48 J!,

p.

S25.

49 Kenneth Thompson, Jr., Whitehead's f.hilosophy .Q!
Reli,ion (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University,

i<}63

p.

s1.

50 .!!:?,!g.,

p.

67.
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description ot the intuition and is unable to answer questions
about the precise nature and character of the data disclosed in
the religious intuition.

In questioning the precise nature and

oharaoter ot the data diaolosed in the religious intuition, Thompson does not mean that Whitehead made no attempt at clarifying

For Thompson h1mselt, although he does not em-

the experience.

phasize the interpretation of the experience as the immanence

or

the kingdom ot heaven, points out clearly and exhaustively how to
correlate the rellgioua intuition with Whitehead's metaphysical
description

or God. What Thompson means is that the religious

intuition aa stated by Whitehead is both vague and ambiguous as
an evidence in its own right.51

Thompson's interpretation is correct with regard to
Religion in !b!, Making, but not with regard to Whitehead's last
book, Modes

~

Thought.

In the former work, Whitehead is content

merely to formulate his assertion and to correlate it with h1a
metaphysical description of God.

He does state the religious in-

tuition in several ways; he does correlate it with the search tor
moral value; he denies that it is an.experience
sonal deity or as

19!!

or God as !h!! per-

personal deity; he does interpret it in

terma of the kingdom of heaven.

However, the evidence of the re-

ligious intuition remains vague and ambiguous in its own right and

.51 Ibid., P• 242.

relies heavily for its truth value upon Whitehead's elaborate
metaphysical description of God.

However, in Modes

9.£. Thought,

Whitehead's aim is to examine some of those general oharaoterizations of human experience whioh are presupposed in the directed
activities of mankind.

He makes no attempt to frame a systematic

philosophy, but rather he condenses for publication those features

ot his Harvard lectures which were incompletely presented in his
previous worka.52

It is in this pre-systematic presentation that

Whitehead reconsiders the religious intuition in order to clarify
it in terms of itself apart from a teobnioal metaphysics.
Whit~head

himself considers an objection to his use of

the religious intuition quite similar to Thompson's evaluatory
remarks.

An intuition merely experienced in exceptional moments

1a simply a function of those moments.

The intuition is a private

psyohologioal faot and is without general evidential force.
Whitehead answers the objection.

Those intuitions which emerge

under exceptional oiroumstanoes and remain knowable only under
suoh conditions have only personal s1gnif1oanoe.

But those intu-

itions which emerge under exceptional oiroumstandes and become
knowable apart from those circumstances have more than personal
significance; such intuitions have general evidential force.

Suoh

generally evident intuitions may be clearer under exceptional cir-

52 !f!'., pp. viii, 1-2.
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oumstanoes, even though the intuitions should not be confined to
such o1roumstanoea.53

Although Whitehead does not say so, it is

the view of this study that the Modes g! Thought description of
the sense of Deitz is his attempt to make the religious intuition
generally evident.

Consequently, the sense of Deity must be

described before examining its relationship to the function of
speculative reason.

c.

±..!!! Religious Intuition .!! 1,!l! Sense .2£ Deitz
The presupposition for the description of the sense of

Deity is Whitehead's discussion of matter-of-fa.ct and importance
in Lecture One of Modea B£,

'l'hough~.

The notion of matter-of-fa.ct

is the concept of something that simply happens, without purpose,
without value, without importa.noe.

'1Th1s grasp or factuality is one extreme or

of mere existence. n54
thought.

"Matter-of-!'aot is the notion

Namely, it is the concept of mere agitation of things

a.gita.ted."55

This notion of mere matter-of-faot is the hidden

ideal of physical scientists who insist upon the exclusive importance of objectivity.

The proverb that applies to nature applies

also to the notion of importance:
and it ever returns.

53 !!,H,

pp.

Expel nature with a pitoh-fork,

To uphold objectivity in scientific and re-

64-66.

54

m,

P• 9.

55

~,

p. 11.

fleCtive thought as an ideal is to insist upon the importance of
objectivity for man.
important.

The zeal for

t~ttth

presupposes that truth is

Also sustained observation presupposes importance.

For concentrated attention means disregard of irrelevancies; and
this disregard can only be sustained by some sense of importance.
Consequently, the sense

or

importance is embedded in the very be-

ing or human and animal experienoe.56
Whitehead points out that it is difficult to use wo:rds
to evoke a sense of this general character of importance.

For

words are generally used to 1nd1oate useful particularities.
Great literature tries to go beyond the usual usaee of language
and evoke such vivid feelings as the pervasive sense of impor-

tanoe.57

One way of characterizing importance ia "that it is that

aspeot of feeling whereby a perspective is imposed upon the universe ot things felt.n58

The perspective an individual takes upon

the universe is the result of his individual interests.

Suoh a

notion of importance as perspective tends "to reduce the concept
of importance to mere matter-of-tact devoid of intrinsic inter-

est.1159

Physical scienoe can use this notion of perspective; "the

56 11t'
:;,r:7

pp. io-12.

Ml', p. 1 •
_

58 !!1 P• 1.$.

59 .!f!,

P•

15.
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oonsequent soienoe is the scheme of physical laws which • • • expresses the patterns of perspective as observed by average human
beings. 1160
tive.

But Whitehead refuses to reduce importance to perspec-

"Perspective is the dead abstraction of mere tact from the

living importance of things felt.

The concrete truth is the vari-

ation of interest; the abstraction is the universe in perspeotive. "61

In 1ns1at1ng that importance is more than mere perspective, Whitehead is speaking of the most primitive stage of dis•
or1m1nat1on in human experience.
words:

Th~ '~rimary

He gropes for the appropriate

experience which lies below and gives its

meaning to our oonao1ous analysis of qualitative detail • • • is
a value-experience.

Its baa1o expression ia--Have a care, here 1a

Yea, that is the best phrase.-the primary
glimmering of consciousness reveals, Something that mattera." 62
something that matters!

There 1a a sense of worth at the base

or

our existence.

Worth

here is not to be conceived as a feeling which man simply subjectively attributes to his grasp of reality.

Rather, the sense of

worth essentially presupposes that which is worthy.

The sense

or

Something that matters is the sense of existence .tbr its own sake,

60

~.

pp. 15-16.

61 J!!, p. 15.
62 ~. pp. 158-159.
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of existence which is its own justification, of existence with its
own character. 63
It is this sense of Something that matters which Whitehead explicates as the sense ot Deity.

This experience ot Some-

thing that matters provokes attention.

Attention dimly discloses

a three-fold character:

Totality, Exte:rnality, and Internality.

These are not clear concepts but dim presuppositions which guide
conaoious analysis of details.

Any experience of the world will

assume as obvious the Totality of actual fact, the Externality or
many facts, and the Internality of the one experienoing.64
Whitehead insists that this three-fold character is
"primarily a dim division.

The senae of totality obscures the

analysis into self and others.

Also this division is primarily

based on the sense of existenoe as a value-experience.

Namely,

the total value-experience is discriminated into this value-experience and those value-experiences." 65 The fundamental basis of
this description is that our experience is' a value-experience, expressing a vague sense or a power maintaining and realizing its
own purpoae. 66

63

"Ou~ experience starts with a sense of power • • •

m.

p. 149·

MT, p • 159.
64 .......

MT,
65 ........

P•

66 _m, p.

lSo.
lSo.
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Power is the compulsion ot composition [Ot aotual1t;i7. • • •

The

essence of power is the drive towards aesthetic worth tor its own
sake."6 7 The drive or actuality towards aesthetic worth tor its
own sake is the appetition of purpose, the appet1t1on o• self-importance.

"We have no right to deface the value-experience which

is the very essence or the universe.

Existence, in its own nature,

is the upholding of value-intens1ty.n68
This fundamental sense ot reality as a value-experience,
with a power striving to maintain and realize its own purpose, is

or Something that matters.
sense or Something that matters

the sense
this

Whitehead has affirmed that
discloses dimly to attention

a three-told character, Totality, External1ty, and Internal1ty,
but he has not explained why attention reveals this character.
begins to explain that this sense

or

He

Something that matters first

differentiates itself into "the sense of many existences with
value-experience; and that this sense of the multiplicity of value-experiences again differentiates • • • into the totality ot
value-exper1enoe, and the many other value-experiences, and the
egoistic value-experienoe."69
The Internality of the one experiencing Something that

67 Jr!, p. 163.
68 !!:t p. 151.

69 .!!!· pp. 150-151.
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matters is the clearest example of reality as value-experience.
"Importance reveals 1tselt as transitions of emotion.

My impor-

tance is my emotional worth now, embodying in itself derivations
trom the whole, and tran the other facts, and embodying in itself

reference to future £Value-experienoe~.n70

The Externality ot

reality 11 revealed in so tar as tho aelt (Internal1ty) feels
itself as deriving from the past, 1.e., trom other value-experiences, and in so tar as the self feels itself as tending to communicate its own value-experience into the value-experiences
others.

or

The Totality ot reality is revealed in so tar as the self

feels itself as deriving from the Totality of value-experience of

the past and as preparing its contribution tor the Totality ot
value-experience

or

the tuture.

The self feels itself as deriving .from Externa.lity, 1.e.

fl"Om other value-experiences.

The most explicit example ot deri•

vation trom Externality is memory, "our realization ot those other
actualities, which we conceive as ourselves in our reoent past,
tuaing their self-enjoyment with our innediate present.n71

"It is

the importance of the others which melts into the importance of
the self.
this

Actuality is the aelt-enjoym.ent ot importance.

selt-enjo~nt

70

!ft,

71

~. p.

But

has the oharaoter of the self-enjoyment of

P• 160.

161.
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others melting into the enjoyment of' the one selt."7 2

The actual-

ity of the present self is constituted by a process of oompoa1tion from the past .facts that

11

have such closeness of reference tc:

the immediate self that an intimate unity with them is claimed.
In this way, the concept of self-identical enduring personal
existence dawns. •t73

From one point ot view, namely, attending to

the past, Whitehead holds that the "sense ot externality is based
on the primary self-analysis of the process of composit1on."74
'Ihe analysis discloses the most valuable tacts ot the past self
becoming faotora in the present composition of the self as a power striving to maintain and realize its own purpose.
Complementary to the point of view which attends to the
past, there is the point

or

view whioh attends to the future.

'!'his latter point of view also discloses the external! ty.

Atten-

tion to the future is involved in the self's striving to maintain
and realize its own purpose.

The self's oonoeptual entertainment

of unrealized possibility is, in its highest development, the en•
tertainment of the ideai.75

This sense of the ideal is involved

in the urge of the self to express itself.

72 .!:!I· p. 161 •
13 lf!:, p. 160.
74

_,
Hr

-

p. 163.

7S MT, p. 37.

"Expression is the
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dit!'usion, in the environment,

or

something initailly entertained

in the experience of the expressor.n76

"The more general notion

of Importance is presupposed by Expression.

Something is to be

diffused throughout the environment which will make a differenoe. 077

The self has the feeling that it has something important

to express to others.

This something important should become part

of the importance of others.

This impulse and urge to diffuse

"is the most fundamental evidence ot our presupposition of the
world without."7 8

Both the past and the future of the self dis-

close evidence for the externality of the world.
There is another way in which attention to the future
discloses the Externality of the world.

Attention to the !'uture

is involved in the self's striving to maintain and realize its
own purpose, its ideal.

The self's oonaeptual entertainment or

unrealized possibility is, in its highest development, the entertainment or the ideal.

This sense or the ideal 1s one way or

experiencing importance, in this case, something important that
needs to be achieved by the self.

This experience

or

ideals in-

cludes through memory the experience of having sometimes succeeded
and othertimes failed.

76 .!!£, p. 29.

77 .!!:.
78 J:!I,

p. 28.
p.

29.

Whitehead explains how this experience
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discloses the externality of the world:
The intertwining of success and failure in respect to this
final experience is essential. We thereby experience a relation to a universe other than ourselves. We are essential•
ly measuring ourselves in respect to what we are not. A
solipsist experienoe cannot succeed or fail, tor it would be
all that exists. That would be no standard ot comparison.
Human experience explicitly relates itself to an external
standard. The universe ie thus understood as including a
source of ideals.79
Whitehead's intuition may be explicflted in the following
modus tollens conditional syllogism in order to elucidate its
self-evidence:
It the self were solus ipse, there would be no success
or failure, in tact, no striving for ideals at all. For selt
would be all that exists; and since it would be all that
Could exist in a sol1psist1c world, it would be unable to
experience a relationship to a universe of ideals other than
1 ts elf'.

But the self does strive tor idea.la, and further, does
have auooeas and failure in its striving fbr ideals.
Therefore, the self is not solus ipse.
The self knows "the sense of external reality--that is to

say, the sense of being one actuality in a world of actualities-is the gift of aesthetic signifioanoe.

This experience claims a

relevance beyond the finite immediacy of any one oocaaion of experienoe. "80

"Importance, limited to a finite individual occasion

ceases to be 1mportant.n81

The self as solus 1pse oeases to be

79 !!1 pp. 141-142.
80 _m, p. 165.
81 l:f!'., p. 28.
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important.

In other words, Whitehead is affirming that the self's

conviction in and sense of importance, Something that matters, is
intelligible only if the self's importance continues and develops
the importance of the past and prepares for the importance of the
future.

Attention to the past and future of the self reveal both

how the self is 1n a process ot constituting itself from valuable
tacts of its past and how the self has the impulse to diffuse the
importance that it realizes into its environment.
On the one hand, the selt (lnternality) feels its valueexperience as deriving from the past, namely, from the Externality
or many value-experiences, and as preparing tor the future, that
is, preparing to diffuse ita own value-experience into the Externali ty of value•exper1encea of others.

On the other hand, the

self (Internality) also teels itselt as deriving from the Totality
of value-experience of the past and as preparing its contribution
for the Totality of value•experienoe of the future.

Whitehead

affirms that this factor of the Totality of value-experience "is
disclosed in our sense of the value, for its own sake, of the totality of historic taot in respect to its essential unity.

There

is a unity in the universe, enjoying value and (by its immanence)
sharing value." 82 Whitehead does not give an analysis of the
composition of the self (Internality) which reveals this factor of

82 .,!!, pp. 163-164.
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the Totality in the past of the self as he has done for the factor

or

Externality.

Rather, he tries to evoke in the listener a sense

ot how the VAlue of the present needs to be taken into the value

8

of the Totality. 3 Thia "sense of the value of the details for
the totality • • • is the intuition of holiness, the intuition or
the aaored, which is at the foundation of all religion." 84 This

is the intuition that importance, limited to the importanoe of Internality and Externality, ceases to be important.

"Importance is

derived from the immanence of infinitude .[f..e., Totality...J in the

83 !!!:,, p. 164: "When we survey nature and think however flitting and superficial he.s been the animal enjoyment of its
wonders, and when we realize how incapable the separate cells and
pulsations of each flower are of enjoying the total ettect--then
our sense of the value of the details for the totality dawns upon
our oonsoiousness."
Hartshorne expresses Whitehead's intuition of the need
in moral experience for an ultimate preservation ot values realized in the universe: "But even the most secular among us, especially when we are at our best, have a feeling of contributing
to some permanent and oommon good. Without this feeling, one act
must seem to us ss reasonable as any other, since the rational
judgment of acts refers to the good on the whole and in the long
run. Now how oan human 1nd1v1duals 1 destined as they are for
death, not only individually but, as it seems, collectively, racially, and lacking any but the most fitful and incomplete awareness ot each otherfs values, or even of their own past values-bow oan such as these serve any inclusive, permanent, common good
unless there be a God whose unitary, sympathetic, and ceathless
awareness, incapable ot forgetting, derive value from our momenltary and fragmented welfRre'l"
Hartshorne, "Ideal Knowledge Defines Reality: What Was
~rue in 1 Ideal1sm,•" Journal£! Philosophz, XLIII, no. 21 (Oct.
10, 1946) p. 582.
84

~. p.

164.
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finite .Lf,..e., Internality and External1ty.sJ"85

"Everything has

some value for 1tselt, tor others, and for the whole.
acterizea the meaning of actuality ... 86

This ohar-

This meaning is the pri-

mary explication of the sense ot Something that matters in its
three-told character.

Neither Internality, nor Externality, nor

Totality in any sense predeoes the others.87

The "dim meaning of

taot--or actuality--is intrinsic importance for itself, for the
others, and tor the whole. 08 8 The religious intuition is the experience ot the three-told character ot Something that matters,
the inter-connected values of selt, others, and the whole.
In Modes _g! Thoyght, Whitehead identities the religious
intuition as the sense ot Deity.89

He uses the sense ot Deity to

refer to value-experience and to the self's experience of ideals.
This double usage oooura in the following t~x.t:
Apart from this sense ot transcendent worth, the otherness of
reality would not enter into our oonsoiousness. There must
be value beyond ourselves. Otherwise every thing experienced
would be merely a barren detail in our own solipsist mode of
existence. We owe to the sense of De1ty the obviousness of
the many actualities ot the world • • • • 90

85 !!'.· p. 28.
86 lfl, p. 151.
87 11£, P• 159.
88 !f!, p. 159.
89 ,m:, pp. 140-142, 163-164.
90 J:r!, p. 140.
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The sense of transcendent worth is the sense of Deity.
This is the experience of values as other than, as beyond, the
present self.
in two ways:

Value-experiences are other than the present self
first, as achieved value-experiences in the past;

and secondly, as ideals, i.e., as value-experiences to be achieved
in the future by self and others.

Both the otherness of reality

and the multiplicity of other actualities is disclosed in the
sense of Deity.

The otherness of reality especially is revealed

in the self 'a experience of ideals only partially achieved.

If

the self were solipsistic, it would not measure itself by ideals,
by something other than itself; nor would it tail to achieve its
ideals, since it would have no external standard of comparison to
judge itself by.

This external standard of comparison is a source

of ideals other than the self.

The multiplicity of other actual•

ities is disclosed in the analysis of the self as a process ot
constituting itself from many valuable taota of its past.

The

analysis of the self also discloses the impulse of the self to
diffuse the value that it has realized into the otherness of ita
environment.

We owe to the sense of Deity the obviousness

or

the

otherness of reality and of the many actualities in reality.
Whitehead has used the sense of Deity to refer to valueexperienoe and to the experience of ideals.

He also uses the

sense ot Deity to refer primarily to Deity, that factor which unities the many value•experiencea ot the universe into the value of

94
the Totality and which is the source of the ideals striven after
by all value-experiences.
text:

This usage occurs 1n the following

"We owe to the sense of Deity • • • the obviousness ot the

unity of the world for the preservation of the values realized
and for the transition to ideals beyond realized faot."91

White-

head's intuition is that only Deity, immanent in experience as
the ultimate preserving unification of value-experiences and as
the source of the world's unity ot ideals, could make intelligible the unity of the transcendent universe for the preservation
of values realized and for the ideals of the universe.92

Immanent

in experience as the unification of value-experiences, Deity is
the Totality which is directly experienced.93

Immanent in exper-

ience as the source of ideals, 1.e., of potential values to be
realized, Deit7 is the external standard to which "human experience expl1o1tly relates itselr."94
In summary:

Whitehead has used the sense of Deity to

refer both to value-experience and the experience of !dee.ls and to
Deit7 itself as the ultimate unification
as the ultimate source of ideals.

91

value-experiences and

This multiple meaning of the

~. p. 140.

J:!!!,
93 _m:,
94 _m:,
92

or

140, 142.
pp. 150-151, 158-160, 163-164.
pp. 141-142.
PP•
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sense of Deity is used by Whitehead to explain the obviousness ot
the otherness of value-experiences, the obviousness of the multiplicity of vnlue-experienoes, the obviousness of the unification
of value-experiences, and the obviousness of the unity
ideals of value-experience.

The Modes

£!

Though~

or

the

description of

the sense of Deity is Whitehead •s attempt to -1ce-'&efl,rally evident the religious intuition of the three-fold character of

So~e

thing that matters, the 1ntercormeoted values ot self, others,
and the whole.

Whitehead indicates that this aense of Deity AX-

hibits itself in several ways, such as, "the sense of morality,
the mystic sense ot religion, the sense of that delicacy of adjustment which is beauty, f;.n~ the sense of necessity tor mutual
connection which is understanding." 9S It is the purpose of the
next section to show how the sense of Deity as the sense of necessity tor mutual connection may serve as a defense of the function
of speculative reason.

D.

The Function of Spt?oulative Reason Considered in Light SJ.t.

ltltional Reliiion and The Religious Intuition as the Sense .Ql
Deitx

The relevance of the religious intuition to the function

ot speculative reason can best be considered after a consideration

or

the relevance of rational religion.

considered in turn:

These two aspects will be

(1) rational religion, and (2) the religious

9$ !f!, P• 37 •

intuition.
(1) The relevance of rational religion as a way of life
to the function of speculative reason is found in Whitehead's em•
phasis on justification.

He has explained that rational religion

should have a system of general truths which Justify a person by
cleansing his character of faults and by developing the oharaotar
towards the religious ideal of porfection.

Rational religious

truth is that which fulfills man's longing for justification.

ae-

lig1on1s confrontation with the problem of evil reveals another
aspect of religion as the longing for Just1f1oat1on.

Religion is

the longing of the spirit that the facts of existence should find
justification, 1.e. finality, in the nature of existence.

The

religious need for justification includes not only the need tor
moral purification and moral development but also the need to understand man's predicament in the problem of evil and the need to
be rescued from this predicament.
Speculatively, the need for justification can be fulfilled by answering man•s question of why evils happen to man, especially to the good man.

Praotically, the need for Justification

oan be fulfilled by a religious life in which evil is overcome or
escaped from in some manner.

There is an ultimate evil in the

temporal world deeper than any speo1f1o evil:
ties cease to be.

all temporal reali•

By itself the temporal world does not provide

for the unification and preservation of values achieved.

Rational
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religion attempts to solve this ultimate evil of the temporal
world and the problem

or

speaifie evils in the world.

One who

lives religion has a deep longing of the spirit that the !acts of
existenoe should find justification in the nature of existence.
As the longing that the facts of existence should find
justification, 1.e.

final1~y,

in the nature of existenae, rational

religion supports the function of'

sp~oulative

:'."'•?ason.

A person

who lives religion hopes that the facts of existence, includir..g
speoif!o evils and the ultimate evil of the temporal world, will
find meaning (that is. a justification, a purpose, a value) in
the nature of reality.

In so tar as his religion hae been ration-

ally critioized, that is has become a rational religion, this
person will tind little or no difficulty in acoppting the ideal

or

speculative reason.

"Religion is the translation of general

ideas into particular thoughts, particular emotions, and particular purposes; it is directed to the end or stretching individual
interest beyond its self-defeating particularity.n96
seeks a world•enoompassing finality.

Religion

The rationalism encouraged

by rational religion can easily overflow into the valuable human

project of metaphysical speculation, for example, about the nature
of the particular temporal realities and their relation to a possible permanent and intelligible reality whioh is non-temporal.

98
11

Ra1. 1g1on is an ultimate craving to in.fuse into the insistent

part1oular1 ty of emot-t.on that non-temnoral genera.11 ty wh1oh primarily belongs to conceptual thought s.lone. 11 97

As an ultimate

craving to understand particulars in terms of general principles,
religion is e demand for an intellectual justifioation ot brute
experience.

This c:'ernand hes been the motive power in the advance

of European science.

In this sense the speculative so1entif1o

interest 1s only a variant form of religioue interest.

Scientific

devotion to truth as an ideal is very similar to religious devotion to morlil and religious Justification as an 1deai.98
The correlation of the ideal of' sneeula.tive reason with
religion as the longing that the

f~ots

of existence find justifi-

cation in the nature of existence presupposes the aooeptanoe of
rational religion.

The religious intuition as the basis of ra-

tional religion must now be examined as to its possible oorrelat1on with the function of

speo~lative

reason.

(2) The religious intuition as the sense of Deity oan
serve as e defense of the tunotion of speculative raason in that
the

s~nse

t!on.

of Deity involves a sense of neoessity of mutual oonnec-

Whitehead has indicated that "rationalism presupposes a

97 .f!!, p. 23.
98

.m,

p.

24.
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complex or definite tacts whose interconnections are sought." 99
But rational religion is based on an intuition into the ultimate
character of the world.

This intuition discloses the values or

self, of others, and of the world as a community derivative from
the interrelations of its members and as necessary tor their continued existence.

The dim but fundamental meaning ot an existing

actuality is intrinsic importance, 1.e., intrinsic justification,
purpoae, value, tor itself, tor others, and for the whole.

This

sense of the three-fold scheme of Something that matters is "our
primary experience which lies below and gives its meaning to our
conscious analysis or" the world.100
Any experience of the world will assume as obvious the
totality of actual tact (the whole), tbe external1ty of many
faata (the others) and the 1nternal1ty of the one experiencing
(the selt).

This three-told scheme

or

something with intrinsic

justification is the presupposition which any experience requires.
It is also the self-evident insight into the presupposition ot
any attempt to explain existing actualities.

For it existing

actualities are not experienced to have intrinsic importance for
themselves, tor others, and tor the whole, then such actualities
do not exist tor their own sake; they do not exist with their own

.!!!· p. 24.
100 J!!, p. 158.
99

100
justification.

To exist without importance is to exist without

value or purpose.

To exist without purpose, without justifica-

tion through final causality, is to be a mere matter of taot inoapable of being understood as an element in a system. 101
Whitehead also indicates that the religious intuition

is the basis, the ultimate premise, of any rational evaluation of
This point may be used to
support the function ot speculative reason. 102 The ultimate prem
oonsoious determination of actions.

ise of any :rational understanding of particular actualities is
disclosed in the religious intuition as a general character of
rightness inherent in the nature or things.

This ultimate charac

ter of the universe is experienced as intrinsic importance tor
self, others, and the whole.

To exist as a self with suoh im-

portance, that is, to exist with such interrelationship with
others and the whole by final causality, is to exist capable of
being understood as an element in a system.
The sense of Deity diaoloses both the ultimate source

101

]!!!, p. 21.

102 !!!, pp. 66-67: "• • • there is • • • a rightness
in things, partially oontormed to and partially disregarded. So
far as there is conscious determination of actions, the attainment of this conformity is an ultimate premise by reference to
which ouz- oho1oe of immediate ends 1s oritioized and swayed. The
rational satisfaction or dissatisfaction in respect to any particular happening depends upon an 1nttt1t1on which is capable of
being universalized. Thia univeraaliaation of what is discerned
in a particular instance is the a~peal to a general ohs.raoter
inherent 1n the nature or things.

101

ot potential value, 1.e. meaning or finality, in the universe and
the ultimate end or preserving un1t1oat1on of values or meanings
achieved in the universe.

The explication of this intuition of

Deity as the ultimate source and end of meaning in the universe
necessarily establishes the function of speculative reason.

In

this experience of Deity, man knows that metaphysical reasons

oan be given for the tacts in the universe; man knows that the
ultimate reasons for meaning in tacts, both their ultimate source
and their ultimate end, can be given.103

In fact, they are given

in that very experience.
This section has explained how the sense of Deity as

the sense of necessity ot mutual connection serves tor Whitehead
as the intuited evidence defending the .function of speculative
reason.

The next section desoribe1 the agreement of this study

with other investigations on Whitehead.

E.

The AS!!eement of this Study with Other Investi~ations ot
lrtirtehead, iipecii'Iii Hartshorne'a ,!!l!! Tillich a
-The thesis ot this study, the positive oonneotion be-

tween the sense of Deity and the tunotion ot speculative reason,
agrees with the results of studies done by Belaief, Oobb, Hartshorne, T1111oh, and Thompson.

The agreement with these investi-

gators will be taken in that order.

103

!!J,

p.

65.
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In a consideration of Whitehead's methodological presuppost11ons, Belaief has conoluded that Whitehead's "vision of the
world as a creative process of internally related 1nd1v1dual1t1es
ultimately grounded in, and everlastingly moving toward, a final
total unity or value and order • • • has led him to the faith ot
rAt1ona11sm." 1 04 Underlying this faith in reason's speoulat1ve

tunotion, there ls, Belaief points out, an intuition ot 1nf1n1ty,
a religious experience, expressed as the 1d&al limit toward which
the world progresses, and therefore, towards which philosophical
description aims. 105 However, Belaiet baa not differentiated the
descriptions ot the religious intuition in Religion

.!n

the Makin_g

and Modes 91.. Thoughi, as this study has done; nor has she pointed
out Whitehead's explicit correlation ot the sense

or

Deity with

the sense of necessity of mutual connection which is understanding.
Belaief does point out that the religious experience at
the basis ot Whitehead's rationalism should be related to an argument in Process .!!!4 Reality tor God's consequent nature as the
principle of truth. 106 While he is discussing truth as an ideal

104 Lynne Belaief, The Ethics of Alfred North Whiteheac
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia-Un!versity, 1964) p. 30.

105

~ ••

pp. 30-Jl.

lo6 Ibid., p. 35; Belaiet makes no t'urther comment on
the argument besides that simple statement.
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limit, namely, fully expressed propositions, Whitehead states the
following argument:
The truth itself is nothing else than how the composite
natures of the organic aotue.lities of the world obtain adequate representation in the divine nature. Such representa•
tions compose the •consequent nature• of God, whioh evolves
in its relationship to the evolving world without derogation
to the eternal completion of its primordial oonoeptual nature. In this way the •ontological pr1no1ple 1 is maintained
s1noe there can be no determinate truth, correlating impartially the partial experiences or many actual ent1ti8A• apar
from one actual entity to which it aan oe referred. 1
Sinoe there is no other reference to this argument in
wh1tehead•s writings, its meaning for his metaphysics has general
ly been neglected.

This argument is similar to Josiah Royoe•a

argument in his article, "The Eternal and the Practioal."108

Royoe•s and Whitehead•s oonclusiona are the same.

Royce conclude

that the Eternal Knower 1a invariant and yet growing because the
world grows. 109 Whitehead concludes that God's consequent nature
evolves in its relationship to the evolving world without deroga•
tion to the eternal completion of his primordial conceptual nature.

Royce's main premise is that man in asserting a judgment

to be true expresses a need tor truth. 110

107

J:!!,

pp. 18-19.

108

Josiah Royce, "The Eternal and the Praot1oal," ?he
American Philosophz, eds. Muelder and Sears (BoS:oughton Mifflin Co., 1940) pp. 246-261.

Develo~ent

ton:

Although Whitehead has

91

109 .12!,g., p. 261.
110

Ibid.
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not expressed the premises of his argument, he must have the same
main premise.

For his oonolusion is that God is the actual en-

tity who determines truth, who correlates impartially the partial
experiences of many actual entities.

'l'his conclusion is the re•

sult of the ontological principle, both in so tar as reasons can
be given (only through actual entities) and also 1n so far as it
states that there is a final truth, that final reasons can be
given. 111
Whitehead'• main premise must be the same as Royce's,
namely, tba t there is a need for a final truth.

1'here is a need

for a final impartial correlation of the partial experienoea ot
the many actual entities, since otherwise there would be no truth.

This need for truth is essential to man since

eve~y

judgment which
asserts that there is truth expresses thereby a need for truth. 112

Therefore, this need tor a final determination of impartial truth
must be fulfilled by an actual entity capable of such a final de•
termination.

Such an entity oan only be God since tbe finality ot

his primordial nature encompasses all possible actual entities
(potential values).

This all-encompassing finality makes God

111 Ot. chapter four for further discussion of Whitehead's ontological principle.
112 Whitehead nowhere identifies the oremises or his argument, but these presuppositions can be discovered in his discussion or his theory of judgments as both a coherence theory and
a correspondence theory inl!!,, pp. 290 rr.
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capable ot being causally affected by, ot being related with perfect feeling and knowledge, to everry temporal actual entity without partiality.

Every temporal aotual entity has only a perspec-

tival or limited finality whioh makes it capable of being related
to any actual entity only with partiality.
perfection ot the unchanging finality

or

Only God through the

the primordial nature is

capable of perfectly knowing the world as it continues to grow
and afteot his consequent nature.113
John Oobb otters a suggestion tor interpreting this argument for the primordial and consequent natures as the ground ot
the possibility ot truth.

He believes that Whitehead is arguing

from the sense, that all men have, "that there is some structure
to which our formulations more or lesa adequately approximate."114
This sense ot "reality as a whole" is exactly what Whitehead meana
by the sense ot Deity.

Because man experiences the structure ot

reality as a whole, he is dimly aware that all his judgments are
trying to express the truths that Deity knows perteotly.
Oharles Hartshorne identities the Modes ,2' Thousht experience

or

Deity with Whitehead's Ro1cean argument.llS

113

!!.

pp.

Thia

$23-524.

114 Oobb, A Christian Natural Theologx (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1965J p. 166. Oobb does not point out the
oonneotion between this sense or "reality as a whole" with the
sense ot Deity.
llS

Hartshorne, "Whitehead'• Idea ot God,"!!:!.!. Philoao-
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studyagr&ea with Hartshorne that the sense of Deity is self-evident but obscure and that consequently the experience needs to be
emphasized, pointed out, through the effects it has on the rest of
man•s experience.

Hartshorne is oorreot when he says that one of

the etteots which the experience ot Deity causes is that truth is
objective.

The sense of Deity as the structure of reality as a

whole gives man the sense that bis judgments are trying to apprcxx.imate that objective structure.

Although Hartshorne identifies ·.

the sense of Deity with Whitehead's Roycean argument, Hartshorne
also distinguishes the two passages, since the sense of Deity can
be a religious experience of the value of reality as a whole. 116
Thia study has emphasized the latter aspect, the experience of the
value of reality as a whole.

For in Modes

.2.! Thought, Whitehead

emphasizes the dim but t'undamental experience as a sense of *Something that matters• in a three-told scheme, Internality, External•
ity, and Totality.

It is the sense ot the value ot the Totality

of the universe wh1oh enables Whitehead to identify this experience as th& sense of Deity.

Hartshorne does not emphasize this

sense of Deity as intuitively given in experience.

But Hartshorne

is correot when he says that the sense of Deity serves as the
foundation of Whitehead's Roycean argument.

Hartshorne is also

•f"'

·--------"·

~t.

116 Hartshorne, •Ideal Knowledge Defines Reality:
Was True in 'Idealism,'" .2.i?• oit., p. 582.

What
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correct when he says that the sense of Deity serves as the basis

ot moral life and ethical theory. 117 For as Whitehead said,
"Everything has some value for itself, for others, and tor the
whole.

This characterizes the meaning ot actuality.

By reason

of this character, constituting reality, the conception of morals
arises." 118
Tillich's interpretation of Whitehead agrees with Hartshorne in holding that there is an awareness of something ultimate
in value and being in every human or intentional act, whether the
aot is theoretical (tor the sake ot truth) or practical (tor the
sake or good}.ll9

Tillich bolds that the fundamental commitment

which directs Whitehead's philosophical approach is a type of
mystical or religious experience, namely, the awareness of valueproduoing processes.

This perception and oonoeption of reality

is based on an immediate experience or something ultimate in value

and being ot which man can become aware intuitively.12 0

Although

Tillich does not off er an analysis of tbe Modes !2t.. Thoµgbt description of the sense of Deity, he is correct in identifying

117

See above, this chapter, p. 91, footnote 83.

118 ~. p. 1$1.
119 Tillich, "The Two Types of Philosophy ot Religion,"
Union Seminaty Quarterly Review, I, no. 4 (May, 1964) pp. 10-11.
120 Tillich, Systematic Theolo"ff, Vol. I (Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, l951J pp. 9, J.

108
Whitehead's fundamental point of departure as the awareness of
value-producing processes, which awareness is based on an immediate experience of Deity.

This sense of Deity is relevant to spec-

ulative reason as the sense of necessity of mutual connection of
all the value-experiences in the universe, and to praotioal reason as the sense ot the interconnected values of self, others, and
the whole. 121
Thompson has pointed out that Whitehead's rationalism
"finds justification or at least exemplification in immediate
experience 1n that immediate experience discloses complex entities
having temporal duration and which are in the process of trans1t1on. "122

In intuitive experience there is disolosed an experi-

ential complexity-unity of different factors.

This unit1 of the

many bas an aesthetic harmony which is to be expressed in a rational understanding. 123 However, Thompson argues, the extension
of this description of immediate experience be1ond immediate experience presupposes a doctrine of empirical analogy: "L!i'h1losopb1cal generalization presupposes as a metaphysical ground a
uniform structure of experience such that the essential constitution of one entity is empirically analagous to that of others."124

121 l:!I1 P• 37 •
122 Thompson, .21?• oit., p. 79 •
123

124

Ibid.
-Ibid
••

p.

Bo.
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When metaphysical generalization is an inductive inference beyond
immediate experience, there must be an actual ground for the inference.

Thompson concludes, referring to Whitehead's discussion

of the presuppositions of scientific generalization that if analogical inference is to be possible, there must be an actuality
which is the ground, the presupposition, of the possibility of
metaphysical truth. This actuality is God. 12S
Thompson does not argue that this ground of the possibility ot metaphysical truth oould be known intuitively and be
related to the function of speculative reason.

He was probably

influenced by Whitehead's statement that these non-statistical
judgments are not in any sense religious. 126 Whitehead's correlation of the sense of Deity with the function of speculative
reason occurred in Modes ot
not emphasize.

~hoygh~,

the book whioh Thompson did

Onoe the sense of Deity is so correlated, an ob-

12.$ .!!?!,g. l
''Now, •in every inductive judgment, there
is • • • contained a presupposition of the maintenance of the general order of the immediate environment, ao far as ooncerna actual
entities within scope of induction.• .Llll, p. 3117 • • • rhus, 'the
basis of all probability and induction is the fact of analogy between an environment presupposed and an environment directly experienced.' [fR, p. 31.!l:l Beyond the principle of analogy must be a
faot of analogy if inference is possible and if the ontologioal
principle is valid. Thus the .method of metaphysical generalization, particularly as it involves inductive inference, presupposes
a non-statistical ground of inference which is itself actual. To
this actuality Whitehead gives the name •God'."

126

.!fi,

pp. 314-315.
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seure passage ot Whitehead becomes intelligible.
Faith in reason is the trust that the ultimate natures of
things lie together in a harmony which excludes mere arbitrariness. It is the faith that at the basis or things we
shall not find mere arbitrary mystery. • • • This faith
cannot be justified by any inductive genAralizntion. It
springs from direct inspection of th~ nature of thin£s as
disclosed in our own immediate present experience. i!T
This is Whitehead's strongest statement calling for an
intuited evidence (which Thompson has not appealed to) that defends the function or speculative reason.

To experience this

faith in reason is to know that man in his experience is more than
his own particular experience.

To experience this .faith is to

know that human experience, dim and fragmentary as it is, yet
sounds the utmost depths or reality. 128 To experience this .faith
is Mto know that detached details merely in order to be themselves
demand that they should tind themselves in a system of things:

to

know that this system inoludea the ha?'mony of logical rationality,
and the harmony of aesthetic achievement. • • • 11129 The aestheti&
religious sense of Deity has been discovered to be the intuited
evidence disclosing the universe as a harmony of logical rational1 ty and aesthetic achievement.

This chapter has tried to show a positive connection

127 ~' P• 27.
128

!H!!, P• 27.

129 ~' PP• 27-28.
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between the function of speculative reason and the sense

or

Deity.

Whitehead indicated that his philosophy is a pragmatism whioh
seeks the self-evidence which is a necessary part of civilized
experience and of what is meant by civilization.

There ie a

strong moral intuition that the good life of civilization is spec-

ulative understanding for its own sake.

This intuition is unlike-

ly to occur in primitive man and the primitive side of civilized
man.

For they lack the intuition of the universe as a complex of

interconnected facts that stimulates man to understand the facts
by analyzing and discriminating the connections; they lack the

intuition into the presuppositions of a coherent rationalism.

In

attending to his primary experience. oiY111zed man rinds that the
basis

or

or

Deity.

rational religion is the religious intuition, the sense
This is the experience of the interconnected values of

self, others, and the whole of the world.as derivative f'rom the
valuable interconnections of its members and as neoessary for the
continued existenoe of value.

This is an evidence which White-

head has systematized in his metaphysics; but he has also des-

cribed it independently, sinoe it is a primary experience.
evidence 1s the presupposition

or

This

civilized experience for White-

head both in its speculative and practical (moral, aesthetic, and
religious) aspects.

It is relevant to speculative reason's func-

tion, since the sense ot the 1nteroonneot1ons of reality, stimulates man to analyze and identify the interconnections.

The evi•
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denoe 1s also relevant to practical reason's function of achieving
value, whether the value be moral-religious or aesthetic.

The

sense of the interconnected values ot self, others, and the whole
as preserving the values of self and others is for Whitehead the
presupposition of man's moral-religious life and his aesthetic
life.

As the presupposition of speculative and practical reasons'

functions. the sense of Deity is necessarily affirmed by man for
Whitehead in any attempt to achieve the good of oiv111zat1on which
their functions seek.
This study continues to emphasize the connection between
the function of speculative reason and the sense of Deity.

As an

evidence for the function of spedulative reason, the sense of
Deity should not be accepted apart from Whitehead's other defenses
of his rationalism.

In aooord with his method of the working

hypothesis, no evidence or theory should be accepted apart from
the total evidence and theories of bia philosophy.
chapter studies bow Whitehead's defenses

or

Thus the next

speculative reasonta

function and the sense of Deity mutually supplement eaoh other.

OHAPrER III

THE SENSE OF DEITY AND OTHER DEFENSES OF THE FUNCTION OP
S.PEOULATIVB REASON AS SUPPLEMENTARY TO EACH OTHER
The purpose of this chapter is to study how the sense of
Deitya.ndother defenses

or

supplement each other.

There are three main d1v1a1ona to the

ohapter:

the t'unotion of speculative reason

first, Whitehead, Hume, and the sense of Deity; second-

ly, Rationalism, Irrationalism, And the sense of Deity; and third•
ly, Whitehead, Dewey, and the sense ot Deity.
pN>aoh ot each section is twofold.

The general

ap~

First, various defenses whiob

Whitebaad gives of speculative reason's function are described.

Secondly, this chapter raises objections to those defenses and
then shows how the sense of Deity can serve as an evidence answering these objections.

However, the other defenses supplement

the sense of Deity as a defense or speculative reason's function
just as much as it supplements them.

It will be pointed out that

all these various defenses need to be fulfilled by the sucoeasf'ul
working out ot a speculative understanding of all particular tacts
1n terms of general principles.

For Whitehead's method of the

working hypothesis demands that the ideal of speculative reason

113

114
needs to be achieved with some success; otherwise it would be a
worthless ideal for man's o1vil1zed life.

However due to the 1m-

perfeotions of metaphysical systems, it is possible for man to
los• hope in this ideal.

Consequently, the appeal to the reli-

gious intuition is important for man to continue to have faith 1n
the ideal of speculative reason.
A.

Whitehead, l!Y!!!!1 and the Sense .2! Deity
Whitehead points out that "since the time of Hume, the

fashionable so1ent1f1o philosophy has been such as to deny the
rationality of science. This oonclusion lies upon the surface of
Hume's philosophy."1 For Hume holds that every effect is a distinct event from its cause and that neither the oause nor the effect discloses any information about the other. 2 Since any connections between cause and effeot "must be entirel1 arbitrary, it
follows at onoe that soienoe is impossible; except in the sense ot
establishing entirely arbitrarz connections wh1oh are not warranted by anything 1ntrins1o to the natures either of causes or ef•
feota."3

Hume's position on the oause-effeot oonneotion consti-

tutes a serious objection to Whitehead's position that the function of speculative reason is to understand all particular facts

l

~. P•

1!!1!!.
3 !!!!f;
2

pp.

5.

5-6.

P• 6.

11$
in terms of general principles.

For if the connections between

facts (causes and effects) are entirely arbitrary as Hume holds,
then there would be no

of the oonneotions between

und~rstanding

facts which could be expressed in general principles.

However,

Whitehead's position differs from Hume's on the experience and intelligibility of the oause-etfect oonneotion.
Whitehead analyzes the presuppositions involved in
Hume's denial of the.experience of the necessary connection of

oause and effeot.

In Hume•s theory

or

perception (experience),

the mind is entirely wrapped up in the observation of the present
moment.

The mind is only conscious ot its passively received

sense-data in the present moment, and it is impossible for the
mind to go behind the present moment in order to discover the
causes of the presently observed sense•data.4 The assumption behind Hume's theory of experience ia his theory of time as pure
succession.

Whitehead points out that this concept of time !s

easily held although it is a mistake.

emphasize the discontinuity

or

For the usual observations

outer temporal events.

The correct

view of time emphasizes the succession of our inner acts of experience and thence derivatively the succession of outer events
perceived in those acts.

This succession is the derivation of

state from state, with the later state showing oonfol'mity to the

York:

4 Whitehead, Sngbolism, 11! Meaning !:!ls! Effeot (New

Macmillan, 1927) pp. 32•JJ.
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ttTime in the conorete is the contormation ot state

anteoedent.S

to state, the later to the earlier; and the pure succession is an

abstraction from the irreversible relationship of settled past to
derivative present. 116
Whitehead defends his view of time by distinguishing
two kinds of perceptions

presentational immediaoy, the awareness

of sense-data wh1oh Hume bas pointed out; and causal efficacy,
the awareness of a reality's derivation from its imrn.ediate pastenvironment. 7

Whitehead agrees with Hume's analysis of sense-data

as vivid; precise, and barren.

'rhere is no directly perceivable

oonneot1on of the qualities perceived with the intrinsia charaoters of the objects qualified. 8 However, Whitehead argues that
man experiences effioient causality in the mode ot perception

named causal effioaoy.

This is a primitive experienoe, the per-

ception of conformation to realities in the environment.

This per·

ception of the pressure from the world of things is especially
strong when vivid sense-perception in the mode of presentational
immediacy is weakened as in a strong enx>tional state.9

s

.!2!,g •• PP•

6

Ibid., p.

34-35•

35.

7 121!!·' p. .31.
8

Ibid.' pp.

23-25.

9

12!!·,

43.44.

pp.
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emotion auoh as fear involves the experience of retreating from
the object feared, of being affected by the action or threatened
aotion of the object feared.

One cannot retreat from mere sub-

jeati vity sinoe subjectivity is what one carries with himself.

Consequently, the emotion of fear is not an

~xperienoe

of man's

own subjectivity simply, nor an experience of sense-data, but
rather a clear recognition of a aausally efficacious object affecting man. 10 '.I'h1s experience of causal efficacy is confirmed
by the practical beliefs of man.

In practice, Whitehead points

out, we never doubt the conformation of the present to the immediate past.

''The present fact is luminously the outcome from 1 ts

predecessors. one quarter of a second ago. • • •

If dynamite ex-

plodes, then present fact is that issue from the past which is
consistent with dynamite explod1ng.nll

It is clear to Whitehead

that man does experience efficient aausat1on and that Hume is
therefore wrong to deny any experience of the cause-effect relationah1p.
Accordingly, Whitehead directly denies Hume's doctrine
of simple ooourrence whereby a moment of time simply occurs with

no intrinsic connection with the past:
I directly deny this doctrine of •simple occurrence.•

45.
pp. 45-46.

10

Ibid., P•

11

.!J?.!g.,
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There is nothing which 'simply happens.• Such a beliet is
the baseless doctrine of time as •pure succession.• The alternative doctrine, that the pure suooess1on of time is merely an abstract trom the tundamental relationship of conformation, sweeps away the whole basis for the intervention of
constitutive thought, or constitutive intuition, in the formation of the directly apprehended world. Universality of
truth arises from the universality of relativity, whereby
every particular actual thing lays upon the universe the obligation of conforming to it. Thus in the analysis of particular fact universal trut~I are df•ooverable, those t:rutha
expressing this obligation. 2
Hume's theory of time as sheer succession disoonneota

cause and effect.

His theory thereby attacks man•s belief in an

order of nature.

However, Whitehead has a notion of time as con-

formation whereby every particular actual thing lays upon the universe the obligation of conforming to it.

His theory

or

time de-

fends the intelligibility of modern man's 1nstioot1ve belief in

an order of nature.

Every particular fact can be conceived as

part ot an orderly world since each fact exemplifies the general
principle of efficient causation.

Por the notion ot: time as oon-

tormat1on means that every particular aotual thing lays upon the
universe the obligation of conforming to it, of being causally affected by it.

This analysis constitutes a defense of the function

ot speculative reason.

Por the analysis of particular fact oan

disclose universal truths.
It is important to point out that in the last cited text

Whitehead rejects the intervention ot constitutive thought (such

12

Ibid., pp. 38-39.
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as Kant•s

aatego~ies)

and of constitutive intuition (suoh as

Kant~

forms of sensibility, spaoe and time) and thereby rejects Kant's
Qrit~gue ~

Pure Reason.

Whitehead points out that Kant followed

Hume in assuming the radical disconnection of sense impressions
gua

but Whitehead holds that suoh disconneotion occurs only
in perception in the mode of presentational immediaoy. 1 3 In per~,

ception in the mode of causal eff1caoy, there is experienosd the
conneotion, the necessary relationship, of the immediately past
environment as causally affecting the present experiencing subject.

In the feeling-experience ot time as oonfol'll'Jat1on, that is,

in the feeling-experience

or

efficient causation, Whitehead has

his basic rejection or Kant's form of sensibility. time, and of
his

~

priori categorization of time into the efficient causation

principle as limited to the phenomenal world.

For perception in

the mode ot causal eftioaoy is not an experience
~wn

or

merely one's

subjectivity but rather of the objective world as causally

~ffeoting

the subject.

Whitehead's answer to Kant's position,

nowever, needs to justify that this experience ot the objective
~orld

as causally affecting the experiencing subject oan be oon-

oeived as disclosing the noumenal, 1.e., the 1ntell1g1ble, world.
~he

problem is how oan Whitehead defend the principle of efficient

oauaation as intelligible in its own right, 1.e., as disclosing

13 J.!,

pp.

172-173.
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the

nou.~enal,

intelligible world.

Whitehead doea defend the prinoiple
tion as intelligible in its own right.

or

efficient causa-

He states "'the principle

ot efficient, and final oausation•• as the "'ontological prino!ple'"s

"Thia ontologioal pr1no1ple means that aotual entities

,Lthe final real things of which the world is made uJil are the only
reasons; so that to search for a reason is to searoh for one or
more actual entit1es.n 14 Whitehead defends the ontological principle by attempting to reduoe it to the principle of contradiction
"It is a contrad1ot1on in terms to assume that some explanatory
tact can float into the actual world out ot nonentity.

Nonentity

is nothingness.

Every explanatory tact refers to the decision
and to the etfioaoy of an actual thing." 15 Whitehead holds that
entity should receive an explanation or reason for its entity from
entity.

For if entity did not receive an explanation from entity,

entity would be explained by nonentity, which is absurd.
ty is nothingness, and nothingness explains nothing.

Nonenti•

It is clear

for Whitehead that entity cannot be explained by, that is, reduced to nonentity but rather that entity should be explained by
entity itslef.

Aa so stated, the ontological principle defends

the function of speculative reason, for all particular entities
should be intelligible in terms of the entities themselves.

14 _!!, PP• 36-37, Category of Explanation, xviii.

15 j!, P• 73.
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Veateh 1 s anelysia of another formulation of Whitehead's ontolog1•
cal principle is helpful in understanding Whitehead:

"Apart from

things that ar" actual, there is nothing, nothing in raot or in
efficacy• Lf!!, p. 6,h?." 16 Veatch defends this as a "metaphysioal

principle which is simply • • • its own reason tor being true.
For that anything should in tact be or be causally efficacious
without actually be1ng--th1s is simply unthinkable; it is even
seli'•oontradictory."17

Veatch calla such a metaphysical truth

analytic, 1.e., evident in and through the statement itself and
not through anything else.

On the one hand, this meaning or ana•

lytic agrees with Kant in that the predicate is analytically contained in the subject.

In the statement, •Anything that is a tact

or that is causally efficaoious must be an actual thing (an actual
entity),' the predicate is contained in the notion
But on the other hand, this meaning

or

or

the subject.

analytic disagrees with

Kant in that the statement is a faotual truth.

For if it is known

that something is causally efficacious, this causally efficacious
thing is known as an actual taot (an actual entity).

The know-

ledge that it is an actual entity is more than the knowledge ttlat
it is causally etficacioua. 18

view

9.1.

16 Henry Veatch, "The Trutha of Metaphysics, n The ReMetaRhiaics, XVII, no. 3 (March, 1964) p. 375.
-----

17

Ibid., PP• 375-376.

18

~., p.

379.
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Two defenses of the function of

speoul~tive

reason have

been described, (1) Whitehead's notion of time as the oon£ormat1on

ot the present to the efficient causality of the past and (2) his
ontological principle.

Difficulties may be raised about these

defenses which can receive an answer from the sense of Deity as
an evidence.
(1) Against Whitehead's notion of time the difficulty
may be raised that Whitehead has generalized the notion of time as
contorm.ation.

The question needs to be asked:

generalization?

what justifies the

Whitehead's answer is that universality ot truth

arises from the universality of relativity, whereby every actual
thing lays upon the universe the obligation of conforming to it.19
But this answer is not sufficient.

For the universality of rela-

tivity is precisely what is in question.

Whitehead could claim

that it is probable that every particular actual thing causally
affects the universe.

But this suggestion of probability would

not justify as necessarily true that there is so complete an order

ot nature that the function of speculative reason is to understand
all particular facts as illustrating the same general rational
principles.
·rhe sense of Deity as the 'I'otal1ty which preserves the
~alues

realized in the universe and which shares its preservation

19

Whitehead, Symbolism, pp. 38-39.
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helps to complete the above defense of speculative reason's function.

For this sense of the Totality is an evidence disclosing

that it is necessary that every particular actual entity causally
affects the universe.

On the basia ot this evidence, 1 t is neces-

sarily true that there is so complete an order of nature that the
function of speculative reason is to understand all particular
facts as illustrating the same rational principles.
(2)
by

The defense of the function of speculative reason

the ontological principle's reduction to the principle of con-

tradiction is successful only if one grants that all particular
facts are intelligible in terms of general principles.

If every

particular fact is 1ntell1g1ble, then entity cannot be reduced to
nonentity; but if every faot is not intelligible, it does not follow that entity cannot be reduced to non-entity.

It is clear that

the attempted reduction of the ontological prinoiple to the

pr1nc~

ple of contradiction is only a restatement in different words ot
the function of speculative reason.
Moreover, Sherburne unwittingly raises a further difficulty in stating that Whitehead 1 s "system requires God in the
first place simply to preserve the ontological principle."20

Haven:

20 Donald Sherburne, A Whiteheadian Aesthetic (New
Yale Universiyy Press, 1961) pp. 36.37-;-

The
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difficulty is that, on the one hand, the ontological principle is
used as a

part'1al basis of the proof of God 1 s existf'noe, but, on

the other hand, the system requires God to nreserve the truth ot
the ontological princ1ple. 21

Veatoh's defense ot the ontological

principle is inadequate because the formulation which he quotes
and explains as selt•evident is taken out or context.
text is:

'Rbe full

"By this recognition of the divine element the general

Aristotelian principle is maintained that, apart from things that
are actual, there is nothing--nothing either in tact or in ettioaoy. "22 The problem remains, how can one affirm that the ontological principle is true without qualification unless one knows that
God, the divine element, exists as the basis of metaphysical
reasons? 23
The key to answering these difficulties by the sense ot
Deity is found in Whitehead's statement that the ontological prin•
21 or • .!!.· p. 48 for one statement of how the ontological principle together with the analysis of temporal actual enti•
ties require tor Whitehead the conclusion that a non-derivative,
eternal actual entity exists.
22 ,!!, p. 64.
23 ]!, p. 28: "The •ontological principle • • • • fJ.fil
the principle that the reasons for things are always to be found
in the composite nature of definite actual ent1ties--1n the nature
ot God for reasons of the highest absoluteness, and in the nature
ot definite temporal actual entities for reasons which refer to,a
particular environment. The ontological principle can be summarized as: no actual entity, then no reason."
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oiple oonstitutes "the first step in the description of the universe as a solidarity ot many actual ent1t1es." 24 Stokes explains
that

11

•solidarity• means that the universe ls an organic whole. ••25

The plurality ot actual entities produces a single, common result
whiah is the universe without the entities losing their individuality. 26

Stokes points out that this "notion of the unity in or-

der ot the universe is Whitehead's articulation of Wordsworth's
nature .!!l solido.

Its technical formulation is Whitehead's onto-

logical principle. 1127

Stokes explains that:

"This principle expresses Wordsworth's experience or 'that
mysterious presence ot surrounding things, which imposes
itself on any separate element that we sat up as an individual for its own sake.• /!MW, p. 12.l] It involves the aisoovery that the universe-TS made up of entwined interconnected entities that are suffused with modal presence of others.
Acoordingly, the whole or nature is involved in the tonality
of each actual entity."26
Stokes's comments on the ontological principle need to
be supplemented by the discussion of the sense or Deity.
sense of Deity, tl's sense of the interconnected values

24 _m,

p.

or

Only the
self,

65.

25 Walter Stokes, "Whitehead's Challenge to Theistic
Reality,,. ~ ~ Scholasticiam, XXXVIII, no. l (Jan., 1964) p. 2.
PP• 2-3; ct. J!B, p. 2$4.

26

~.,

Z'l

Stokes, ll•

28

-Ibid.

.ill•, p • .).
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others, and the whole universe, establishes in one intuitive aot
that actual entities constitute a universe.

Other intuitions can

establish the interoonneotions of some actual entities as causally
intertwined, but not of all actual entities as causally intertwined.

The text which Stokes cites trom Science .!!lS! !h!, Modern

World emphasizes the interconnections of some actual entities as
causally intertwined with others, but not of all actual entities
as causally intertwined.

There is another text in the same chap-

ter which definitely emphasizes the Totality, the whole of the
universe:

"Both Shelley and Wordsworth emphatically bear witness

that nature cannot be divorced from its aesthetic values; and
that these values arise from the cumulation, in some sense, or the

brooding presence of the whole onto its various parta."29
perience of the brooding presence

or

The ex-

the whole which gives rise to

values bas been explicated by Whitehead as the sense of Deity, the
sense of the interconnected values of self, others, and the whole
universe.

Consequently, the ontological principle should be rec-

ognized as Whitehead's way of starting to express in a systematic
metaphysics the solidar'ity ot the universe which the sense of

Deity establishes as an unsystematized, intuited evidence.
Because the sense of Deity discloses Deity as the ultimate source or potential values and as the ultimate end or preserving unitioation ot values realized in the universe, this ex29

SMW.

p.

127.
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perienoe is a defense of the ontological prine1ple.30

For reasons

are 1n faot known to be found for entity in entities themselves,
especially in that entity named Deity.

The problem of the circu-

lar argument raised against Veatch with rega:r-d to the knowledges
of the ontological principle and of God may be solved in the fol-

lowing way.

The

s~nse

of Deity ls a presystematio evidence which

Whitehead will not let any theory explain away or deny.31

It is

an evidence which defends the basic presupposition of any attempt

at metaphysics, namely, the presupposition of the function of speo
ulat1ve reason that all actualities are intelligible.
of departure in metaphysics, the

p~~suppos1t1on

This point

of the funotion ot

speculative reason, however, can receive other defenses.

These

other defenses are more easily stated due to their olar1ty, e.g.
the clarity of the reduction of the ontological principle to the
principle of oontrad1ction.

The formulation of the function ot

speculative reason 1n terms of the ontological principle 1s part

or

Whitehead's attempt to develop the technical principles of his

metaphysics.

Such p:rinoiples allow him to examine the evidence of

all of man's experience and thereby to clarity the relationship
between Deity and the world in a systematic metaphysics.

The clar.

1t1oat1on does not prove what was previously unknown, namely, that

30

or.

chapter

J, p. 33.

31 JY.!, pp. 79-80.
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Deity exists.

Por the basic presupposition or metaphysics, name•

ly, the presupposition of the function of speoula.tive reason, relies ultimately on the sense of Deity.
Before an examination of how the sense of Deity supplements defenses of speculative :reason, it is appropriate to point
out that the context of the description of the sense or Deity includes a contrast or Whitehead's notion of experience with Hume's
notion of experience.

Whitehead points out that Hume•s fundamen-

tal assumption is that sensa are primary since they are clear and
definite.

These senaa disclose no experience or the necessary

oonnection or cause and effect.

All of man's emotions and 1nten-

tions are merely concerned with senaa.
doctrine which Whitehead denies.

It is this part of Hume•s

Whitehead attempts to base his

own epistemology on the self-evidence of experience just as Hume
did.

Hum~•s

mistake is to take clear-out experienoe of the human

adult as the primary faot of human experience.

Obscurity is the

primary faot of human experienceJ clarity is something secondary.
The unDDrn child in the womb lives and has experience, as shown
in his reactions to stimuli.

Yet his experience can hardly be

said to be olear"out even though he definitely lives in the obscure-feeling context or and in reaction to the nourishing womb of
his mother.

Clear-cut sensations help to make us hum.an but they
do not make ua live.32

32

~.

pp. 152-158.
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What Whitehead is suggesting here but not identifying is
his dist1not1on between perception in the mode

or

presentational

imroediaoy and perception in the mode of causal efficacy.

The for-

mer does not reveal the oause-effeot connection, whereas the latter does reveal it as a fundamental taot of reality.

It is by

perception in the mode of causal efficacy that there occurs the
"primary experience which lies below and gives its meaning to our
conscious analysis of qualitative detail," that is, to our conscious oeroeption in the mode of presentational immediacy.33
primary experience establishes an A

~rior1

This

structuring of any ex-

perience in that it universally acoompanies every experience.
This primary experiential structuring of experience is a sense

or

Something that matters in a three-fold scheme, Totality, External1ty, and Internality.

Any experience of the world will assume as

obvious the Totality of aotual faot, the External1ty of many
and the Internality of the one experiencing.
scheme is the background of metaphysical

fact~

This threa-fold

neoessiti~s

which any

experience of the world presupposes.34

33 !fI, p. 150. In identifying the primary experience
(which lies below the conscious analysis of qualitative detail)
as the sense of Deity, the sense of the interconnected values of
self, others and the universe as a whole, Whitehead is identifying
the metaphysical factors of any experience, of any actual entity.
For •act or experience• and 'actual entity' are two names for one
and the same metaphysical reality, the final facts of which the
universe is oompose4. l!it p. 28.
34

!I.1

P• 159.
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No matter how abstract the selections of consciousness
may become in the mode or presentational immediacy, there is always present in consciousness an instinct to see how these selections, 1.e., abstractions, are oonneoted with the totality revealed in perception in the mode of causal eftioaoy.

Whitehead

illustrates this instinct, which is the reverse of abstraction,
with a consciousness, first attending to a sensory detail in the
mode of presentational immediacy, and then attempting to see how
this detail fits into a concrete whole such as a picture.

However

the point made 1s the general one that consciousness always tends
to see how an abstraction fits into the totality of immediate experience.JS
This instioot is present in oonaciousnesa because there
is always a dim sense ot the realities trom which selective abstractions are made.

The abstractions arise from the primitive

stage of discrimination in experience, namely, from perception in
the mode of causal efficacy, in which the concrete totality of
value experience is known.

The process of abstraction from the

totality points back to the totality.36

However, Whitehead points

out thats
• • • consciousness, which is ttie. supreme vividness of
experience, does not rest content with the dumb sense of impor-

JS ~. PP· 169-170.

36

lJ!,

p. 170.
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tanoe behind the veil. Its next orocedure is to seek the
essential connections within its own conscious area. This is
the process of rationalization. This process is the reoogni tion of essential connection within the apparent isolation
or abstracted details. Thus rationalization is the reverse
of abstraction, so far as abstraction can be reversed within
the area or oonsoiousnesa.37
Oonsoiousneas does not rest content with a dim awareness

ot importance as somehow a tundamental experience of reality.
Rather oonsoiouaness tries to elicit that awareness as much as
possible.

A vivid apprehension

or

reality as valuable is the

sense ot Deity, the interoonneoted values of self, others and the
whole.

This evidence defends the function of speculative reason

but does not give a complete speculative understanding of the metaphysical necessities underlying all particular actualities.

Such

a complete speculative understanding 1s to be achieved by the process ot rationalization, which is the reverse of the process ot
abstraction.

Abstraction is the process ot selecting particular

details from the totality; rationalization is the process of rediscovering the totality, the metaphysioal necessities, underlying
all particular details.

Whitehead has expressed the function

or

speculative reason with the notion of •rationali•ation• and haa
connected it with the sense of Deity.
cess or criticizing abstractions:

Rationalization is the pro-

first, completing them by di·

reot comparison with oonorete intuitions of what is universal

37

~'

P• 170.
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(metaphysically necessary) in all actualities; and secondly, harmonizing the abstractions and placing them in their proper order
as abstraotiona.38
In this section. two defenses of speculative reason's
function have been studied, Whitehead's notion

or

time as per-

ceived in the mode of oausal efficacy and his ontological principle.

These two defenses have been found to have assumptions which

can be established by the sense of Deity.

However, the evidence

for those defenses also helps to support Whitehead's description
of the sense of Deity.

First, the notion of perception in the
'

mode of causal efficacy explains how the past actual entities as
temporal (Externality) and as eternally preserved in God's consequent nature (Totality) oan be peroeived as causally affecting the
experiencing self (Internality).

Secondly, the ontological prin•

ciple's reduction to the principle or contradiction is one way of
expressing the 1ntelligib111ty of the sense ot Something that
matters in the three-told scheme.

For the sense or Something

that matters, of the interconnected values of self, others, and
the whole, is the aense "ot existence tor its own sake, ot exist•
enoe which is its own juatification."39
The importance ot the ontological principle in the de-

38 !!!!!. pp. 126-127.
39

!!1

p. 149.
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fense ot speculative reason oan be developed further by an e xam1nat1on of Leclerc•s interpretation of Whitehead's rationalism.
It will be shown that Leclero 1 s argumentation needs to be supplemented by the sense of Deity.

B.

Rationalism, Irrationalism,

~

!!'!.! Sense £.!: Deitz

Leclerc notes that the attempt to fulfill the function

ot speculative res.son "is the pursuit of rationalism to its !'ullest extent:

1t ia the endeavour to discover the final •reasons'

for things.

According to the ontological principle these reasons

are to be discovered in 'the composite nature
entities.•"40

or

definite actual

Metaphysical reasons, reasons of the highest abso-

luteness, are to be found in God: oosmological reasons, reasons
for particular environments, are to be round in the nature or temporal actual entities.41
In order to defend Whitehead's rationalism, Leclerc
quotes the following text:
That we fail to find in experience any elements 1ntr1ns1·
cally incapable ot exhibition as examples of general theory,
is the hope of rationalism. This hope is not a metaphysical
premise. It is the faith which forms the motive tp~ the pursu1 t of all sciences alike, including metaphysios.4-G

40 Leclerc, Whitehead's Metaphysics, pp. 2'7-28.
41 !J!, p. 28.
42 !!1 p. 67.
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Leclerc comments that the acceptance of the rational endeavour of
trying to understand reality, whether in soienoe or philosophy,
involves the acoeptanoe, tacit or explicit, of the function of
speculative reason as an ideal.

Any rational attempt to deny the

ideal of rationalism would be selt-oontradiotory.43

For any ra-

tional attempt to deny the ideal of rationalism would be the aoceptanoe of irrationalism, the aooeptanoe ot inooherence.44

"In-

ooherenee is the arbitrary disconnection of first prinoiples."4S
Two first pr1no1plea or explanations are arbitrarily disconnected
in so far as no explanation can connect the two explanations and
no explanation can be given as to why no explanation can be given.
For to give an explanation tor the 1mpoas1bil1ty of connecting
two first principles would be to connect supposedly disconnected
first principles.

Therefore no rational defense can be given for

irrationalism since a rational defense would make coherent and
rational that which is supposedly absolutely incoherent and 1rrat1ona1. 46
Leclerc points out that irrationalism is "the denial
that •reasons• or general principles are attainable, either at

43 Leclerc, .2.12• cit.,
44 !219.·' pp. 35, 37.
4S ..§, 'P· 9.
46 Leclerc, .2.2• oit.,

p.

37.

p.

35.
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all LJos1t1viam?, or beyond a certain point--usually that which
the special sciences happen to reaoh.47

Whitehead has serious

objections to both forms of 1rrat1onal1sm, Positivism and the limitation of speculation to science.
Whitehead offers one discussion of the Positivist position that no general explanations are possible at all, by examining the discovery of the planet Pluto.

The discovery of Pluto

was based on observed deviations of the orbits of the planets
Uranus and Neptune from their calculated orbits.

The calculation

of orbits was based on the law of gravitation as followed by the
then known planets and their effects on Uranus and Neptune.
their observed motions deviated from the predicted paths.

But
The ob-

served deviation in orbital path was described by a mathematical

formula.

At this point, prior to the discovery of Pluto, White-

head points out that every positivist should have been completely
sat!sfied.48 "A simple description had been evolved whioh fitted
the observed facts.

They .£the positivist.!? could now relapse in-

to their unexplained persuasion that in the future these formulae
would oontinue to describe the motions of Uranus and Neptune.«49
But one astronomer, Percy Lowell, was not satisfied; he remembered

Ibid •
...............
48 !,!, pp. 161-162.

49 .Alt

p. 162.
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the law

or

gravitation.

He calculated the direction and magnitude

of the vector component of aooelerat1on as it would be caused by
an imaginary point representing a planet moving round the sun in
an elliptic path, even more remote than the orbit of Neptune.
Lowell ohose a path for this imaginary planet, so that the magnitude of the acceleration of Neptune varies as the inverse square
of the distance between Neptune and the moving imaginary planet.
His prediction that there is another planet was verified at the
Lowell Observatory in Arizona.50
Whitehead oQncludes from his discussion of the discovery
of Pluto two points.

First, Positivism has a truth to its doc-

trine that description is an essential aspect of scientific method.

aut secondly, scientific method does not involve only accur-

ate description even though the description may be a generalized

one such as the law of gravity.

Man has the desire to obtain the

exolanatorz description (the understarxiing) of the generalizes
description and the particular description of fact.

Man desires

an understanding of particular and general fact in terms of general principles which oan justify the S?eculative extension of a
generalized description, such as the 10.w of gravity bey,::md actual,
particular instances of observation.

In attempting to find the

exelanatorz description, scientific method is seeking to fulfill

50 !,!, pp. 161-162.
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the t'unotion of speculative reason.51
Whitehead oarefully considers the other form of irrationalism besides Positivism, namely, the limitation of speculation to scienoe.
speculat1v~

This second form or 1rrat1onalism claims that

understanding is a proper goal or science but not of

metaphysics because the methodology of soienoe has been suooessful but the methodology

or

philosophy has not been.52

Whitehead

answers this rejection of metaphysics by showing that the objection presupposes that the method of philosophy is dogmatio.53

He

explains that philosophy "he.s been haunted by the unfortunate notion that its method is dogmatically to indicate premises which
are severally clear, distinct, and certain; and to erect upon
those premises a deductive system ot thought.n54

Philosophy has

been haunted so, suggests Whitehead, because Western philosophy
was helped into being by the development of mathematics.

In imi-

tation of mathematics' deductive procedure, philosophers have
tried for clear and distinct premises as the basis of a deductive
system.55

AI,
51 ........

p•

164.

,m,

P• 20.

53 181

p. 20.

54 181
55 l!1

pp. 11-12.

52

pp. 15-16.
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Whitehead rejects suoh a oonoept of philosophy's method.
Just as it is a mistake to believe that the foundations of ma.thematios are clear, distinct, and certain, so also it is a mistake
to believe that the foundations of philosophy should be clear,
distinct, and oertain.56 Whitehead holds that:
• • • the accurate expression of the final generalities is
the goal of discussion and not its origin • • • •
• • • Metaphysical categories are not dogmatic statements ot the obvious; they are tentative formulations or the
ultimate generalities.
It we consider any soheme of philosophic categories as
one complex assertion, and apply to it the logician's alternative, true or false, the answer must be that the scheme is
false. The same answer must be given to a like question respecting the existing form~lated principles of any soienoe.57
The point is that soienee does not have any special oer-

ti tude whioh philosophy is laoking.

Neither Rhilosonhy nor soi-

.!!12.! should 12.! viewed !.!. dogmatic statements of the obvious
!!.!, tentative formulations

true that science

.£! general Erinciples.

~

For it is not

has been succeeding for centuries, whereas

philosophy has been failing ror- centuries.

Both science and phil-

osophy have had partial success in reaching their goals.
In defense of his understanding of science and philoso-

56 PR, p. 12: Whitehead refers to his work coauthored
with Bertrand RUssell, Principia Mathematica; or • .!£, P• 144: The
history of science is .full or such examples of sciences bursting
through the bounds of their original assumptions. Even in pure
abstract logic as applied to aritbmetia, it has within the last
half century been found necessary to introduce a doctrine of types
in order to corr~ct the omissions of the original premisses."
57 J.!,

pp.

12-13.
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phy as having only partial success. Whitehead points out, "We no

more retain the

or the seventeenth century than we do the

~hysics

Cartesian philosophy of that century.
systems express important truths. ,.5B
mechanistic conoept

or

Yet within limits, both
'lihe Galilean-Cartesian

material bodies launched modern science on

its tr1U11lphant career.

the high point which this theoretical

structurA allowed science to attain is well symbolized by Newton.S
Although science has gone beyond Newton's formulae, they were not
false; rather they were unguardedly stated.

Einstein's formulae

are not false; rather they are unguardedly stated.

We do not yet

know the limitations or Einstein's formulae, but when they may be
discovered they will constitute a yet more subtle limitation to
Newton's formulae.

Soienoe does not start with clear and distinct

elements in experience and proceed to elaborate these elements as
premises with pure deduction.
fo~ulations

Rather it prooeeds by tentative

of particular and general descriptions (speculative

under9tandings).

In this manner, science is suooessful in reach-

ing some understanding of the world even though it cannot claim
dogmatic finality of ti'!uth.60
In a similar w<J.y, philosophy is successful.

58 lfi,
59 A!t

pp. 20-21.
p.

145.

60 ,!!!!. P• 53.

The seven-

4
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teenth century meohan1st1o oonoept of nature has a partial truth
which Whiteheac tries to incorporate into his own philosophy.

The

mPohanistic oonoept of nature has a aonsonanoe with common-sense
observation.

There are bits of matter in the universe; whether

these oits of matter are dirt, rooks, drops of water, or planets,
they are simply bits of matter.
throughout any stretch

or

These bits of matter are the same

time or even in an instant of time.

The

relations between these bodies are simply spatial relations which
can be changed only by loeal motion.

This concept of nature was

to be the presupposed support supplying the terms in which the
answers were to be found to all further questions suoh as about
the meaning of life, mentality, and the interrelations of matter,
life, and mentality.

Whitehead has no doubt that this concept of

nature expresses large, all-pervading truths about the world, but
he questions how fundamental these truths may be.61

He argues

that the mechanical conoept of netut'e which denies the meaningful-

ness of final causality cannot explain the emergent evolution of
life and mentality, especially of man. 62 F..e aonciludes with a concept of nature which would explain emergent evolution and at the
same time explain the downward, mechan1oal trend of nature.63

61 l'.!r1
62

or.,

pp.

175-177.

oh. l, pp. 12-14.

63 !!!. pp. 3-34.

In

this way, Whitehead himself shows how a philosopher incorporates
the truths expressed in other philosophies and shows the limitations and qualifications of those truths.

He shows that the his-

tory of philosophy manifests some suooess in fulfilling the func•
tion of speculative reason.
Since philosophy shows this success, the objection ia
ill-founded which attacks as unsuccessful, philosophy's attempt
to fulfill the function of speculative reason.
Whitehead further defends speculative philosophy as
necessary for the oritioism and evaluation of scientific interpretations of reality.
philosophy.

Interpretation of reality did not begin with

Philosophy is the search for more adequate cr1tia1sm

and for more adequate justification of the interpretations which
we employ in science and religion and even in philosophy itselr.64

For philosophy is never a finished produot but rather a way of
life, an attitude of mind towards doctrines never completely undett·

stood.6S
No knowledge is ever completely understood since oonsciousness 1s always selective of a few elements from the fullness
of experience. 66 Whitehead explains that our disciplined know-

64 _m,

p. 22.

6$ 1:!!• PP• 233-234.
66 .f!!, P. 22; J!I, p. 168.
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ledges are a combination

or

the Observational Order (direct d1s-

or1minat1ons of particular observations) and the Conceptual Order
(a general way of oonoe1v1ng the Universe).

There is no point in

human history at which we can say that man was having pure observations.

The Observational Order is always interpreted in terms

of the Conceptual Order.67

Moreover, the Oonceptual Order dic-

tates the Observational Order to a great extent; that is, theory
dictates what evidence to look tor and how to interpret the sporadic observations of evidence.
philosophy.

One example is found in Hume•a

If we try to find in the ObserY,ational Order direct

evidence of the interconnectedness ot things, we will not succeed,
Whitehead points out, if we follow Hume.

On Hume'• theory,

the

only data originating reflective experience are sense impressions.
Examining such sense-data, we find that no one sense-datum dis·
closes in itselt any information as to any other sense-datum.
Therefore, on Hume's theory, there is no direct evidenoe for the
interconnectedness of things.68

Hume's theory has dictated what

evidence to look rorl
However, not only does theory dictate what evidence to
look for and how to interpret it, but it is also true that the Observational Order itself is s€leotive.

67

68

A!·
!!;

pp. 198-199.
p. 283.

The mode of perceptive ex-
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perience named presentational immediacy (the awareness of senseimpressions) is usually dominant in ma.n's consciousness.

This

mode ot perception does not disclose the interconnectedness of
things.

The other mode of perceptive experience named causal ef-

ficacy (the awareness

or

being affected by other realities in the

universe) only becomes dominant to man in primitive experiences
such as strong emotions.

This mode of perception does disclose

the interoonneotedness of things.

How has Whitehead become aware

of this evidence ot interconnectedness?

On the one hand, he has

done so through his insight that theory is only a working hypothe•
sis due to the faot that theory dictates what evidence to look for
and how to interpret it.

Thereby Whitehead was aware that a

theory other than Hume's could have been possible which would allow other evidence.

On the other band, Whitehead has been able to

find this evidence of interconnectedness because he has tried to
be open to the fullness o.t'experienoe.

Therefore Whitehead sug-

gests two ways of correcting the defioienoies in man.•s interpretation and awareness of the Observational Order.

First, novel

concepts suggest novel possibilities of observational discrimination.

That is to say, novel theories suggest novel possibilities

of evidence.
theoriea. 6 9

Secondly, novel observations help to modify old

69 !!1 pp. 198-199.

In the evaluation ot Conceptual Orders and Observational
Orders, philosophy should especially consider the
volved in both science and religion.

select~vity

in-

Whitehead points out that

there is a grave divergence between science and religion in their
respective emphasis or different aspects

or

experience.

Religion

is concerned with the harmony of rational thought with the person's reaction to the peroepta from which experience originates.
But science is concerned with the harmony or rational thought with
the percepta themselves apart from the meaning and value of the
person perceiving.

By insisting on philosophy's close relations

with religion and with science, natural and soolologioal, Whitehead intends to tree philosophy once and for all from the objection that it is useless speoulation.70
It is the function of speculative reason to harmonize,

refashion, and justify man's divergent theories and intuitions as
to the nature or things, especially those from religion and the
so1enoea.

Speculative reason has to insist on the scrutiny of the

ultimate ideas and on the retention of all the evidence in attempting to understand all particular fact in terms of general principles.

In Whitehead's view, the attempt to fulfill the function of

speculative reason ls the most effective ot all the intellectual
pursuits.

Speculative reason builds cathedrals before the workmen

70 ]!,

p.

21.
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have moved a stone, and it destroys them before the elements have
worn down their arohes.

Speculative reason is the architect of

the buildings of the spirit, and it is also their solvent.
ulati ve reason works slowly.

Speo-

Thoughts lie sleeping tor ages; and

then, apparently suddenly, mankind finds that they have embodied
themselves in the lives and institutions of man.7 1
Speculative reason•a function is to criticize and evaluate the selective abstractions
Orders in two ways.

the Observational and Oonoeptual

First, speculative reason should harmonize

abstractions by assigning to
abatractions.7 2

or

the~

their right relative status as

In this way, s,peculative reason avoids the falla-

cy of misplaced concreteness, which, for example, seventeenth
century meohan1st1c so1enoe committed in neglecting the degree of
abstr.action involved in its consideration of reality as simple
bits of matter.73

Secondly, speculative reason should complete

abstractions by direct comparison with more concrete intuitions ot
mankind penetrating into what is universal in concrete tact.74

71

~.

PP• ix-x.

72 !}!!Ji PP• 126-127 •

73 ..!!, P• 11; !!!f, PP• 7$, 8$.
74 ~. pp. 126-127; it is significant that Whitehead
appeals to the testimony of the great poets as very important for
philosophy: ''Their survival is evidence that they express deJ~P
intuitions of mankind penetrating into what is universal in concrete fact." The significance or this emphasis on aesthetic
experience is developed by Whitehead in his description of the
rel! 1 u
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Leclero•a interpretation of Whitehead's rationalism has
been described and completed by a discussion of Whitehead's rejection of two forms of 1rrat1onal1am, Positivism and the limita•
tion of speculative understanding to science.

The difficulty

raised against the ontological pr1no1ple may also be raised a•
gainst Leolero•s interpretation of Whitehead's rationalism.

It

may be granted that one who accepts rational and coherent explanation cannot give a rational explanation ot the irrational and in•
coherent. but the difficulty ia that it is not clear why one
should accept rational explanation.

The positing

or

irrat1onal1am

and incoherence is irrational only tor one who accepts Whitehead's

He himself points

concept of the function of speculative reason.

out that •1t is always possible to work oneself into a state of
complete contentment with an ultimate irrationality.

The popular

poa1t1v1st1o philosophy adopts this attitude."75
Consequently, Leolero•s interpretation of Whitehead's
rationalism needs to be completed by Whitehead's own rejection ot
1rrat1onalism in Positivism and the limitation
understanding to science.
may be accepted.

or

apeoulatlve

Whitehead's rejection ot irrat1onal1am

He has shown that science does involve more than

description slnoe it also involves explanatory description (understanding).

Also, he has shown that an evaluation of the special

75

~. PP• 202-203.
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sciences• selectivity in knowledge of the world is needed and that
philosophy should do the job of harmonizing abstractions.

But the

question may be raised whether or not Whitehead has shown that it
is the function of speculative reason to complete the abstractions
of science by comparing them with concrete intuitions of the uni-

In view of the

verse which reveal what is universal in all facts?

selectivity of science, some discipline is needed which evaluates
that selectivity..

But should philosophy assume that its function

is to understand all particular facts as intelligible 1n terms ot
general principles?

In view of Whitehead's understar.ding of soi-

enoe• the assumption of the function of speculative reason as the
ideal of reason appears very plausible.

For just as science un-

derstands the general prinoiples of a particular epoch of the
world, ao also the reflective thought which evaluates so1ent1t1c
explanations• selectivity should do so in terms

or

general princi-

ples which apply to all possible epochs and facts of the world.
Whitehead assumes the function of speculative reason as an ideal
to be fulfilled.

This ideal of rationalism is the hope that we

fail to find in experience any elements intrinsically unintelligi•

ble in terms of general principles.
plausible assumption of the ideal

or

However, it is clear that the
speculative reason is not a

necessary just!fioation of this ideal.
However, Leolero 1 s interpretation of Whitehead's rationalism must be accepted as fundamentally correct.

For Whitehead

does say that faith in reason ttdoes not embody a premise from
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which metaphyaioal theory starts; it is an ideal which is seeking
satistaotion.

In so far as we believe that doctrine, we are all

rationalists."7 6

Leolero•s interpretation has defended White-

head's faith in reason without making it a premise from whioh
metaphysical theory starts.

Leclerc has taken Whitehead at his

word and tried to make sense out of it.

What Leclerc has said is

fundamentally consistent with Whitehead's faith in reason and his
rejection of Positivism and the limitation of speculative understanding to science.
However, this chapter has shown that the ontological
principle, one of Whitehead's fundamental metaphysical premises,
is basically a formulation or the function of speculative reason.
Consequently, Leclerc should have round an inconsistency in Whitehead's statement that faith in reason's speculative function ia
not a metaphysical premise.

The reason that Leclerc did not find

an inconsistency is primarily that the basic text of Whitehead
which he commented on was quoted out ot context.77

Leclerc tailed

to consider jhe connection of the ideal of speculative reason with
religious intuition.

The religious intutiion discloses the sense

of Something that matters, the sense of the interconnected values
of self, others, and the whole, the sense of existence for its

76

PR, P• 67.

77

Full text ia quoted in chapter 2, p. 62.
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own sake, the sense of existence which is its own justification.
This intuited evidence answers the difficulty raised against Leolero 1s interpretation of Whitehead's rationalism, namely, it ia
not clear that one should accept rational explanation, the function of speculative reason.

One should accept rational explana-

tion of reality as the ideal of speculative reason because the
sense of Deity is the sense of existence which is its own juatitioation.

On the one hand, this intuited evidence complements the

attempts at justifying the function of spedulat1ve reason by rejecting both Positivism and the limitation of speculative understanding to science.

But on the other hand, Whitehead's rejection

of these two forms of irrationalism complements the sense ot Deit7
as a defense of the f'unotion of speculative reason.

The examina-

tion of scientific explanation shows that the scientist is seeking
a speculative understanding of reality and that his selectivity in
knowledge, as well as the selectivity of other knowledges, needs
to be harmonized and criticized by speculative philosophy's intuitions of what is metaphysically necessary in all tacts.

c.

Whitehead, Dewey, and the Sense

.2£.

Deitz

The previous section has shown how Leolerc's interpretation of Whitehead's rejection of 1rrat1ona11sm and the sense of
Deity are mutually supplementary defenses ot the function of speculative reason.

This section will show how Whitehead's rejection

of Dewey 1 s interpretation or speculative philosophy and the sense

lSO
ot Deity are mutually supplementary defenses ot the function ot
speculative reason.
Dewey attempts to show how Whitehead's concept of speculative philosophy oan be given an emp1r1c1at•pragm.at1o interpretation.

Dewey points out that the task ot philosophy tor White-

head is to frame descriptive generalizations of experience.

Dewey

as an empiricist agrees with this without reservation eapeoially
since Whitehead emphasizes that elucidation

or

immediate experience is the sole justification for any thought. 78 Although Whitehead calls the method of philosophy Rationalism, Dewey argues that
Whitehead's Rationalism is not the Rationalism with whioh empiricism is at odds.

This latter Rationalism is concerned not with

descriptive generalization but ultimately with

~

2rior1 generali-

ties from whioh the matter of experience itself can be derived.
However, Whitehead's Rationalism emphasizes not

~

Rriort general-

ities but the immediately existent actual entities by the ontological principle . . . ,These actual entities,• he says, •are the final
real things of which the world is made up.

There is no going be-

78 John Dewey, "Wh1 tehead' s Philosophy," The Philosophical Review, XLVI, no. 2 (Jan., 1937) p. 170; PB, p.""1>:" It the
winter meeting of the Eastern Division of the liiierioan Philosophical Association in 19.36, John Dewey and Whitehead met for a
oolloquium on Wh1tehead 1 s philosophy. Dewey offered an interpretation of Whitehead's speculative philosophy, and Whitehead responded to Dewey's paper.
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hind actual entities.

They are the only reasons tor anything. ,,.79

Dewey does admit that Whitehead wants the descriptive
generalizations to form a coherent, logical, necessary system of

gen~ral ideas which can interpret every element

or

experience.BO

Thi1 concept of speculative reason makes Whitehead's Rationalism
more like traditional Rationalism, but Dewey says that an empiricist should agree in proceeding "as logically as possible, striving to present findings that are coherent, that are even 'neoessary•, if the necessity in question be that

or

olose-knit relatio

to one another without omiasions and superfluities in the general1zed descriptions or experience. • • • u81
Dewey's empirioist-pragmatic interpretation of Whitehead's concept or philosophy proposes a genetic-tunotionai method
tor reason.

This method ls closely allied to the method of the

natural sciences.

Man's reason or thinking ooours because of

some problem occurring in his experience-nature.

Ideas that arise

in the problem context emerge originally as suggested solutions.
These ideas are not something to be known in themselves; rather
they are instruments with which the problematic situation may be
resolved.

An idea is only something to be used in controlling and

79

Dewey, 12.9,. ill•; 1!1 P• 27 •

8o Dewey, loo. o1t.;
81

.m,

p.

Dewey, .22• cit, p. 171.

4; Mi p. 285.
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ordering the materials and processes ot experience; an idea is
not something to be known and appreciated as a speculative penetration into ultimate reality.82
Dewey indicates that another interpretation of Whitehead 1 s concept ot philosophy is possible which is allied with
traditional Rationalism.

Thia interpretation views the method of

reason in philosophy as similar to the procedure of the mathematical logician.

Reality itself is presupposed to have certain

necessities in its make-up.

The generalized description of these

necessary elements should be statable inra succinct s7stem ot
definitions and postulates.

The deductive interweaving and expli-

cation or these definitions and postulates should result in a
logical• coherent. necessary system

or

ideas which can interpret

every element of experienoe.83
Dewey contrasts the genetic-functional concept of reason
with the 1ntu1tional-struotural concept of reason of tra.ditional

RPtionalism.

The genetio method of reason treats ideas and ex-

perience not as something to be known by immediate insight, but as
something to be used to make experience more fruitful and meaningful.

In contrast, the intu1tional method of reason treats experi-

ence as something to be known by speculative insight so that a

82

Ibid., P•

83

~ •• p.

175.
174.
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general scheme of the universe can be formulated.

The tunotiona.l

method of reason understands ideas as instruments with which the
functioning processes of experience can be made more valuable.

In

contrast, the structural method ot reason understands ideas as
expressive of the intelligible structure ot reality.84
Dewey asks Whitehead to say which concept ot reason ia
primax-y in Whitehead's philosophy, the genetic-funot1onal or the
intu1t1onal-struotural concept.

Dewey wants him to aay that prao-

tioal reason•a genet1c•funot1onal method is a more fundamental
oonoept than speculative reason's 1ntuit1onal-struotural m.ethod. 85
In chapter one, we have seen Whitehead define the

func~

t1on ot reason as primarily practical, namely, (1) to constitute
final causes, that is, to live; (11) to emphasize final causes,
that is, to live well; and (111) to cr1tio1ze final causes, that
is, to live better. 86

However, in h1a direct reply to Dewey,

Whitehead refuses to emphasize praotical reason to the resulting
exclusion of speculative reason and metaphysics.
prooess of the world not only requires the

The evolutionary

genetic-tunctiona~

concept of reason but also requires the 1ntu1t1onal-structural
concept ot reason in order to understand the ultimate principles

84 ~ •• p. 175.

85

~ •• pp.

175, 177.

86 Ot. above, oh. 1, PP• lJ-18.
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ot existence which express the necessary connections within the
changing world.87

As one example or such a necessary truth.

Whitehead turns Dewey's argument around and agrees with him, "The
compound word •senetic-tunctional• means an ultimate metaphysical
principle from which there is no escape.n88
The fundamental answer which Whitehead gives to Dewey
to show the possibility of metaphysical statements is an analysis

ot methematica and its relationship to the world.

Whitehead's

direct response to Dewey can be best understood by discusaing it
with two other defenses of metaphysical knowledge:

(1) Whitehead

considers how the togetherness of things in one universe requires
general conditions such as those expressed in mathematics; and
(2) he considers the proposition, 'one and one make two,• as an
example of a metaphysical proposition.

(J)

His direct response

to Dewey is a suggested comparison of the poopositiona of algebra
with those of metaphysics.
(1)

Whitehead considers how the togetherness of things

in one universe requires general conditions such as those e:xr;, .. _
pressed in mathematics.

Pure mathematics is not a science devoted

simply to the exploration of quantity and number, but rather it is
thought moving in the sphere of complete abstraction from any par-

XLVI. no.

87

Whiteheadt ''Remarks,"
2 (Jan., 19371 P• 179.

88

~., p. 181.

!!l!
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ticular instance of what it is talking about. 89

Pure mathematics

is the realm of complete and absolute abstraction.

"All you

assert is, that reason insists on the admission that, 1f any entities whatever have any relations which satisfy suoh-and-suoh
purely abstract oond1tiona, then they must have other relations
which satisfy other purely abstract oond1t1ons."90
Whitehead argues that the togetherness of many things
in an overall unity requires an aesthetic harmony (a system) of
general conditions.

For in order to have suah an overall unity,

the many things must be harmoniously related.

The general condi-

tions of this overall unity must themselves be harmoniously related, since otherwise there would be no overall unity.

This

aesthetic harmony of general conditions is what reason tries to
discover.

Thia aesthetic harmony of many realities in one over-

all unity and of the general conditions is the primary article of
metaphysical doctrine.

For the aeathet1o harmony means that rea-

son will not be disappointed in its searoh for the general conditions that apply to that one overall unity.91
The general conditions which apply to the overall unity
will necessarily apply to all the many realities that are unified

89 ~. pp. 31-32.
90

SMW, pp. 31·32.

91

~.

p.

40.
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in or connected with that unity.

If there ia a reality whioh is

not connected with that unity, then no statement can be made about
it except that man is in ignorance about it or its poasibility.
This qualitication of ignorance about a supposedly existing reality unconnected with the overall unity

or

an experiential moment

for man is not a limitation upon man's ability to know metaphysical truths.

Rather, this qualification is the basis for White-

head's assumption that the full universe discloses itself to man's
experience with every element in that universe entering into the
ha:rmony of that experiential unity.
this assumption.

It is impossible to deny

For it is impossible to know an entity supposed-

ly unconnected with experience without thereby connecting it with
that experienoe.9 2 nApart from the experiences or subjects there

is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness."93

Therefore,

Whitehead argues that the subject can discover 1n his experience
truths that apply to all realities.

The only realities which man

can know about are those which relate themselves to man's experi-

ential unity.

Those realities which do relate themselves to man's

experience must have the same general conditions (essence) as
man•s experience sinoe its unity requires an aesthetic harmony of
general conditions.

92

~. p •

93

J!,

What is not in any way related to the uni-

.38.
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verse of man's experience is simply unknowable by man.

Therefore,

the universe disclosed to man's experience must have an essence
(an aesthetic harmony of general conditions) whioh forbids relationships beyond itself as a violation of its aesthetic

harmon~.

The function of speculative reason is to disolose that essence in
a ·scheme or necessary truths, truths that apply to every .faot of
the uni verse of e.xper1enae. 94
(2)

Another way in which Whitehead uses mathematics to

show the pos,ibility or metaphysical truths occurs in his analysis
of the proposition, •one and one make two.•

To express a neces-

sary truth, a proposition must fulfill three conditions.
it must be meaningful .for anyone who conceives it.

First,

Secondly,

the proposition must be general in that its truth-value is asserted about actual-entities, the .final real things
world ia made up.

or

which the

If these first two conditions are fulfilled by

a true proposition, the third condition is already

t'ultil~ed.

Por the third condition is that the proposition have the same
truth-value 1n each of its uses; and a true, universal propos1t1o
is necessarily true of all its particulars.

However, if the first

two conditions are fulfilled by a false proposition, the third
condition is not thereby fulfilled.

For a false, universal propo-

sition 1s not necessarily false of all its particulars.

So a true

proposition must fulfill the first two conditions (thereby auto-

-6.
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ma.tioally fulfilling the third), and a false proposition must ful
fill all three conditions in order to be metaphyaioal propositio
A metaphysical proposition has the same truth-value, no matter
what the cosmic epoch might be.95

Having offered these oriteria for a metaphysical proposition, Whitehead points out that sometimes we certainly like to
think that we do know such propositions.

But, reflecting on the

mistakes of the past respecting the foundations of geometry, he
suggests that it 1s wise to reserve some soept1oism about man's
claim to have metaphysical knowledge.

By an analysis of the prop-

osition, •one and one make two,' he attempts to give some just1t1oat1on first, for man's claim to have metaphysical knowledge, and
secondly, for some soeptioism about this olaim.96
First, he attempts to justify man•s claim to have metaphysical knowledge.

He explains that the proposition •one entity

and another entity make two entities• appears to be a meaningful
truth to any subjeot which would oonoeive it.
the first oriterion ot being meaningful.

It thereby fulfills

Further, the proposition

is general in that its truth-value is asserted about actual entities.

For in Whitehead's theory, every actual entity possesses a

unique self-identity, and therefore no two actual entities can

95 J:!!, p. 300.
96

1!!·

pp. 300-301.
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ever combine into a unity other than that which respects their
unique self-identities.

The proposition therefore fulfills the

second criterion of generality.

As a truth which is meaningful

and general, the proposition has fulfilled the first two oondi·
tions and should be aooepted as metaphysical knowledge. 97
Secondly, Whitehead tries to justify some scepticism in
regard to man's claim to have suoh metaphysical knowledge.

He

points out that we often assert the above proposition, •one entit'
and another entity make two entities,• thinking it to be metaphys1oal, when it is not so.

The assumption which helps to make the

proposition metaphysically true is that the two entities are oontre.ries, incapable of being joined together to make simply a new
unity which has dissolved the previous two entities.

If that

assumption is not true, then the proposition can sometimes be
true and sometimes false.
oal knowledge.

Therefore, 1t would not be a metaphyai-

Whitehead points out th.at we hardly ever apply

arithmetic in its pure metaphysical sense.

We usually make as-

swnptions, seldom made explioit, wh1oh justify the use of some
mathematical propositions in our particular cosmic epooh.9 8

97 PR, p. 301; Robert M. Falter, "The Plaae of Mathe:mat1os in Whitehead's Philosophy," Alfred North Whitehead: Esaa;a
.2!! His PhilosophI, ed. Kline (Englewood D11frs: New Jersey, 196 J
pp. ""'"4.!-44.

98 !!!• PP• 301·303; Whitehead's concept of actual enti•
ties as the fundamental uni ts of rea.11 ty does not dirt~ctly apply
to the every day world known by man. The entities which common-
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Whitehead explains the assumptions we have to make abou
the proposition, •one and one make two.•

First, one thing is be-

ing added to another thing, not itaelt.

Secondly, the two things

added together must be the proper sort ot things which added together issue in the proper group which we call two things.

And

thirdly, we must assume that the change ot oiroumstanoes that occurs each time the proposition is used in a different context is
unimportant.

Common sense seems to tell us what we need to know

about the meaning of the proper sort of togetherness and about the
meaning of unimportant change of oiroumstanoea.

But common sanse

makes assumptions which must be understood as the background ot
the meaning ot its statements.

Because common sense usually ne-

glects the background ot ciroumatanoes, Whitehead refuses to rely
completely on the analysis of this background by oommon sense itselt. 99
In this second defense of the possibility

or

metaphysi-

cal statements, Whitehead has attempted to show cause both for be-

sense man knows are built up out ot many aotual entities. Accordingly, since our mathematical propositions are often referred back
to the world of common sense, mathematical propositions are truths
about this cosmos, but not truths about every possible oosmos,
1.e., not metaphysical truths.

99 Whitehead, "Immortality,".!!!! Philoaophx of Alfred
North Whitehead, ed. Soh11pp, pp. 699-700. \lih!tehead also points
out that we cannot rely on the clarity revealed by the methods of
the exact sciences because their methods are limited by their
apeo1t1o selectivities.
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11ev1ng that the proposition, 'one and one make two,' is true

witt~

out qualification about actual entities, and for reserving some
scepticism as to this claim to metaphysical knowledge.

The para-

dox of Whitehead's simultaneous defense and scept1oism is clarified in the next defense of the possibility of metaphysical propositions by his appeal to algebra's method for handling the background of circumstances in common sense knowledge.

(3) Whitehead's direct response to Dewey in defense of
metaphysical knowledge is a suggested comparison of the propositions of algebra with those of metaphysics.

The method of alge-

bra shows the best praotioal remedy of the obscurities involved
in the background assumptions of comm.on sense knowledge.
bN 'a

method helps to remedy ambiguous, unolear, and indistinct

language by four assumptions.
•and~,

Alge-

(1) Connectives such as

'ot•, 'is',

and •or• are chosen as capable of being expressed in a

system of postulates in which the connectives receive mutual definition and in which these oonneotivea are assumed to have invariable meaning.

(ii) These connectives are used to relate and join

together various concrete realities which are expressed by the device of the real variable.

Again, it is assumed that the unspeci-

fied entities indicated by the real variables have meanings which
do not differ in different contexts.

(111) It is assumed that the

patterns of real variables thus oonneoted are meaningful.

(1v)

Finally, it is assumed that when the algebraic meaning is oom-
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pleted by substituting the realities symbolized by real variables
for the variables, the meaning

or

the oonneotives is not ohanged.

This last assumption is that, even though the meaning

or

the oon-

neoti ves does ohange when substituting the concrete realities wit
all their oiroumsta.noes tor the variables, contrary to the assumption (i) that the connectives do not change their meanings, yet
the change in meaning of the connectives is irrelevant.loo
The basic connectives ot algebraic symbolism are like
metaphysical principles (necessities) that underlie all partioula
tacts.

The real variables of algebraic symbolism are like the

particular tacts which exemplify metaphysical principles.

Just

as in algebra the basic connectives are assumed to have an invariant meaning or a meaning that changes irrelevantly when the realities are substituted for the variables, so in speculative philosophy the metaphysical principles are assumed to have an invariable
meaning or a meaning that changes irrelevantly when the particular
facts exemplify the metaphysical principles.

In algebra this suf-

fusion of the connectives with the things connected made difficult
the discovery of the fundamental principles

or

arithmetic which

would exclude as impossible any alternative formulation of the
basis of arithmetical truth.

In a similar way in the world, the

suffusion of metaphysical principles with their exemplification

100

Whitehead, "Remarks," .22•
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made difficult the disaovery of metaphysics and still now makes
difficult the disoovery of the fundamental principles of metaphysics which would exclude as impossible any alternative formulation
of metaphysical truth.

In both algebra and metaphysics, the ab-

straction of the invariable necessities from the exemplification
of these principles shows why the necessities appear to be known
clearly, but the suffusion of the invariable necessities with
their exemplifications shows why the necessities are only deceptively clear.

Although tbe perfect algebra is not yet formulated,

the algebras which man has elucidated up to this day have a pragmatic justification.

They work; we use them to change human life.

In a similar way, we should expect that although the perfect metaphysios is not yet formulated, the metaphys1os which men have attempted to elucidate should have a pragmatic justit1cat1on.

That

is to say, we should expect that a metaphysics should make man's
practical experience mean1ngfu1.lOl
Through this comparison of algebra and metaphysics and
101 ~., pp. 180, 183-184. or. !B. PP• 42-43: "The
enormous advance in the technology of the last hundred and fifty
years arises from the tact that the speculative and the practical
reason have at last made contact. The speculative Reason has
lent its theoretic activity, and the practical Reason has lent
its methodologies for dealing with the various types of facts.
Both functions of Reason have gained. in power. The speoule.tive
Reason has acquired content, that is to say, material for its
theoretio activ1 ty to work on, and the methodio Reason has ac•·~
quired theoretic insight transcending its immediate limits.''
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their pragmatic justification, Whitehead may seem to be reducing
speculative reason to a subordinate role to praotieal reason.

It

P'.18.Y seem that he has made metaphysics only a scheme which is used
tor Zl'llking practical aot1v1ty more fruitful, but it is not so.
For he is only pointing out that a metaphysics whloh is without
relevance to man's practical activity is not a good metaphysics
since it omits a s1gn1t1cant aspect of man•s experience.

Since

practical activity is so pervasive of the whole world whether it
is exemplified in the human world or non-human world, metaphysics
may be seen as "the description of the generalities which apply t
all the details of praotice. 11102 A metaphysics is not simply a
speculative understanding of the general principles underlying al
particular facta but also a guide for intelligent practical aet1v
1ty.

At the same time, a metaphysics is not simply a guide for

intelligent practical activity but also a speculative understanding of the necessary principles which all particular facts exemplit'y.
Three defenses of speculative reason's function have
been described:

(1) the appeal to the unity of man's experiential

world; (2) the appeal to man's oonfidenoe that some mathematical
propositions are metaphysical knowledges; and (3) the appeal to
the pragmatic justification of the assumption that such metaphys1-

102 ]!, p. 19.
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cal knowledges do not change their meaning or change only irrelevantly when they are exemplified.
(l) The following 'difficulty may be raised against that
first defense in order to show how the sense
it.

or

Deity supplements

In appealing to the unity of man's experiential world, White-

head has assumed that there is an essence to the universe which
forbids relationships beyond itself as a violation of its aesthetic harmony.

This is an assumption because Whitehead holds that

the total universe must be related to man'a unity of experience
since anything outside this unity is simply unknowable.

It may

be granted that the truths which disclose the essence of the universe as experienced by man are metaphysical (necessary) in so tar
as they apply to everything experienced.

But the difficulty re-

mains that such truths may not be metaphysical if there are facts
whioh exist but are neither related to man's unity of experience
nor intelligible in terms

or

suoh truths as do apply to the uni-

verse of man's experience.
Christian points out that the supposition that there is
nothing beyond our experience is the supposition that there is
nothing which is absolutely transcendent.

This supposition is the

justification for constructing a categoreal scheme in terms of

which everx actual entity oan be interpreted.

Christian evaluates

this supposition as justifying only the oonoeption ot a logical
harmony of being, 1.e., a unity in thought but not necessarily in
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faot. 10 3

"The supposition that all things are interconnected in

some systematic way does not, of itself, justify us in going further and saying there is a harmony of being in some other and
stronger sense. 0104 Yet, Christian points out, "Whitehead does
go further.

In the last Part of Process and Real1tx, in the f!na

E.! I~eas, and elsewhere he speaks of a
'Harmony of Harmonies' ./J;!, p. 361] which is both the basis ot

chapters ot Adventures

morality and the object of religious experienoe.nl0.5

In light ot

this evidence, Christian draws the conclusion that Whitehead's
speculative philosophy is not putte speculative philosophy proceed
ing onl1 from a speculative interest.

A

religious interest has a

basic influence on Whitehead's attempt to do speculative philoso-

phy.1o6

Reterring to two passages, one from Science and lb.!

Modern World and the other from Prooeaa and Reality, Ohristian
suggests that Whitehead is asking the basic religious question in
two torms:

"What is it that rightly claims worship?" and "What i

the (ultimate) source of refreshment and oompan1onah1pf"l07

103 William A. Ohristian, "Some Uses of Reason,"!!:!!,
Relevance !]£. Whitehead, ed. Leolero, pp. 84-8.5.

104 1!?!.,g., p. 85.
10.5 .!!?!,g.
106

~ ••

pp. 85-86.

107 Christian refers to these two passages: "The vision claims nothing but worship • • • •" SMW, p. 268. "It L°the
primordial actual entit.tf is here termed TlJ<id 1 ; because the oon-
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This study agrees w1 th Ohr-1st1an' s 1nterpreta.t1on but
proposes beyond his view that the r-eligious intuition as the sense
of Deity is an important evidence e3tabl1shing Whitehead's metaphysical assumption of the

unive~se

as an aesthetic harmony.

Christian has not analy,ed the sense of Deity as Whitehead's
attempt to make the religious intuition generally evident.
~erienoe

or

The ex•

the Totality as the ultimate souroe and end of all par-

ticular actualities (values) is an experience of the solidarity of
the universe, of the ultimate rationality and aesthetic harmony ot
the universe.

Thia experience is an intuited evidence which neces-

sarily justifies the assumption that there is an essence to the
universe which forbids relationships beyond itself as a violation
bf its aesthetic harmony, its rationality.
(2) and
~ion

(3) Whitehead's appeal to a pragmatic justitioa-

of the ideal of speculative peason also needs to be supple-

~ented

by the sense

or

Deity.

For Whitehead himself argues that

~the formation of a general idea--suoh as the idea of the Order

Nature--, and the grasp
lts

exempl1t1oa~1on

or

or

its importance, and the observation ot

in a variety or instances are by no means the

necessary oonsequenoes of the truth of the idea in quest1on.nl08

~emplation or our natures, as enjoying real feelings derived rrom
the timeless source of all order, acquires that 1 subjeot1ve form'
~r refreshment and companionship at which religions aim."

108

!Ml!·

p.

6.
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This idea or the Order of Nature is the ideal ot speculative
reason, for this idea means "that all things great and small are
oonoe1vable as exempl!f1oat1ons of general principles which reign
throughout the natural order."109

Therefore, for Whitehead himselJ

the pragmatic just1f1oat1on ot the truth or the ideal of speculative reason does not show that the ideal is necessarily true.
Thia difficulty of the 1neuffio1enoy of such a pragmatic
juat1t1oat1on may be solved by the definition of Whitehead's pbilophy as a pragmatism described in ohapter two.

Pragmatism is

Whitehead's appeal to that self-evidence which sustains itself in
o1v111zed experience.

One suoh selt-evidenoe is the strong moral

intuition that speculative understanding for its own sake is one
pf the ultimate elements in the good life of o1v111zat1on.

The

1ntu1t•d evidenoe whioh is at the basis of the moral intuition of

the f\ination of speculative reason is the sense of Deity.
~ense

Por the

ot the interconnected values of self, others, and the whole

diaolosea the universe as a complex or interconnected tacts that
stimulates speculative reason to believe and hope that the connections can be analyzed and identified in order to be stated as
the general principles that underlie all particular tacts.

'l'hia chapter haa;studied how the sense of Deity and
other defenses of speculative reason's function are mutually sup-

109

~..

p.

7.
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On the one hand, the sense of Deity defends crucial

plementary.

assumptions which these other defenses make; but on the other hand,
these other defenses show how the assurilpt1on ot speculative reason's function is consonant with the following evidences examined
in the three parts of this chapter.

(l) Perception in the mode of

causal efficacy discloses the necessary connection of cause and
effect, and the reduction of the ontological principle (the principle of efficient and final causality) to the principle of contradiction expresses the 1ntelligibll1ty of the cause and effect connection.

Perception in the mode of causal effioaoy is an experi-

ential evidence whioh helps to explain how the sense of Deity is

the primary experience underlying all human awareness.

The onto-

logical principle is a olear way of stating how the sense of Deity,
the sense of the interconnected values of self, others, and the
whole, is the sense of existence which is its own justification.
(2) Whitehead's examination
~onaequent

or

the scientific endeavor and his

rejection of Positivism and the limitation of speoula-

tive understanding to science show how the sc1ent1.f 1a endeavor is
in accord with the ideal
~bowed

or

speculative reason.

(3) Whitehead

that the togetherness of things in one universe requires

general conditions such as those expressed in mathematical under•tandings

or

the world.

The attempt to gain a speculative under-

•tanding ot the world is similar to the attempt to gain a mathematical understanding of the world.

Whitehead also showed how
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speculative philosophy uses a method similar to that of algebra
for the handling of ambiguity and possible change of meaning in
the fundamental principles of each discipline.
The sense of Deity and other defenses of speculative
reason's function have been discussed as supplementary to each
other.

By themselves, these defenses do not constitute the actual

doing or speculative philosophy, although they have important evi•

dences to contribute.

Whitehead's method or the working hypothe-

sis requires that the ideal of speculative reason be treated as
tentatively accepted until it is successfully attained to some degree.

"In so tar as metaphysics enables ua to apprehend the ra-

tionality of th~ngs, the claim .[the ideal of speculative reaso'!i/

is justified."llO

Since such a pragmatic justification does not

establish the necessary truth of the ideal of speculative reason
•nd sinoe it is always possible tor man to lose hope in this ideal
due to the imperfection of all metaphysical systems, the preservation of such faith in reason must depend upon an ultimate moral

~ntuition. 111 This moral intuition was shown in chapter two to be
tounded 1n Whitehead•s description or the religious intuition as
~he

sense of Deity.

!!!. p. 67.
111 1!!1 p. 67.
110

OHAPI'ER IV
CONCLUSION

A.

Solution to the lz:oblem

Ef. .!Ul!.!

Studt

The Introduction stated the problem to be an examination
or the relevance or the sense of Deity to the function ot specula-

tive reason.

Chapter one has identified the funotion of specula-

tive reason by a discussion of reason and evolution.

Since White-

head admits the category of final causality as explanatory of emer

gent evo,lution, he defines the primary function of reason to be:
(1) to constitute final causes, that is, to live; (11) to emphasiz
final causes, that is, to live well; and (11i) to criticize final
causality, that is, to live better.

The function of praotioal

is to achieve a purpose exterior to the safisfaation of
itself, whereas the function of speculative

r~aaon

is to

atisty its own purpose of understanding all matters of faot in
erms of principles intelligible to itself.

The Greek logic of

isoovery provides a set of five criteria by which any speculative
derstanding of reality should be tested.

It is in terms of

hese criteria that Whitehead defines speculative philosophy and
171
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its method for the fulfilment of the function of speculative reason.

Speculative philosophy seeks to frame a coherent, logical,

necessary system of general ideas which makes intelligible every
element of experience.

Speculative philosophy uses the method of

the working hypothesis in order to fulfill the five criteria of
the Greek logic of discovery.

Although direot insight ia the

point of departure for reason•s speculations, it is not a superior
form of knowledge but one aspeot in the whole constituting the
method of the working hypothesis.

The direct insight must be ca-

pable of being stated in systematic terms in order that it will
fit in with and be verified by all of

~n's

experience and know-

ledge.
Chapter two has shown a positive connection between rational religion and the religious intuition as the sense or Deity.
n the one hand. and the function of speoulat1ve reason. on the
ther.

Rational religion as a way of life involves the longing of

an that the faots of existenoe, particularly the ultimate evil of
emporal, valuable realities oeas1ng to be, should find justifioaion, that 1s. value or finality. in the nature ot existence.

Oon-

equently, rational religion seeks an all-encompassing value or
inality for the particular, valuable, temporal realities.

As an

lt1mate craving to understand particulars in terms of general
rino1plea, that is, in terms of an all-encompassing finality,
ational religion is a demand for the intellectual justification
rute experience.

The rationalism enc

or
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can easily overflow into the valuable human project of attempting
to fulfill the function of speculative reason by scientific,
mathematical, and metaphysical speculation.
Chapter two went on to show that since rational religion
presupposes the religious intuition for Whitehead, rational religion\ defense of speculative reason's function needs to be completed by the examination of the sense of Deity.

The sense of

Deity provides an intuited evidence or the reality ot the allenoompaasing finality which rational religion aeeka.

The sense of

Deity ia the experience of the interconnected valuea of salt,
others, and the whole of the world as derivative from the valuable
1nteroonneot1ona of its members and as necessary for the continued
existence of value.

Thompson bas described how thia evidence is

systematized in Whitehead's metaphysics, but Whitehead baa also
described it independentl7 of that systematization.

The sense

ot Deity is the presupposition of civilized experience tor Whitehead both in its speculative and practical aspects.

It is rele• ...

vant to speculative reaaon•s function because tbe sense of the .!!!·
terconnectiona

or

reality stimulates man to anal7ze and identity

the 1nterconnect1oa1.

As the sense of the neoessitJ

~

mutual

connection of actualities, the sense of Deity ia an intuited evidence at the base ot Whitehead's moral intuition that speculative
understanding for its own sake is one ot the elements ot the civilized life of man. Tbe intui!tion required tor the presuppositionoj

17~

rationalism is an intuition ot the universe as a complex of interconnected

facts~

The sense of Deity is the intuition disclosing

that the dim but fundamental meaning of exis·ting actuality is intrinsic importance (i.e., intrinsic just1f1oat1on1 purpose, value)
for itself, for others, and for the whole world.

To exist with

such justification through final causality interconnected with the
final causality of other actualities and of the whole is to be a
matter of fact capable of beini understood as an element exemplifying the general principles by which all actualities are oonnected •
..............
Just as the sense of Deity is relevant to speculative
reason's function, so also it is relevant to practical reason's
function of achieving value.

The sense of the 1nteroonneoted val-

ues of self, others, and the whole as preserving the values of
self

a.~d

others is for Whitehead the presupposition of man's moral·

religious life and his aesthetic life.

As the presupposition of

speoulat1ve and praotioal reason's functions the sense of Deity is
neoessarily affirmed by man in any attempt to achieve the value or
civilization whioh their functions intend.

The interpretations of

Hartshorne and tillich are correct in pointing to the sense of
Deity, the sense ot the interoonneoted values of self, others, and
the whole. as a fundamental presupposition of Whitehead's speculative and practical philosophy.

In showing how the sense of Deity and other defenses of
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speculative reason's function supplement each other, chapter three
indicated the inadequacies of the Christian-Lowe-Leclerc interpre•
tation.

Christian's !nterpretation .!!. correct

Whitehead's systematic notion

.2! Q.gg,

sequent, and superjeot natures, !!
head's oategoreal scheme
Ohr1at1an,

~•

~

~

!·~·•

!!!

showing !h!!

of the primordial, c2n•

derivative notion g,t White-

!.Q. understand reality.

However,

.!!!S Leclerc !J:! not correct !!l omitting

vano! ,g! the sense g! Deity £Q

~

~

rele-

function ,2! S£eoulat1ve reason

!.! stated !!l the ontological Rrinoiple, one .2!_ the fundalqental

Rr1no1ples .Q! the categoreal schemt•

Whitehead's detense ot spec-

ulative reason's function by the reduction of the ontological
prinoiple to the principle ot contradiction is suooesstul only it
one grants that all particular tacts are intelligible in terms ot
general principles.
logical principle.

Two difficulties were raised against the onto•
First, 1r every raot is unintelligible, it

follows that entity can be reduced to non-entity.

Whitehead's at-

tempted reduction ot the ontological principle to the principle of
contradiction is only a restatement in different words of the tune·
tion of speculative reason.

Secondly, the difficulty was raised

as to how one oan affirm that the ontological principle is true
without qualification unless one knows that God exists as the basia

or

metaphysical reasons.
The answer to these difficulties has been shown to lie

in the relevance of the sense of Deity to the function ot apecula-

U6
t1ve reason.

The ontological principle constitutes the first,

systematic step in Whitehead's description of the universe as a
solidarity of many actual entities.
must be

r~oognized

The ontological principle

as starting to express in a systematic metaphys

ios the same solidarity of the universe which the sense of Deity
establishes as an unsystematized, intuited evidence.

The sense ot

Deity is a J2res1stematio evidence which Whitehead will not let any
theory explain away or deny.

It is an evidence which supports the

basio presupposition of any attempt at metaphysics, namely, that
all actualities are intelligible.

The ontological principle's re-

duction to the principle of contradiction is one way of expressing
the intelligibility of the sense of Something that matters, the
sense of Deity.

For the sense of Something that matters, the sens

ot the 1nteroonneoted values of the self, others, and the whole,
is the sense of existence which is its own justification.

The

formulation of the function of speculative reason in terms of the
ontological principle is part of Whitehead's attempt to develop
the systematic principles of his metaphysics.

Such principles al-

low him to examine the evidenoe of all of man•s experience and
thereby to clarify the relationship between Deity and the world in
a systematic metaphysics.

However, the clarification does not

prove what was previously unknown, namely, that Deity exists.

Por

the basic presupposition of metaphysics, namely, the presupposition of the function of speculative reason, relies ultimately on
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the sense of Deity.
The mutually supplementary defenses of speculative reason •a funotion by the sense

or

Deity and other evidences need to

be fulfilled by the best defense:
philosophy.

the actual doing of speculative

Whitehead's method of the working hypothesis requires

that the ideal of speculative reason be treated as tentatively
accepted until it is suooessfully attained to some degree.

The

ideal of speculative reason is justified in so far as metaphysioa
enables man to apprehend the rationality of things.

However,

since such a pragmatic justification does not establish the necessary truth of the !deal of speculative reason and since it is always possible for man to lose hope in this ideal due to the imperfection of all metaphysical systems, the preservation of scuh
faith in reason must depend upon an ultimate moral intuition
closely allied with religion.

The basis of the moral intuition

that speculative understanding for its own sake is part of the
good life is

fo~nd

in Whitehead's description of the religious

intuition as the sense of Deity.
B.

Problems Suggested .2J: this Studz
This study is directly related to two further problems

raised by Thompson and Hartshorne in their interpretations of
Whitehead.

(1) Ohapter two pointed to Thompson's evaluatory re-

lmarks about Whitehead's desoription of religious experience in
Reli~ion

!!!

the Making and suggested that the Modes

.2!

Thought
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description of the sense of Deity would constitute Whitehead's
answer.

the problem is whether or not Whitehead has answered

Thompson.

(2) The other problem arises from Hartshorne•s claim to

have worked out an

~

priori method in metaphysios which is consis-

tent with Whitehead's philosophy.

The problem is whether or not

this method is consistent with Whitehead's thought.
problems will be
l.

di~ouased

These two

in turn.

The Sense .Qf Deity.!.! !n Evidence
Thompson holds that Whitehead was content simply to for-

mulate a statement of the religious intuition and did not concern
himself with answering questions about the precise nature and ohar•
aoter of the data disclosed in the relig16us intuition.

Oonse•

quently, Thompson holds that the religious intuition as described
by Whitehead is both vague and ambiguous as an evidence in its
own right.

Whitehead himself considers an objection to his use of

the religious intuition quite similar to Thompson's remarks.

An

intuition merely experienced in exceptional moments is a private
psyoholog1oal fact and is without general evidential force.
head•a answer is that those intuitions which emerge under

White·

exaep~

tional circumstances and remain knowable only under such conditions have only personal s1gnif1oance. 1 But those intuitions
which emerge under exceptional circumstances and become knowable

l

~. pp.

63-64.
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apart from those oiroumstanoes have more than personal s1gn1£1oanoe; such intuitions have

gen~ral

evidential force.

Such gener-

ally evident intuitions may be clearer under exoeptional oiroumstances,

This answer of Whitehead will constitute the criteria

by which his own description of the sense of Deity will be evaluated.

If Whitehead oan describe the religious intuition in terms

of the fundamental evidences and
then he has not given a vague and

prineipl~s
a..~biguous

of his metaphysics,
description

or

the

religious intuition.

For the purpose of analyzing the evidence which Whitehead proposes for the sense of Deity, the evidence may be divided
into four aspects:

the religious intuition discloses reality (1)

as Something that matters, and this includes the interoonneoted

values of (11) Internality, (iii) Externality, and {iv) Totality.
These tour aspects will be discussed in turn.

(1) Whitehead holds that the sense of importance la embedded in the very being of human and animal experience.

His ex-

planation in Modes ,g! Thought suooesstully exhibits that evidence
in terms of (a) his analysis of experience and (b) his prinoiplea
or rationalism.

(a) Selective attention which is a necessary as-

pect of consciousness presupposes importance.

For sustained ob•

jeotion means disregard of irrelevances; and this disregard can
only be sustained by some sense of importance.

Consequently, the

basic expression of man•s primary experience is--Have a oare 1 here
is something that matters.

The primary

11mmer1n

of

l8o
reveals Something that matters.

The fundamental basis of this

description is that a person's experience is a value-experience,
expressing a vague sense of a power maintaining and realizing its
own purpose.

The essence of power is the drive of the person

towards aesthetic worth for its own sake.

This worth is not a

feeling which man arbitrarily attributes to his grasp of reality.
Rather, the drive towards worth is felt as exhibiting the very
essence ot actualities in the universe.
(b) Logical consistency of Whitehead's rationalism alao
upholds his oonoept or importance as embedded in matter ot fact.
The upholding or objectivity in scientific and reflective thought
as an ideal is the insistence upon the importance of objectivity
tor man.

Man's zeal for matter-of-tact truth irrespective ot sub-

jective human interests and values presupposes that true descriptions of matter of fact are very important for objective human
interests and values.

Consequently, matter-of-fact as objectively

known is important for man.
(11) and (111) Whitehead holds that the sense of Something that matters differentiates itself into the inter-connected
values ot Interna.11ty (self) and Externality (others).

His des-

cription in Modes .2.f Thought auooesafully exhibits that evidence
in terms of perception in the mode of causal efficacy.

The sense

ot Something that matters is most clear in Internality, the selfteeling of its emotional worth now.

This is the self feeling the
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drive of the person towards aesthetic worth for its own sake.

How·

ever, the self does not feel this apart from its causal derivation
from its past (External1ty) nor apart from its tendency to causally affect its future (Externality).

The self's value-experience

now embodies in itslef value-experiences from the past.

The most

explicit example of derivation from the valuable past occurs in
memory, in the self's awareness of its past actuality as fusing
its self-enjoyment with its immediate present.

The self also has

the feeling that it has something important to express to others
in the immediate future.

This 11 the feeling that the self's im-

portance now should bedome part of the importance

or

others.

Both

the past and the future of the self disclose evidence for the value of others (Externality) in the world. 2 Importance, limited to
the self alone, solus ipse, ceases to be important.
conviction in and sense

or

The self's

importance, Something that matters, is

intelligible only if the self's importance continues and develops
the importance

or

the past and prepares tor the 1mportanoe of the

future.3
2 Ot. Al• pp. 375-376: "Oare for the future of personal existence, regret or pride in its past, are alike feelings
which leap beyond the bounds of the sheer actuality of the present~

) Of. !,! 1 PP• 371•372: ttthe egoistic desire for.tame •
• • 1s an inversion of the social impulse, and yet presuppose• it.
• • • In the widest sense, it _Lthe egoistic desire for tmrel ia
the craving for sympathy. It involves the feeling that eaob act
of experience is a central reality, claiming all things as its
own. The world has then no justification except as a satisfaction
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(1v) Whitehead holds that the sense of Something that
matters differentiates itself into the interconnected values of
Internality, Externality, and T_otalitz.

Whitehead claims that

the self (Internality) feels itself as deriving from the Totality
of value-experience of the past and as preparing its contribution
for the Jotality of VRlue-experienoe of the future.

This aspect

of the religious intuition is the most d1ff1oult to give evidence
for•

This aspect of the religious intuition is that there is a

unity in the universe whioh unifies the many past value-experiences into Totality and which shares this value of the Totality with
present and future value-experiences.

Whitehead 1 a intuition is

that only Deity, immanent in experience as the ultimate preserving
unification of value-experiences and aa the source of the world's
unity of ideals, could make intelligible the unity of the transcendent universe for the preservation of values realized and for
the ideals ot the universe.

Immanent in experienoe as the unifi-

cation of value-experiences, Deity is the Totality which 1a direct·
ly experienced.

Immanent in experience as the source of ideals,

1.e., ot potential values to be realized, Deity is the external
•tandard to which human experience explicitly relates itself.
Whitehead hes attempted to establish general evidence for

of suoh claims. But the ~oint is that the desire for admiring
lttention beoomes futile except in the presence of an audience
rit to render it."
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Deity as the Totality of value-experiences and as the source ot
ideals.

Thia public evidence is the obviousness of the unifica-

tion of value-experiences and the obviousness of the unity of the
ideals of value-experience.

To establish this as generally evi-

dent Whitehead must answer the following objections:

how does he

know that the unitioation of values achieved is a unification in
taot and not in imagination, and how does he know that there is
one source or all the ideals in the universe?
The best answers to these two questions are Whitehead's
appeals to •modes or experience which in some degree are exception·
al.

It must be remembered that the present level of average wak-

ing human experience was at one time exceptional among the ancestors of mankind."4

Oonsequently, Whitehead believes he is justi-

fied "in appealing to those modes of experience which in our di·
reot Judgment stand above the average level.".$

Whitehead appeals

to the experience ot Peace to establish that the unification of
value-experiences is a unification in fact, and he appeals to the
experience or unselfish love to establish that there 1s a unified
~inality

to the universe.
"Peace • • • is a broadening of feeling due to the emer-

gence ot some deep metaphysical insight, unverbalized and yet mo-

4 £,
5 !!·

p. 379.
p. 380.
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mentous in its coordination

.2f values. " 6 In the midst of the

passing away of temporal beauty and heroism, "Peace is • • • the
intuition of permanence.n7
vation by Deity

or

Peace ia the intuition of the preser-

values achieved in the universe.

If the unifi-

cation were simply a deliberately imagined unification, the resulting feeling would be the "bastard substitute" of Peace, "Anaestheaia. "8

Anaesthesia is the withdrawal of the self from life

of the universe, whereas the experience of Peace coordinates the
value-activity of the self with the value-activity of others and
of the Totality.

Since the unification of values achieved in the

universe is experienced as !'actual, "Peace is self-control at its
widest, --at the width wae:re • • • interest has been transferred
to coordinations wider than personality. • • •
is • • • the love of mankind as such. ,,9

One of its fruits

The experience of unselfish love helps to establish that
there is a unified finality to the universe.
should be distinguished from selfish love.

Unselfish love
In selfish love, "all

personal desire is transferred to the thing loved, as a desire for
its perfeotion.nlO

Thia love excludes the rest of the universe;

6

y,

p. 367 (my emphasis).

1

AI.

p. 369.

.!!1
9 ,g,

p. 368 •

8

p. 368.

10 AI· P· 372.
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the self is simply "clinging to a condition for selfish happiness.
There is no transoendenoe ot personality.nll

But unselfish love

is:
• • • the love of self-devotion where the potentialities
of the loved object are felt passionately as a claim that it
find itself in a friendly Universe. Such love is really an
intense feeling as to how the harmony of the world should be
realized in particular objects. It is the feeling as to what
would happen if right could triumph in a beautitul world,
with discord routed. • • • Suoh love is distracting, nerveraoking. But, unless darkened by utter despair, it involves
deep feeling of an ai~ in the Universe, winning such triumph
as is possible to 1t.i2
Unselfish love involves a deep feeling of a unified f1nali ty towards value in the Univ.rse because such love hopes that
the potentialities of the loved object find their actualization in
a friendly, harmonious universe.

Whitehead has appealed to the ex·

periences of Peaoe and unselfish love to establish the factuality

ot unification of value experiences and the unified finality of
the world.
Whitehead's appeal to such exceptional experiences needs
to be supplemented by an appeal to more ordinary experiences.

Thii

further appeal is found in Whitehead's indication that the sense
of Deity, the sense ot the interconnected values of self, others,
and the whole, is the presupposition of moral and speculative experience.

Although Whitehead recognizes the relativity of moral

11

Al·

p.

373.

12 _!!, p. 373.

186
•'

codes whioh men have oonstruoted, he argues that ''what these codes
do witness to, and what their interpretation by seers of various
races throughout history does witness to, is the aim at social
perifeotion. nl3

This sooial per.feotion is "an abiding perfection·

in the nature of things, a treasure for all ages. It is not a romance or thought, it is a fact of Nature." 1 4 The general principles underlying all moral codes are "the principles

or

the gener-

ality of harmony, and of the importance of the individual. The
first means •order,• and the second means 'love•." 15 The apparent
oontlict between impersonal order and personal love is solved: (a)
by valuing those orders in the degree in which they succeed in

promoting worth of individual actualities; and (b) by valuing the
individual in so far as he achieves ett'.!lf-worth and also promotes

those valuable orders which themselves promote the worth ot 1nd1v1duals.16

"The essence of Peace is that the individual," whose

or

value 1• tounded upon the religious intuition, "thereby
is extending the 1nfluenoe of the source of all order." 17

seeking

Just as moral experience presupposes and points obscure•

13 AI, P• 375.

14 .!!.
15

p. 375.

,!!, p. 376.

16 ! j , pp. 376-377.

17 !!1 p. 377.
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ly to the abiding value of the Tmtality, so also speoulat1ve reason's attempt to state objective truth presupposes and points obscurely to the objective structure of the Totality.

Whitehead's

Roycean argument fo~ the primordial and consequent natures ot God
is based on the sense of Deity.

18 Man believes that objective

truth is possible because man has the sense that there is some
structure to which all his judgments more or less adequately approximate.

This sense of reality as a whole discloses to man that

all his judgments are trying to express the realities {achieved
values) which Totality objectively preserves and unities.

Because

the arguments from moral and speculative experience are interpretations of experienoe and of the interpretations of those inter-

preta tions, these argumentations need to be completed by a systematic metaphysics.

In fact, the way in which Whitehead has stated

his Royoean argument and concluded to the actuality of God's primordial and consequent natures indicates that it cannot be properly discussed outside

or

his appeal to a variety

his systematic metaphysics.

or

evidences tor

Oonsequently, although Thompson did

not recognize the sense of Deity as Whitehead's attempt to make
the religious intuition generally evident, Thompson is oorrect to
nave emphasized Whitehead's metaphysical concept of God as an interpretation of his description of the religious intuition.

18

or.

oh. 2, pp. 102-105.

White-
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head explicitly points out that

11

1t is impossible to tix the sense

of fundamental terms except by reference to some definite metaphysical way of conceiving the most penetrating description of the
universe.

Thus rational religion must have recourse to metaphys-

ics !'or a scrutiny of its terms. 11 19

2.

Hartshorne•s Interpretation J21: Whitehead
Hartshorne identifies himself as an interpreter of White

head who has recognized a problem in Whitehead's claim that the
method of philosophy by description
sary truths. 20

2£ experience attains neces-

Hartshorne has tried to work out a solution ot

this problem in g~neral harmony with Whitehead's thought. 21

Harts·

home's problem can be solved by appealing to the sense of Deity.

For the difficulty which he raises is the very same difficulty
raised in chapter tihne about Whitehead's assumption that necessary
truths oan be had from

since what does not communicate
with experience is simply unknowable. 22 For Whitehead points out
~xper1enae

that the sense or Deity is that "starting point in philosophy"
w'hioh "is the determination of that aspect of experience which

19 fil:l, p. 79.
20

Charles Hartshorne, "Whitehead and Contemporary

21

Hartshorne, loc. o1t.

Philosophy, 11 'I1he Relevance of Whitehead, ed. Lealerc, p. 35; o~.
_!!H, p. 88; l!!, pp. 3-6.

22

--
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most fully exhibits the universal necessities of existenoe. 02 3
This starting point in Whitehead's metephysios 1s both
and neoessa!'I.
experience.

desoriptiv~

It is descriptive since it is based on immediate

Also, it is necessary since the sense of Deity dia-

oloses Totality as the ultimate source and end ot all particular
actualities.

As chapter three pointed out, this experience justi-

ties Whitehead's assumption that the universe of experience has an
essence which forbids relationships beyond itself as a violation
of its aesthetic harmony, its rationality.

Accordingly, specula-

tive philosophy is justified in its method of attempting to reach
necessary truths in descriptive intuitions of immediate experience.

It oan work no other way since it must criticize abstrac-

tions only by 1ntu1 t1ona of imm.edia te experience.

However, as

chapter one pointed out, speculative philosophy must avoid the
dogrre.tio fallacy which is the belief that the principles
working hypothesis are clear, obvious, and irreformable.

or

its

Specula·

tive philosophy must embody the method of the working hypothesis
since its first principles are the very elements which speoulative
reason is trying to grasp.

Consequently, tor Whitehead, there is

always a tentativeness to the claim that a necessary or metaphysical truth has been disclosed in an intuition of immediate exper1ence.

23 _!!, p. 155.
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It is primarily in terms of Whitehead's criterion of the
working hypothesis that
be evaluated.

Ha~tshorne's

solution to the problem will

In order to solve the problem of how metaphysical

truths may be both experiential (descriptive) and necessary,

Harts~

home proposes a notion of metaphysical truth based on logical
consistency.

"Metaphysical truths may be described as such that

no experience can contradict them, but also such that any experience must illustrate them."24

He defends logical consistency with

every experience as the criterion
by distinguishing three kinds

or

of~

priori metaphysical truth

statements:

(1) those partially

restrictive of existential possibilities; (2) those completely restrictive; and (J) those completely non-restrictive.
(1) Partially restrictive statements are illustrated by
ordinary factual statements.

If they are affirmative, they im-

plicitly deny something, thereby restricting some existential poaaibili ty from being realized at the same time and place; and it
they are negative, they implicitly affirm somAthing.

For example,

to affirm that there are men in the room is to deny 1mpl1o1tly
that the room is totally filled with air; and to deny that there
are men in the room is to affirm implicitly that every part or the
room contains something other than a man_ 25

Review

24

Hartshorne, "Some Empty Though Important Truths,"

.2.! Metaphysics, VIII, no. 4 (June, 1955) p. 557.
25 Hartshorne, 11Metaphys1cal Statements as Non-Restric-
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(2) A completely restrictive statement is one such as,
'Nothing exists,' which would exclude anything and everything trom
existing.

This statement restricts any existential possibility

from being realized.

Consequently, such a statement is unverifi-

able, since the verifying experience itself would have to exist.
Also, such a statement is falsifiable, sinoe the existence of any

experience at all falsifies the statement.

Accordingly, a com-

pletely restrictive statement is impossible to verify and always
falsifiable sinoe it is not consistent with the existence of any
experience.

Hartshorne suggests that the more plausible view ot

such statements is that they express 'impossibility• and not 'a
conceivable but unrealized faot•. 26

(3) A completely non-restrictive statement is one which
is consistent with the existence of any experience.
ment would be, 'Something exists.'

Such a state-

Since this is the contradio-

torr of the completely restrictive statement, 'Nothing exists,• it
should be necessarily true.

For a completely restrictive state-

ment is impossible, and the contradictory of an impossible statement is necessar7.

In contrast to the completely restrictive

statement whioh was unverifiable and alwars falsifiable, the completely non-restrictive statement is always verifiable and unfal-

tive and Existential,"·Review E.f. Metaphysics, XII, no. 1 (Sept.,

1958) p. 35.

26

Ibid.
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s1t1able.

The statement, •something exists,• is unfalsifiable and

always verifiable, since the supposed falsifying experience would
itself have to exist and would thereby verity it rather than falsity it.

Accordingly, Hartshorne proposes that a statement which

is unfalsifiable and always verifiable by the existence of any

experience is the criterion of metaphysical truth.

A

metaphysical

truth as a completely non-restrictive statement is to be discerned
through its properties of being unfalsifiable and always verifiable by any experienoe. 27
Hartshorne views metap<hysios as studying non-restrioti ve
existential affirmations in contrast to mathematics which studies
non-restrictive, non-existential affirmations.

Mathematical state

ments, as usually interpreted, affirm, not that something with a
certain character exists, but that if it did, such and such would
also be the oase.

Mathematics explores relations between possibilities without affirming that possibility exists. 2 8 In contras~
"metaphysics tries to

expr~ss

what

~

possibilities ot existence

have in common excluding blank non-existence as an impossibility.~~
Metaphysics explores being qua being, namely the strictly universal features of the ultimate realities, those features which oan-

27

l'E,!g., pn. 35-36.

-Ibid.

28 Ibid.
29

19)

not be unexemplified, such as the statemtnt, 'Something ex!sts.t30
Sinoe the prooos1t1on, •something exigts,• is necessary,
Hartshorne

a~gues

that the contemporary dogma is wrong which as-

serts that a statement is rendered contingent by the mere faot
that it asserts existence.

For the false dogma, •all existential

statements are oonting$nt,• the following true principle should
be substituted, 'all partially restrictive statAments are oonting~nt

and all completely non-restrictive statements are neoes-

sary.131

The criterion for a metaphysical truth is whether or not

positive illustration

or

the proposition is inconsistent with,

that is, would exclude, anything positive.
physical,

~

This criterion

or

meta

Er1or1 truth may ba incapable of clear and certain

application by man•s cognitive powers.

But such a difficulty

would not make metqphysical truth unknowable in itself.

For what

is oommon to all possible worlds is certainly included in the
present actual world; it is only a matter of trying to identify
the metaphysical elements, which again may be qt1ite diffioult.3 2

Hartshorne•s proposal for determining metaphysical truth
in

an~

Erior1 way through consistency with every possible experi-

ence is in fundamental agreement with Whitehead's comments on

30

~ ••

p.

37.

31 .!219.·· pp. 35-37.
32 Hartshorne, "Some Empty Though Important Truths,"

.21:?•

.2.!S·· pp. 556-551.

194
metaphysios and consistency.

For Whitehead does hold that meta-

physical truths are necessary truths which apply to every possible
and aotual experienoe.33

Further, Whitehead agrees with basing

logio upon the conoept of oonsistenoy-1noons1atenoy.
cy introduces Spinoza's concept of tinitude.

Inconsisten-

The finite is neces-

sarily inconsistent with some other state of affairs, since limitedness to a square, for example, prevents the finite reality
from being at the same time a circle.

Inconsistency as the basis

for logic is a fundamental principle of Whitehead's metaphysical
understanding

or

reality in

pro~eas.

By means of process, the

universe can escape from the exclusions

or

finite inoonsistenoy.34

In other words, Whitehead has stated that the criterion
of a non-metaphys1oal proposition is that it excludes the simultaneous realization

or

another meaningful proposition.

According•

ly, Hartshorne agrees with Whitehead in proposing that partially
restrictive propositions, that is, ordinary tactual statements,
are contingently true, whereas oompletely non-restr1ot1ve proposi•

33 ]!, pp.

5-6.

34 ]!!, PP• 72-73, 75: "The oonoept that two propositions, which we will name J2 a..~d _g, are inconsistent, must mean
that in the modes of togetherness illustrated in some presupposed
environment the meaning of the propositions R and ~ cannot both
occur. Neither meaning may occur or either may occur, but not
both. Now process is the way by whioh the universe escapes from
the exclusions of inconsistency.rt
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tions, that is, metaphysical statements exempl:t!'iable by any possible exper:tenoe, are necessarily true.
However, Hartshorne•s

~

priorJ method for discovering

metaphysical truths appears to violate White.head's method or the
working hypothesis.

Por Hartshorne argues that all metaphysical

truths are implied by the fundamental, metaphysical truth •some-

thing exists.•

He seems to be saying that a simple analysis o!'

that proposition will disclose "Within its meaning all the metaphysical trutha."35

However, that procedure is not what Harts-

horne is proposing, but rather exEerimentation with meanings of
propositions to discover those propositions which are completely
non-restrictive.

He explicitly rejects the fallacious notion

that insights into the absolute must be absolute insights, that

1~

that insights into metaphysical truths must be unqualified insights.

Any insight into a metaphysioal truth should be accepted

not as an absolute, never to be reconsidered, but rather as an
hypothesis to be considered in light or its deductive 1mplioationa
and of how well it fits into all man's experience.

Accepted as

hypotheses, such insights should be defended against a vigorous
devil's advooqte.
~s

Such insights should be expanded by deduction

a way of testing the insights by examining the self-evidence

and testability or their oonsequences.36

Hartshorne's procedure

__

35 Hartshorne, "Metaphysical Statements as Non-Restrictive and Existential," .22• ,gj!. P• 37.
36 Hartshorne, Man's Vision ....................
or God and the Lo2io of
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is to experiment with such insights by trying to find those which
are

~

Rr1or1 consistent in mutually implying each other and in

being completely non-restrictive and which are exemplified
teriori in all experienoes.37

~

pos-

Therefore, Hartshorne•a procedure

does embody the Whiteheadian method of the working hypothesis.
Hartshorne's exemplification of his method should help
to clarify his procedure.

He proposes that the following proposi-

tions are oomfletely non-restrictive (metaphysically true} and mutually imply eaob other:
Necessarily, something exists.
Necessarily, experience occurs.
Necessarily, creative synthesis occurs.
Necessarily, there are concrete actualities all of
which are both externally and internally related, both absolute and relative.
f!;.J Necessarily, divine or infallible expe~Senoe, having
fallible experiences among its objects, oocurs.J

(1) The statement, 'something exists,• has been aonsid·
ered with regard to its complete non-restrictiveness.

It excludes

nothing except bare nothing itself, and the existence of bare
ing is no existence.

not~

Further, the statement is in principle un-

falsifiable and always verifiable by any existent experience which
would grasp its meaning, since the experience itself exists.

Theism (Hamden:
37

As

Arohon Books, 1964} pp. 68-70.

Ibid., pp. 71-72. Or. Hartshorne, A Natural 111seolQOpen Court, 1967} pp. 29-31.
-

SI !2.;: Our Time (LaSalle:

38 Hartshorne, "Metaphysical Statements as Non-Restrictive and Existential," .21?~ ci~., p. 47.

197
consistent with every possible state of affairs, the statement is
necessarily true.
(2) The statement, •experience ooours,• is in principle
unfalsifiable and always verifiable by any existent experience,
since the experience itself exists.

The statement does not appear

to exclude any existential possibility.

For 'experience' is not

to be taken in the sense of human or animal experience but in the
metaphysical sense which Hartshorne and Whitehead propose.

The

existence of human experience would exclude at that same time the
existential realization of a world without human experience, but
the existence of experience itself does not exolude any possible
state of affairs from ooourring.39

For in Whitehead's and Harts-

horne's view, an act of experienoe is an appropriate way ot oonoeptualizing actual entities, the ultimately real things which
constitute the world.40

Accordingly, Hartlshorne concludes that

this line of thought "strongly suggests, and I think proves that
it Litatement (217 1s necessarily true, or an~ Rriori valid
statement. • • •

I conclude, that if the statemtnt • • • ls re-

str1ct1ve, there is no way to ascertain this.

I think it is non-

restrictive, and so neoessary.n4l

39 !219.·· pp. 38-39.

40 .f!!,

p.

28.

4l Hartshorne, "Metaphysical Statements as Non-Restric•
tive and Existential, ..21?• ~., PP• 38-39.
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Hartshorne has stated his conclusion about the necessary
truth of statement (2) in a tentative way.

'l'his tentativeness is

appropriate since the statement presupposes that the oonoept ot
experience can be generalized from human and animal experience
to an analogous concept consistent with every possible state of
affairs.

The devil's advocate in the court ot metaphysical in-

quiry should attack such a presupoosition, and Hartshorne would be
required to defend it at some length.

A convincing defense, tor

example, would have to show how such a generalization would help
make emergent evolution inteiligible.42 Without suoh a defense,
the Whiteheadian metaphys1o1an cannot be sure that the generalization is VPlid, that is, consistent with any possible state of affairs.

Without testing the application ot the generalization to

reality, Hartshorne runs into the difficulty that his criterion ot
metaphysical,

~

priori truth may be incapable of olear and certain

application with regard to the statement, •experience occurs.•
The mere application of the criterion, the simple non-contradictoriness of a oonoept which is completely non-restrictive of any
possible state of affairs, to the concept, •experience occurs,'
is not sufficient for judging it to be metaphysically true.43

The

mind is left with the desire that verification be had in which the

42 er. !Ji, PP· 3.34.
43 Hartshorne, "Metaphysical

tive and Existential," .2.12• cit., p. 39.
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oonoept is aotually seen to be applied meaningfully to various
different states ot affairs.
The same diffioulty raised with regard to the claim that
statement (2) is necessarily true can be raised with regard to
statements (3) and (4), •creative synthesis ooours,• and 'there
are concrete actualities all of which are both externally and internally related, both absolute and relative.•
successful applicAtion of the criterion

or

The apparently

metaphysical,

~

eriori

truth does not suffice to judge these statements as necessarily
true.44

The mind is left with the desire that verifications be

had in which the concepts are meaningfully applied to various different states of affairs.

In light of these reflections, Harts-

horne• a procedure for determining metaphysical truth by

an~

pri-

..2!:! criterion is a valid Whiteheadian development of the method ot
the working hypothesis; but Hartshorne•s procedure needs to be
supplemented by the inductive method Whitehead himselt used.
It is in this light that Hartshorne•s methodological
commitment to the redoing of Anselm's ontological argument must be
judged.

Hartshorne•s redoing of the argument is valid according

to his Whiteheadian criterion of metaphysical truth as completely
non-restrictive.

In fact, it would be a dis-confirmation of White·

head's theism if it were

44

~., pp.

impossible~

39-43.

Rriori to form a concept ot
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Whitehead's God as a non-oontradictory possibility which was com•
pletely non-restriotive.45

However, as Hartshorne himself points

out, the whole burden of asserting the existence ot God as a meta
physical truth should not be placed on the ontological argument,
since other approaches are available in Whiteheadian metaphysics.
All such approaches, including the ontological argument, should
be used as mutually confirming each other.46
The brief defense outlined in this section is only a
suggestion of the full defense which Hartshorne recognizes should
be given for a criterion of

~

priori metaphysical truths.

A

thorough consideration of symbolic logic and the philosophy of
symbolic logic and of the nature of contingent and necessary
truths needs to be developed.47

Consequently. Hartshorne•a pro-

posal is a reformable, human attempt to identify the criterion of
~

priori metaphys1oal truth.

Both Christian and Leclerc, on the

one hand, and Hartshorne, on the other, are correct to emphasize

45

Ct. Hartshorne, ! Natural !lieolosz,

~p.

33•43.

46 Of. Hartshorne• Man's Vision 2£ God, pp. 339-340.
One way in which Hartshorne redoes the ontological argument is hi
appeal to the Royoean argument which Whitehead himself accepts.
Any attempt to state an objectively true statement, even the posi
t1v1st attempt to deny meaning to the concept ot God, necessarily
establishes the exiatenoe ot God as the orit1oal judge of all
judgments. Consequently, tor Hartshorne suoh positivism is
necessarily false, and theism necessarily true.
Hartshorne, The Log1o of Perfection, P• 70; "Metaphysical Statements as Non-Ri'Strictlve-and liistential," .2R• Ji!.,
p. 45.
47

Hartshorne, The Lo io of Perfection
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the tentativeness, the contingency, of any claim to metaphysical
truth, whether the truth be proposed inductively by analogous
generalization and verifioation in experience ror Christian and
Leolero, or deductively by analogous generalization and experimentation with such axioms in

an~ prior~

way by Hartshorne.

For

the tentativeness ot philosophical insight and argument is the
basic principle speeulative reason must rollow in attempting to
£u1r111 its funotion.
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